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The Need to Reform Nigeria’s Plea Bargaining System
When plea bargaining was introduced into Nigerian criminal jurisprudence, it was welcomed with considerable optimism as a tool for expediting justice, recovering assets, and encouraging accountability. Some politicians and businessmen, however, viewed it with caution. In its early years, the mechanism was used to rein in a number of erring public officials, former Governors, Bank executives, and business figures. In more recent years, there has been a noticeable decline in the use of plea bargains. This raises two questions: has confidence in the process eroded, or has the mechanism been undermined by those it was designed to hold accountable? In this Discourse, Joseph Bodunrin Daudu, SAN; Anthony George-Ikoli, SAN; Kingsley Jesuorobo; Chief Anthony Malik, SAN; Dr Monday Ubani, SAN and Norrison Quakers, SAN, examine the issues
Declining Use of the Plea Bargain Feature in Our Criminal Justice System
Joseph Bodunrin Daudu, SAN
When the Administration of Criminal Justice Act was enacted in 2015 (ACJA), one of the innovations it came with was the ‘Plea Bargain’ system. Historically, in criminal trials conducted in sophisticated climes, the procedure, which allows the State, the Defendant and Courts to shorten a criminal trial and reach a conclusion satisfactory to all sides, is called a plea bargain. This meant and as captured in ACJA that, the Prosecution will protect the interest of the Federation, while the Defence counsel or Defendant would project the interest of the Defence, and finally the court acting as an Arbiter projects and protects the interest of the society.
We are not here concerned with the practice and procedure associated with the practice of plea bargain, as set out in the law. We are here, concerned with its dwindling influence in contemporary Nigerian criminal jurisprudence.
Example of Plea Bargain
If a man is accused of laundering money to the tune of say N10 billion and the predicate offence is ‘Criminal Breach of Trust’, that is, he helped himself with government funds and in the process established a shipping company with many boats and small ferries for sale at a profit. In Court, all the parties realised that a full trial would not be beneficial to any of the parties because, in some instance, certain key features of the prosecution would be incomplete or unavailable, and for the Defence certain features of his defence would unavailable to free him comprehensively. The law therefore, allows for Plea bargain usually, to reach or strike a balance where Defendants do not go to prison and he regurgitates or vomits 80%/50% of asset therefore seized, could be returned to the coffers of the State, the asset having appreciated in value during the intervening period.
This is an example of the Plea Bargain, the dilemma faced with the system as at today is that, it is not attractive to the State again, and even the Defence for a variety of reasons. All the stakeholders as identified by the provisions of Section 270 of ACJA do not subscribe to the Plea Bargain procedure for a variety of reasons. So, the real issue here is, ‘Why did Plea Bargain lose its attraction, if it ever had one or worked’?
Loss of Attraction of Plea Bargain
Firstly, we must examine the attitude of the Prosecution and the purpose of the chief prosecuting agency for financial cases which is the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Perhaps, unknown to it, the EFCC has assumed a larger than life/draconian stature and to justify its super status, it wants to win financial cases at all cost. In most cases, it comes from the angle of superiority and a ‘know it all’ platform. The agency is therefore, not ready in most cases, to reach a compromise with the Defendant, which is what plea bargain is all about.
Secondly, the modus operandi in crime management, crime detection and crime prosecution of the EFCC, is to assume a righteous disposition and that the Defendant is a demon; a blood thirsty financial criminal, so, from the moment the EFCC receives a petition against the Defendant, it begins to demonise the said Defendant calling him all sorts of names such as ‘looter of treasury’ , ‘enemies of the peoples’ etc. Even after the Defendant is charged to court, bail is vehemently opposed. This is despite the fact that the Constitution says that Bail is a right, and can be granted based on the Defendant’s constitutional presumption of innocence that inures in his favour.
The long and short of it all is that, bail is usually very toxic under the supervision of the EFCC, at that stage, the Defendant who has been demonised or maltreated by the EFCC will never agree to a Plea Bargain. This is because, at that stage, the Plea Bargain would merely be confirming that the Defendant is indeed, a criminal.
Thirdly, and characteristic of the EFCC – it places the Defendant in a position of double jeopardy, simultaneous with the criminal trial, the EFCC is known in almost all cases of money laundering, to engage the same court in civil forfeiture proceedings of the same properties that are the subject-matter of a criminal trial. Thus, in one breath, the EFCC is treating those assets in issue as a product of crime with the standard of proof being reasonable doubt, and it is, in another breath, within the same trial, treating the assets connected with the trial simultaneously as objects of civil forfeiture proceedings with a standard of proof which is considerably lower that is, on a balance of probability. So, usually the outcome of such unholy alliance is that, heads or tail, the Defendant roped in such a situation must lose his assets, rightly or wrongly.
So, there have been many situations where EFCC loses the criminal case, and retains the asset and properties which are subject-matter of the same criminal proceeding it lost through a dubious civil proceedings. Now because these unconstitutional/demonising measures are in favour of the EFCC, they are unwilling to go into Plea Bargain because most times, they are on top of the game and there is no incentive for them to engage in any Plea Bargain.
A plea Bargain can only operate in an atmosphere of prosecutorial candour and humility, judicial fairness or boldness and the last leg of the tripod sincerity of purpose by the Defence. We must therefore, safely conclude that Plea Bargain is dead as a result of present prosecution.
Joseph Bodunrin Daudu, SAN, former NBA President
Plea Bargaining in Nigeria: Usefulness, Effectiveness and Prosecution of Former Political Office Holders
Anthony George-Ikoli, SAN
Abstract
Plea bargaining remains a lawful and potentially valuable component of Nigeria’s criminal process, but its legitimacy depends on whether negotiated outcomes are evidence-based, voluntary, proportionate and publicly defensible. It can secure convictions, conserve scarce trial capacity, protect witnesses and accelerate recovery. Its failures in prominent public-corruption matters, especially where a modest sentence appeared to accompany enormous public loss, damaged confidence and weakened the perceived force of deterrence. Yet, the record is not reducible to notorious first-instance outcomes. In Yakubu v Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Supreme Court affirmed appellate intervention that replaced an inadequate plea-related sentence with consecutive custodial terms and substantial fines. Federal practice is also now governed by the 2023 Plea Bargaining Guidelines for Federal Prosecutors, a development absent from earlier drafts. The appropriate course is neither unqualified retention, nor wholesale abolition. Nigeria should implement and strengthen the existing framework, clarify its statutory ambiguities, publish decisions and outcome data, and use property-focused forfeiture alongside criminal prosecution. Deferred prosecution agreements may be considered for corporate offenders through future legislation, but they are no substitute for individual accountability.
Introduction
Plea bargaining is a negotiated resolution in which an accused person agrees to plead guilty, commonly to an agreed charge or factual basis, in exchange for a prosecutorial concession. It is attractive to a justice system burdened by delay and complex financial investigations; it is also troubling where bargaining obscures the true criminality, transfers bargaining power to wealthy Defendants, or produces a sentence that trivialises public harm. For a former political office holder, the central question is not whether status should exclude ordinary process, but whether the State can investigate and prosecute with sufficient independence, skill and speed to make the law real.
The Nigerian Legal Framework
At Federal level, Section 270 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 (ACJA) authorises a prosecutor to receive, consider or offer a plea bargain. The provision contemplates bargaining where the prosecution evidence is insufficient to prove the charged offence beyond reasonable doubt, the Defendant agrees to return proceeds or make restitution, or a conspirator fully cooperates against other offenders.
The prosecutor must assess public interest, public policy, justice and prevention of abuse of process; consult the investigator and victim or representative and afford the victim an opportunity to make representations. The agreement must be written, fully state its terms and admissions, record advice on silence and be signed by the Defendant and Counsel, among others.
The court’s role is substantive. It questions the Defendant in court, tests whether the plea admits the allegation and was voluntary, and determines whether the Defendant can be convicted on it. It may impose the agreed sentence, a lesser sentence, or notify the Defendant that a heavier sentence is warranted. If the Defendant then withdraws, the case proceeds de novo before another Judge and negotiation admissions are inadmissible. A Judge is therefore, not bound to endorse the parties’ proposed penalty. Section 270 also provides that judgement following an accepted agreement is final, except where fraud is alleged, making meaningful scrutiny at first instance particularly important.
The constitutional setting includes the fair-hearing and presumption-of-innocence guarantees in Section 36, and prosecutorial powers under Sections 174 and 211. The Attorney-General of the Federation and State Attorneys-General must exercise their powers with regard to public interest, the interests of justice and prevention of abuse of process. A plea requires a knowing and voluntary waiver of trial rights, access to competent counsel, and the court’s inquiry are safeguards, not formalities. ACJA operates in Federal courts and the FCT, while the State criminal procedure is governed by each State’s legislation, so the applicable State law must be checked in State prosecutions.
An important development corrects earlier claims that Federal plea bargaining lacked published standards. The Attorney-General of the Federation’s Plea Bargaining Guidelines for Federal Prosecutors, 2023 prescribe approval and documentation procedures, written reasons, consultation, recorded negotiations, factual accuracy, proportionality and consideration of victims. For financial crimes, they require surrender or forfeiture of proceeds or equivalent value, or restitution as appropriate. They call for full disclosure of illicit gains, agreements reflecting the seriousness and extent of the offence, and enabling a commensurate sentence. These are existing Federal prosecutorial guidelines, not a universal sentencing code; they apply to Section 270 ACJA matters, permit written exceptions in specified circumstances, and do not automatically govern State prosecutions.
There is a drafting tension, requiring legislative clarification. Section 270(2) locates bargaining during or after prosecution evidence but before defence evidence, while subsection (4) contemplates an agreement before plea; the 2023 Guidelines allow negotiations before charge and at later pre-defence stages. Guidelines cannot override an Act. Parliament should state clearly when the statutory power may be exercised, and align the procedure with the Guidelines. State legislatures and Attorneys-General should separately review their own laws, and issue public rules suitable to their jurisdictions.
Does Plea Bargaining Remain Useful?
Yes, but only as a controlled procedural option. A guilty plea can conclude a case sooner than a contested trial, spare witnesses repeated attendance, reduce pre-trial detention and release court time for matters that require proof. In intricate fraud and corruption cases, a co-operator may provide evidence against higher-level participants, while a negotiated admission can secure a conviction where trial evidence is at risk of deterioration. A plea can also secure timely restitution and forfeiture, though the value, ownership and transfer of recovered property must be verified rather than assumed.
These benefits are conditional. Efficiency is not justice if a charge is reduced below the provable conduct, if a plea is extracted from a detainee seeking release, if the victim’s interests are ignored, or if recovery is exchanged for a token penalty without a defensible sentencing rationale. Nor does an agreement cure an inadequate investigation. It can conceal evidential weakness or poor asset tracing, as readily as it can save resources. Properly used, bargaining complements trial; it cannot be the principal policy for prosecuting high-level corruption.
How Effective has it been?
The defensible assessment is mixed, and necessarily qualitative. Publicly available material does not provide a consistent national dataset linking plea agreements to charge reductions, sentences, net assets actually recovered, victims compensated, compliance defaults and later appellate outcomes. Conviction counts or headline recovery values alone, cannot establish effectiveness. Any confident national claim that bargaining has been “moderately effective” in recovery or “largely ineffective” in deterrence exceeds the evidence, unless supported by comparable outcome data.
The prominent cases, nevertheless, reveal both the risk and the possibility of correction. In the Police-pension prosecution of John Yusuf Yakubu, the trial court imposed a two-year term on each of three counts, concurrently, with an option of N250,000 per count, alongside forfeiture. The Court of Appeal substituted consecutive custodial terms, and very substantial fines; the Supreme Court affirmed that intervention. The decision warns against treating forfeiture as an adequate substitute for punishment, or assuming that an agreement controls sentencing. It also demonstrates that appellate review can correct a plea-related sentence, although the correction came years after the original judgement.
Earlier cases involving former Governor Lucky Igbinedion of Delta State, former Inspector-General of Police, Tafa Balogun and Bank Executive, Cecilia Ibru, became emblematic of public concern about charge reductions, short custodial sentences and the relationship between punishment and recovered assets. They remain important to public confidence, but descriptions of sums and terms differ across contemporary reports and should not be treated as a complete measure of the agreements or amounts ultimately realised. The stronger conclusion is institutional: a process whose reasons, factual basis and compliance record are not readily accessible, invites the inference that influential Defendants receive a different measure of justice.
Full trials do not offer a frictionless alternative. The prosecutions of former Governors Joshua Dariye of Plateau State and Jolly Nyame of Taraba State, took many years to reach conviction; the proceedings against Orji Uzor Kalu of Abia State were nullified after the Supreme Court held that a Judge elevated to the Court of Appeal couldn’t continue as a Federal High Court Judge under Section 396(7) ACJA in the face of the Constitution. Ude Jones Udeogu v FRN turned on judicial competence, not the merits of the corruption allegations. These cases establish that, delay and procedural failure can defeat conventional prosecution. They do not prove that every trial is preferable, or that bargaining is indispensable; they show the need to improve both tracks.
Should Plea Bargain be Replaced?
No single substitute, performs all the functions of plea bargaining. If the objection is too lenient or opaque bargains in grand corruption cases, the direct answer is a narrower and more rigorously supervised scheme, with full trials where the charge is provable and the public interest requires adjudication. If bargaining were abolished altogether, ordinary prosecution would remain the route to criminal conviction and punishment; better case preparation, continuous trial management, timely appeals and adequate prosecutorial resources would be needed to make that route workable.
For asset recovery, the Proceeds of Crime (Recovery and Management) Act 2022 provides a distinct property-focused route, including non-conviction-based confiscation through judicial proceedings. It can complement prosecution where assets may be dissipated, or a criminal case cannot promptly conclude. It is not a replacement for conviction or punishment; the State must establish the statutory basis for recovery, respect notice and third-party interests, and account transparently for property managed or returned. Recovery should be pursued on its own legal merits, not used to buy a reduced sentence.
Restorative processes and compensation may be appropriate in legally eligible, lower-harm cases, but cannot substitute for public prosecution of serious abuse of office. Deferred prosecution agreements are not presently a general Nigerian statutory alternative. Our legislature could consider a carefully regulated framework for corporate Defendants, where cooperation, compliance reform and compensation can address institutional wrongdoing. Any such proposal should require independent judicial approval, publication, monitoring and consequences for breach; it should not become an exit route for individual office holders accused of grand corruption.
Comparative law offers design examples, not rules that apply in Nigeria. England and Wales uses a structured reduction for guilty pleas, and reserves deferred prosecution agreements for eligible corporate offenders, while United States Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requires the court to examine voluntariness and factual basis. Their useful lesson is procedural predictability, judicial scrutiny and any Nigerian adaptation, would require attention to local statutes and constitutional structure.
Recommendations for Effective Prosecution of Former Political Office Holders
Apply the Existing Rules Rigorously
The Attorney-General, EFCC, ICPC and other Federal prosecuting bodies, should implement the 2023 Guidelines consistently: obtain written approval at the prescribed level, document offers and concessions, record the evidential and public-interest reasons, consult investigators and victims, state the full, provable facts, verify disclosure and restitution, and present a sentence that reflects the offence’s gravity. Any exception permitted by the Guidelines, should be recorded in writing and disclosed to the court. State authorities should establish equivalent, jurisdiction-specific rules. The court should independently confirm voluntariness, legal advice, factual basis, victim impact and proportionality in open court, with reasoned rulings that can command public confidence.
Make Investigations Trial-ready and Asset-aware
A prosecution should be built around a tested evidential theory, before arraignment. Standing teams combining prosecutors, investigators, forensic accountants, data analysts and asset-tracing specialists can preserve institutional memory across investigation, trial and appeal. Early analysis of procurement records, bank flows, beneficial ownership, tax filings and public contracts, should identify both the offence and the persons who controlled or benefited from the assets. Preservation and restraint orders, should be sought lawfully and promptly; parallel confiscation proceedings may be used, where the 2022 Act permits. A verified schedule of loss, ownership, encumbrances, recoveries and outstanding restitution, should accompany any negotiated proposal.
Improve Independence, Continuity and Court Capacity
Case selection and discontinuance decisions should follow written public-interest criteria, applied consistently regardless of party, region or office held. Significant decisions should have a recorded internal review and an auditable file, while preserving the constitutional discretion of the Attorneys-General. The security of tenure and transparent appointment of anti-corruption agency leadership merit legislative consideration, but must be designed consistently with the Constitution and the agencies’ enabling statutes.
Courts should enforce the ACJA’s day-to-day trial requirement and limits on stays of criminal proceedings, while preserving legitimate defence rights. Dedicated financial-crime lists, trained Judges, adequate registries, electronic filing and reasoned adjournment control can reduce delay, without creating a parallel court system lacking constitutional footing. Appeals in complex corruption cases should be managed promptly. Any reform permitting an elevated Judge to finish a part-heard case must proceed through the constitutionally required amendment process; Section 396(7) ACJA cannot simply be treated as operative, in defiance of the Udeogu v FRN case.
Protect Witnesses and Represent Public Victims
Witnesses, whistle-blowers and cooperating Defendants need reliable protection from intimidation, retaliation and disclosure of sensitive information. Legislation, funding and clear protocols should support risk assessment, secure testimony and, where justified, protective measures consistent with fair-trial rights. Where the immediate victim is the State, the relevant Ministry, pension fund, public corporation or affected beneficiaries, should provide an informed representative. Victim consultation must be meaningful, and ordered compensation should be traced to actual receipt.
Measure Outcomes and Correct Failures
The Administration of Criminal Justice Monitoring Committee and prosecuting agencies should publish annual, anonymised data on plea negotiations and outcomes: case type, stage of plea, agreed and original charges, reasons for approval, sentence, restitution ordered and realised, assets forfeited and transferred, time to resolution, breach or default, and appellate result. Data should distinguish gross asset values, from cash actually recovered and property ultimately vested. The record should permit comparison between negotiated cases and trials, while protecting Defendants’ fair-trial rights. Without this evidence, claims of deterrence, efficiency or successful recovery remain assertions.
Conclusion
Plea bargaining remains useful in Nigeria, but its utility is conditional, and its effectiveness cannot responsibly be reduced to a few notorious cases or headline recovery figures. The Supreme Court’s decision in Yakubu v FRN confirms that an inadequate bargain-related sentence can be corrected, and that the penal element of accountability cannot be displaced by forfeiture. The 2023 Federal Prosecutors’ Guidelines now provide a substantial operational framework; the central task is to enforce, disclose and evaluate it, while clarifying the timing and reach of Section 270 ACJA and addressing differences across State regimes.
The proper response is reform and supplementation, not blanket abolition. Where prosecution is warranted, a well-prepared trial remains indispensable. The Proceeds of Crime Act supplies a complementary route to pursue assets, under judicial supervision. A future corporate deferred prosecution regime may be considered by legislation, but neither it nor restitution alone, can replace personal criminal accountability for grave abuse of public office. Former political office holders should face the same law as every Defendant, supported by independent case selection, competent financial investigation, protected witnesses, capable courts and transparent measurement of what the justice system actually delivers.
Anthony George-Ikoli, SAN, former Bayelsa State Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice
Plea Bargaining and the Price of Accountability
Kingsley Jesuorobo
The case for retaining plea bargaining in Nigeria rests on its capacity to secure convictions, recover assets and expose wider criminal networks within a reasonable time. Public corruption tests that case most sharply. A concession to an offender must secure an identifiable public benefit, while punishment must reflect the abuse of entrusted power. The central challenge, is to make negotiated outcomes both effective and publicly defensible.
The Nigerian Framework
The Federal framework is Section 270 of ACJA. The Plea Bargaining Guidelines for Federal Prosecutors 2023, reinforce the ACJA duties.
Disclosure and Accountability
An informed plea depends on, access to the case being answered. For High Court proceedings by information, Section 379 requires service on the defendant or counsel of the information and accompanying prosecution materials: witness and exhibit lists, summaries of witness statements, the Defendant’s statements, material intended for trial and particulars of any plea bargain. Section 270(7) requires the agreement to state its full terms and admissions, with a signed copy forwarded to the Attorney-General of the Federation.
Public access provides a further safeguard. Criminal hearings are public under section 36(4) of the Constitution, subject to specified exceptions, and ACJA sections 307(2) and 311(1) require the finding and sentence to be pronounced in open court. The Freedom of Information Act 2011 provides access to prosecution-agency records, subject to its exemptions. Sections 12, 14 and 16 address law-enforcement, privacy and privilege protections; Section 18 requires disclosure of separable, non-exempt material, and Section 20 permits judicial review of refusals.
The disputed reporting concerning Official Gredo Limited shows why the underlying record matters. Nairametrics reported on October 23, 2024, that the Federal High Court convicted the company under a plea agreement and ordered N140 million forfeited, identifying charge FHC/ABJ/CR/308/2024. The Nation reported on April 21, 2026 that the company’s Lawyers challenged the account, maintaining that it had never been charged, tried or convicted for an offence relating to USDT or cryptocurrency trading. The alleged agreement, judgement and forfeiture order, would provide the documentary basis for resolving those competing accounts.
Measuring Usefulness
An accessible judgement also permits assessment of what a bargain delivers. In FRN v Idris Ibrahim, FCT/HC/CR/284/2021, decided on July 13, 2023, the FCT High Court imposed one year’s imprisonment with an option of a N500,000 fine and ordered transfer of property valued at N55 million, as full and final restitution for N70 million obtained from the Complainant. Conviction and a specific recovery mechanism were secured, while the financial compromise invites scrutiny of the value accepted and the justification for the concession.
Appellate scrutiny protects the integrity of the process. In Ijire v FRN CA/A/1033C/2019, decided on July 24, 2020, the Court of Appeal set aside a three-year sentence imposed without the required notice of an upward departure from the agreed sentence. In Promise v FRN, CA/A/767C/2019, decided on May 22, 2020, it held Section 270(18)’s restriction on appeals unconstitutional for conflicting with Constitution Sections 240 and 241(1)(a)–(b). The practical obligation is to observe these procedural and appellate protections.
These examples establish practical uses, and enforceable safeguards. A national assessment must go further, examining case duration, proportionality of sentences, assets recovered, payments delivered to beneficiaries and evidence obtained against other offenders. Those measures connect efficiency with accountability. The Canadian, American and English approaches illuminate how certainty, cooperation and judicial control, can contribute to that balance.
Canada and negotiated certainty
Canada places particular weight on certainty, when the prosecution and defence negotiate a joint sentence. In R v Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43, the Supreme Court adopted a demanding public-interest test for rejecting such a submission in exchange for a guilty plea. R v Nahanee, 2022 SCC 37, confined that protection to submissions covering every aspect of the proposed sentence. Canadian Criminal Code Section 606(1.1) requires a voluntary, informed plea supported by the facts. Together, these rules make the bargain dependable, while preserving scrutiny of its validity.
The responsibility attached to office remains relevant within that process. Canada’s Criminal Code Section 718.2(a)(iii) expressly treats abuse of trust or authority in relation to the victim, as aggravating. Nigeria’s Section 19 of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000, criminalises corrupt use of office. Both systems therefore, require attention to entrusted power; a defensible bargain must explain how the proposed punishment accounts for its abuse.
United States and the Value of Concessions
The American federal system, distinguishes the legal effect of different bargains. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1) permits charge concessions under paragraph (A), non-binding sentencing recommendations under paragraph (B), and agreed sentences or ranges binding upon judicial acceptance under paragraph (C). Nigeria’s Section 270(11) preserves express powers to accept, reduce or propose increasing the negotiated sentence, with withdrawal safeguards. This comparison highlights the importance of identifying precisely what the prosecutor promises, and what remains for judicial determination.
Cooperation gives that distinction particular significance, in corruption prosecutions. An intermediary may supply evidence against more powerful participants, in return for prosecutorial support for leniency. Section 270(2)(c) of the ACJA recognises assistance towards prosecuting other conspirators, while subsection (5)(b)(i) makes willingness to cooperate a public-interest consideration. The quality and value of the assistance must therefore, inform the concession sought from the court.
United States v Jose Uribe, S3 23 Cr. 490 (SHS), illustrates that exchange. The prosecution’s October 2, 2025 sentencing submission, Document 911, records his guilty plea under a cooperation agreement, testimony against Senator Robert Menendez and others, and proposed sentencing credit. Associated Press reported on October 9, 2025 that he received six months of home detention, forfeiture and restitution. The record makes it possible to examine the connection between assistance delivered, leniency requested and punishment imposed. Comparable disclosure, would permit the same assessment of Nigerian corruption bargains.
England and Wales and Judicial Control
England and Wales place negotiated charges and facts, under independent judicial sentencing. The Attorney-General’s Guidelines on Plea Discussions in Cases of Serious or Complex Fraud, establish the formal process, with the accompanying CPS Directors’ Guidance expressly covering bribery, corruption and misconduct in public office, subject to its qualifying criteria. Paragraphs 9.1–9.2 of the Code for Crown Prosecutors permit acceptance of fewer or lesser charges, that adequately reflect the provable offending.
The agreement records the charges, facts and admission, and prosecutors document concessions and their reasons. Cooperation may attract a reduction under Section 74 of the Sentencing Act 2020, through a written assistance agreement; the CPS guidance, Assistance Provided by Offenders, explains review under Section 387 when promised assistance is withheld. This approach connects leniency to recorded obligations and performance, while leaving sentencing with the Judge.
Across the three jurisdictions, the strongest justification for a bargain is an intelligible relationship between provable wrongdoing, concessions and the public benefit obtained.
Priorities for Nigerian Prosecution
For Nigeria, that relationship begins with preparation. Prosecutors should link each count to admissible evidence, trace funds through contractors and nominees, and satisfy Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011, as amended in 2023, for relevant electronic records. Asset ownership, value and recovery arrangements require verification. The evidence should support the charges retained, and the proposed punishment should reflect culpability, public harm and the applicable statutory penalties.
Prosecutorial independence must be accompanied by reasons. Sections 174 and 211 of the Constitution require the respective Attorneys-General to consider public interest, justice and prevention of abuse. Canada’s Director of Public Prosecutions Act, Sections 10 and 11, offer a useful transparency model through written and published directives, with regulated delay for specific prosecutions. In Nigerian corruption cases, recorded decisions and consultation with the affected institution, would make the justification for concessions and restitution open to scrutiny.
Negotiations also require credible alternatives. Skilled financial-crime teams, effective witness arrangements and firm case management enable a prepared prosecution to proceed, when acceptable terms cannot be reached. Recovery remains available under the Proceeds of Crime (Recovery and Management) Act 2022. For office holders protected by Section 308, evidence should be preserved and the investigative mechanism in Section 52 of the ICPC Act applied where appropriate.
The resulting agreements and outcomes should be accessible through official records, with lawful redactions. Publication should identify the admitted conduct, concessions, sentence, recovery obligations and amounts actually delivered. Properly recorded proceedings, support appellate review. Plea bargaining serves the public when each concession can be justified by evidence and results, and when the institutions negotiating it retain the capacity to prosecute effectively.
Kingsley Jesuorobo, Member of the Bars of Ontario, Canada and Nigeria; Member of the Board of Governors of the Law Commission of Ontario
Plea Bargain: An Enabler to the Nigerian Criminal Justice System or Disabler
Chief A. A. Malik, SAN
“Loot Plenty and Return Little”
One of the most controversial features of plea bargain in Nigeria, is what has popularly become known as the phenomenon of “loot plenty and return little”. This expression captures much of the criticism that has bedevilled the practice, particularly among common Nigerian citizens. Many argue that rather than promoting justice, plea bargaining often provides an avenue for the wealthy and politically connected, to escape full accountability for their actions. Understandably, this perception has continued to generate considerable debate about the fairness and effectiveness of the mechanism.
In the face of the persistent incidence of corruption and financial crimes in Nigeria, it is unsurprising that the effectiveness of plea bargaining as a deterrent has repeatedly been questioned. Does plea bargaining still serve any useful purpose in our criminal justice system? How effective has it been, in curbing the looting and embezzlement of public funds, particularly by public officials? These are some of the questions, this discourse seeks to address.
Plea bargaining evolved from an informal prosecutorial practice into a recognised legal mechanism designed to facilitate speedy trials, reduce court backlogs, recover proceeds of crime and encourage cooperation in criminal investigations. It has since assumed considerable significance in the Nigerian criminal justice system, with its principal statutory framework provided under Section 270 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) 2015. The provision regulates the circumstances and conditions under which plea bargaining may be considered, including considerations of public interest, the interests of justice, restitution and cooperation in the prosecution of other offenders. Importantly, the mechanism is not intended to confer an automatic entitlement to a reduced sentence, but rather, to provide a regulated alternative for the disposition of criminal proceedings.
The functionality of plea bargaining cannot be accurately assessed without appreciating the mischief it was designed to address, which, as stated above, includes clearing court backlogs, decongesting overcrowded prisons, ensuring the recovery of a portion of embezzled public assets, and cooperating with investigation of other intricate corruption networks or schemes that may have otherwise remained hidden. One can readily appreciate, therefore, that the principle behind plea bargaining is neither unreasonable, nor without merit.
Indeed, plea bargaining has been deployed in several high-profile corruption cases in Nigeria, most of which resulted in convictions and various arrangements involving the forfeiture or recovery of assets, alongside sentences that attracted widespread public criticism. However, the crucial question is, whether the outcomes achieved in such cases adequately reflected the gravity of the offences and served the ends of justice.
Critics argue that lenient sentences offered in plea bargains could undermine the severity of the crime, and fail to hold perpetrators fully accountable for their actions. In a country where corruption remains a significant challenge, there is a legitimate concern that individuals with political connections or resources, may be better positioned to negotiate favourable outcomes, while ordinary offenders face harsher penalties. The widespread impression is that, persons accused of serious financial crimes are somehow allowed to escape with little more than a slap on the wrist because they entered a plea bargain. This raises legitimate concerns about equality before the law, proportionality of punishment and public confidence in the administration of justice.
Other Jurisdictions
Before completely dismissing plea bargaining as ineffective or anti-justice, it is also useful to consider its application in other jurisdictions.
In the United States, for instance, plea bargaining has become an accepted norm, such that an average criminal case in America is disposed through the mechanism. It has been a success story for the United States Government, in eliciting convictions in criminal cases. Nevertheless, the American experience is not without its own criticisms, so the lesson is not necessarily that the Nigerian criticisms are unreasonable, but that plea bargaining can remain useful where appropriate frameworks ensure fairness, accountability and proportionality.
Greater Scrutiny
In my view, the more fundamental problem is not necessarily the existence of plea bargaining, but the manner in which it is sometimes applied. The mechanism should not be abolished or replaced completely, as doing so would amount to discarding a potentially useful instrument of criminal justice administration. Rather, its application, particularly in serious corruption cases involving public officials, must be subjected to greater scrutiny. The relevant prosecuting bodies must be adequately equipped to conduct sophisticated financial investigations, in order to gather sufficient evidence to prosecute serious allegations of corruption. The prosecution should be prepared to proceed to a full trial, where a negotiated disposition would not adequately serve the interests of justice.
I believe that greater emphasis should also be placed on strengthening transparency and accountability, across all tiers and sectors of government. Effective mechanisms of checks and balances, proper auditing of public expenditure, transparent procurement processes and the enforcement of applicable asset declaration requirements, are necessary to prevent corruption before it occurs. The private sector must equally remain committed to applicable corporate governance principles, and internal compliance mechanisms capable of detecting and discouraging financial misconduct.
Ultimately, the measure of an effective criminal justice system should not be limited to the number of convictions secured, the speed with which cases are disposed of, or the quantum of assets recovered. It must also be assessed by the extent to which offenders are held appropriately accountable and the punishment reflecting the gravity of offences, thereby preserving public confidence in the rule of law.
Conclusion
Plea bargaining remains a potentially valuable instrument in our criminal justice system, but its application must be guided by justice rather than expediency. The objective should not simply be to recover what has been stolen, but to ensure that those responsible are held accountable in a manner that reinforces the integrity of our criminal justice system.
Chief Aikhunegbe Anthony Malik, SAN, MCIArb. (U.K), Managing Partner, A. A. Malik SAN & Co.
Plea Bargaining in Nigeria: Is it Still a Useful Instrument of Criminal Justice?
Dr M.O. Ubani, SAN
Plea bargaining has become one of the most debated aspects of Nigeria’s criminal justice system, particularly in the prosecution of corruption cases involving former Governors, Ministers and other politically exposed persons. It is a process whereby a Defendant agrees to plead guilty to an offence, sometimes in exchange for the withdrawal or reduction of certain charges or a concession in sentencing, subject to judicial approval.
However, the Nigerian experience has raised serious concerns about whether the process promotes accountability, or provides an escape route for politically influential persons accused of looting public resources.
My position is that plea bargaining should not be abolished, but its application, particularly in cases of grand corruption, must be fundamentally reformed.
Legal Framework in Nigeria
Plea bargaining has statutory recognition in Nigeria. Section 14(2) of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, 2004 recognises the possibility of negotiated arrangements, in the prosecution of economic and financial crimes.
More comprehensively, Section 270 of ACJA 2015 provides for plea bargaining. It considers factors such as the strength of the prosecution’s evidence, the Defendant’s willingness to return proceeds of crime, cooperation with investigators, the circumstances of the offence and public interest.
The Federal Government also introduced the Plea Bargaining Guidelines for Federal Prosecutors, 2023 (S.I. No. 84 of 2023), to promote transparency, consistency and accountability.
Therefore, the issue is not the absence of legal provisions, but whether the existing framework is being implemented in a manner that serves justice and protects the public interest.
How Effective has Plea Bargaining Been?
Plea bargaining has recorded some benefits in Nigeria
1. It has facilitated the speedy conclusion of criminal proceedings.
2. It has assisted in recovering proceeds of crime and public funds.
3. It has encouraged some Defendants to cooperate with investigators, and expose other participants in criminal activities.
4. It has reduced the burden on courts and prosecuting agencies.
Shortcomings of Plea Bargain
However, its shortcomings cannot be ignored.
First, there is a perception that wealthy and politically connected Defendants, enjoy more favourable treatment than ordinary citizens.
Second, the punishment imposed in some high-profile corruption cases, appears disproportionate to the alleged amounts involved.
Third, there is the danger of serious corruption charges being reduced to lesser offences, thereby undermining deterrence and public confidence.
The experiences involving former Inspector-General of Police, Tafa Balogun, former Bayelsa Governor, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha and former Edo Governor, Lucky Igbinedion, have featured prominently in public discussions about the adequacy of plea bargain outcomes.
Consequently, although plea bargaining has utility in asset recovery and speedy case resolution, its effectiveness in promoting deterrence, equality before the law and public confidence, remains questionable.
Should Plea Bargaining be Abolished or Replaced?
I do not support its wholesale abolition. It remains a legitimate instrument of criminal justice, when properly applied. However, it should not become a mechanism through which criminal responsibility for serious economic crimes, is converted into a negotiated financial settlement.
Nigeria should strengthen three complementary approaches:
1. Full Criminal Prosecution: Where sufficient evidence exists to establish serious corruption, the prosecution should ordinarily proceed to trial and seek appropriate convictions and punishment.
2. Non-Conviction-Based Asset Forfeiture: The Proceeds of Crime (Recovery and Management) Act, 2022 should be effectively utilised, to recover assets established through the appropriate legal process to be proceeds or instrumentalities of unlawful activities. This must not automatically replace criminal prosecution, where sufficient evidence exists.
3. Restitution and Cooperation Agreements: Defendants who provide substantial assistance in exposing wider criminal networks or recovering stolen assets may receive legally justified concessions, subject to judicial scrutiny. Restitution must not extinguish criminal responsibility, automatically.
Recommendations for Effective Prosecution of Former Political Office Holders
I recommend the following measures:
1. Independent Prosecution: Investigations and prosecutions must be based on credible evidence, free from political interference, vendetta or partisan considerations.
2. Improved Financial Investigation: EFCC, ICPC and other agencies should strengthen forensic accounting, asset tracing, beneficial ownership investigations and examination of suspicious financial transactions, before filing charges.
3. Stricter Plea Bargaining Conditions: In cases of grand corruption involving substantial public funds, there should be a presumption against plea bargaining, except in exceptional circumstances demonstrably justified by the public interest. Any agreement must reflect the gravity of the offence, provide for comprehensive asset disclosure and appropriate restitution, and receive careful judicial scrutiny.
4. Specialised Anti-Corruption Courts: Dedicated judicial divisions with effective case-management procedures, should handle complex financial crime cases to minimise unnecessary delays.
5. Transparent Asset Recovery: Recovered assets and funds must be properly documented, independently accounted for and transparently managed. Nigerians should know what was recovered, and how such recoveries were utilised.
6. Witness Protection: Effective protection should be provided for whistleblowers, witnesses and insiders willing to expose corruption, particularly where powerful former public officers are involved.
7. International Cooperation: Government should strengthen mutual legal assistance, extradition and cross-border asset recovery arrangements, to prevent offenders from hiding stolen funds outside Nigeria.
8. Equal Application of the Law: Section 308 of the Constitution protects specified serving public officers, while in office. It does not confer permanent immunity, on former office holders. Nevertheless, prosecutions must be evidence-based, and must respect the constitutional right to fair hearing.
Conclusion
Plea bargaining is not inherently inconsistent with justice. Properly regulated, it can facilitate speedy prosecution, encourage cooperation and recover stolen public assets.
However, it becomes an instrument of injustice when the recovery of part of the stolen wealth is treated as sufficient compensation for serious criminal conduct, or when powerful Defendants appear to enjoy privileges unavailable to ordinary citizens.
My recommendation is that Nigeria should retain plea bargaining but fundamentally reform its application, particularly in cases of grand corruption and abuse of public office. Full prosecution should ordinarily be preferred where sufficient evidence exists, while negotiated settlements should be reserved for exceptional circumstances that demonstrably advance the administration of justice.
Ultimately, the recovery of stolen public funds must not become a licence to escape criminal responsibility.
A country cannot successfully fight corruption, if the punishment for stealing public wealth can be negotiated like a commercial transaction.
Nigeria needs a criminal justice system in which former Governors, former Ministers, former public officers and ordinary citizens are equally accountable under the law, and the ultimate objective must be justice, deterrence, recovery of public resources and restoration of public confidence in our institutions.
Dr Monday Onyekachi Ubani, SAN, former Chairman, NBA Section on Public Interest and Development Law
Plea Bargaining in Nigeria: How Effective has it Been? Any Better Alternative?
Norrison Quakers, SAN, FCArb
Introduction
The import of criminal prosecution is not just to secure convictions but to ensure that persons who violate or breach the law are held accountable, victims receive justice, public confidence in the judicial system is preserved and the rule of law is strengthened.
The concept of plea bargaining emerged as an important instrument for resolving criminal proceedings, with a view of dispensing with the full process of trial.
Since this concept is now an integral part of our administration of justice, has it been an effective instrument of justice in Nigeria, or has it become a convenient escape route for politically exposed persons and influential individuals who have looted public resources?
It is imperative to state that, plea bargaining remains a legitimate and potentially useful instrument of criminal justice. However, its application in Nigeria requires fundamental reform. It should not be abolished outright, but it must not be allowed to undermine accountability, deterrence and the principle that nobody is above the law.
Understanding plea bargain
The underlying philosophy is that both the prosecution and the accused may benefit from an agreed resolution of the criminal proceedings.
Prosecution saves time and resources, while the accused may receive a lesser sentence or other lawful concessions.
However, plea bargain is not intended to confer immunity from criminal responsibility. It is a mechanism for facilitating the administration of justice, not an instrument for negotiating away justice.
The Nigerian legal framework
Section 270 of ACJA 2015 provides the statutory framework for plea bargaining in criminal proceedings within its application. ACJA applies to Federal courts and the Federal Capital Territory within its statutory scope, while individual States have their own Administration of Criminal Justice Laws.
Therefore, plea bargain in Nigeria is not an unlawful or inherently questionable practice. It is a recognised procedure, although its exercise must comply strictly with the applicable legislation.
The introduction of plea bargain was informed by several practical considerations, such as:
The problem of delayed justice; congestion of courts and correctional facilities; the difficulty of prosecuting complex financial crime; recovery of stolen public assets
and conservation of prosecutorial resources.
The prosecution can concentrate its limited resources on more serious cases, particularly where an accused person provides useful information against other offenders.
These objectives are legitimate. The problem, however, is whether the way plea bargaining has been applied in Nigeria has achieved them, without compromising the administration of justice.
Its Failures and Limitations
Despite these advantages, the application of plea bargain in Nigeria has generated serious concerns along the following lines: 1) The perception that plea bargain favours the rich and politically influential; 2) Weak deterrence against corruption; 3) Inadequate punishment; 4) Lack of transparency; 5) Political interference and selective prosecution; 6) Recovery of assets without adequate accountability.
Should Plea Bargain be Abolished or Replaced?
There are arguments on both sides.
The Argument for Abolition
Those advocating abolition, particularly in cases involving public corruption, argue that:
1.Public office is a position of trust, and its abuse should attract serious consequences.
2.Negotiated reductions in charges may undermine the gravity of corruption.
3.The possibility of a favourable plea agreement may encourage future public officers to engage in corruption.
4.The public interest in accountability should take precedence over the convenience of the prosecution.
5.Returning stolen funds should not automatically erase criminal responsibility.
There is considerable merit in these arguments.
The Argument Against Total Abolition
On the other hand, abolishing plea bargaining entirely would create its own difficulties.
Not every criminal case requires a full trial. Some Defendants may voluntarily admit their wrongdoing, surrender criminal proceeds, provide evidence against more culpable offenders and save the State considerable resources.
Abolition could also increase the burden on already congested courts, and prolong the recovery of stolen assets.
It is therefore my considered position that plea bargain should not be abolished altogether; rather, its application should be restricted, regulated and fundamentally restructured, particularly in cases involving public corruption and economic crimes.
The law should distinguish between ordinary criminal cases, organised financial crimes and grand corruption involving public office holders.
For serious corruption cases, the return of stolen funds should ordinarily be treated as an additional obligation and a mitigating consideration, not as a substitute for meaningful punishment.
What Should Replace the Present Model?
If the objective is to achieve a criminal justice system that is faster, more transparent and more effective, Nigeria should consider a combination of the following alternatives
Restorative justice with criminal accountability
Restorative justice focuses on repairing the harm caused by criminal conduct.
In cases involving financial crimes, it may require:
• Full restitution of the proceeds of crime.
• Forfeiture of properties acquired through unlawful means.
• Compensation where identifiable victims have suffered loss.
• Disclosure of accomplices and other beneficiaries.
• Cooperation with investigations.
However, restorative justice must not be confused with immunity from prosecution.
Where a serious criminal offence has been established, restorative measures should complement appropriate punishment rather than displace it.
The Nigerian Correctional Service Act 2019 recognises restorative approaches, including victim-offender mediation and community-based interventions. There is an opportunity to develop a more coherent relationship between restorative justice and plea bargaining
Specialised anti-corruption courts
Nigeria should strengthen the capacity of designated courts to hear corruption, money laundering and other complex financial crime cases.
Such courts should have:
• Judges with appropriate expertise in financial crime litigation.
• Dedicated registries.
• Strict case-management procedures.
• Adequate forensic and technological support.
• Limited and properly controlled adjournments.
• Effective enforcement of court orders.
The objective is to ensure that, corruption cases are determined expeditiously.
Mandatory asset recovery and forfeiture
The law should make asset recovery, a central component of the prosecution of economic and financial crimes.
Where the prosecution establishes that identified property represents proceeds or instrumentalities of unlawful conduct, the relevant statutory forfeiture procedures should be pursued.
A distinction must, however, be maintained between civil forfeiture and criminal conviction. Civil forfeiture cannot automatically be treated as proof of the owner’s criminal guilt.
Sentencing guidelines for economic and financial crimes
Nigeria should introduce clear sentencing guidelines that take account of:
• The amount of public funds involved.
• The duration and sophistication of criminal activity.
• The Defendant’s position of public trust.
• The degree of participation.
• The harm suffered by government and the public.
• Whether the Defendant voluntarily disclosed the offence.
• Whether the proceeds have been fully recovered.
• Whether the Defendant assisted in prosecuting other offenders.
This would reduce arbitrary sentencing, and discourage the perception that wealthy Defendants can negotiate their way out of punishment.
Deferred prosecution agreements with strict limitations
Nigeria may also examine the use of deferred prosecution agreements, particularly for corporate entities.
Under this arrangement, prosecution may be suspended subject to strict conditions, including admission of specified wrongdoing, payment of penalties, restitution, cooperation and independent monitoring.
However, such agreements should not become a means by which individual political office holders escape prosecution for personal criminal conduct.
The model is more appropriately considered for corporate entities, with clear statutory safeguards.
Recommendations for Effective Prosecution of former Political Office Holders
This is arguably the most important aspect of the debate.
The prosecution of former political office holders requires a deliberate and well-coordinated strategy.
Nigeria’s anti-corruption campaign cannot succeed, if the prosecution of former public office holders is treated as a political exercise rather than a serious legal responsibility.
The following recommendations are proposed.
Establish an independent and professionally competent prosecution system
The EFCC, ICPC and other relevant agencies must be allowed to discharge their statutory responsibilities, without interference from political office holders or government officials.
The decision to prosecute must be based on credible evidence and the public interest, not political affiliation, personal relationships or the administration in power.
Strengthen investigation before instituting criminal proceedings
A major weakness in corruption prosecutions, is the commencement of criminal proceedings before investigations have been sufficiently concluded.
Prosecution should be evidence-driven, not media-driven.
A well-investigated case is more likely to survive preliminary objections, withstand cross-examination and secure a sustainable conviction.
Establish a specialised financial investigation and prosecution unit
Nigeria should establish a specialised unit comprising:
• Experienced criminal prosecutors.
• Forensic accountants.
• Financial analysts.
• Digital forensic investigators.
• Asset-tracing specialists.
• International cooperation and mutual legal assistance experts.
• Investigators with expertise in public procurement and government financial transactions.
Such a unit would investigate the financial trail from the point of alleged diversion to the ultimate beneficiary.
The prosecution of grand corruption, should not depend exclusively on oral testimony. It must be supported by documentary, electronic, banking and forensic evidence.
Introduce a policy restricting plea bargaining in grand corruption cases
There should be a clearly defined category of offences for which plea bargaining is either prohibited, or subject to exceptional statutory conditions.
These should include particularly grave cases involving:
• Massive diversion of public funds.
• Systematic embezzlement of public resources.
• Large-scale money laundering involves public funds.
• Organised corruption involving several public office holders.
• Abuse of public office resulting in substantial national economic loss.
Where plea bargaining is permitted in such cases, it should require exceptional justification, independent review and judicial approval.
The accused should not be permitted to negotiate a minor offence, where the evidence establishes serious and substantial criminal conduct.
Make full restitution as a condition of any permissible plea agreement
Where plea bargaining is permitted, the accused should be required to make full disclosure of all proceeds of crime and their whereabouts.
The following conditions should ordinarily apply:
1.Full disclosure of the criminal proceeds.
2.Identification of all assets acquired directly or indirectly from the proceeds.
3.Recovery or lawful forfeiture of identifiable criminal assets.
4.Disclosure of accomplices and beneficiaries.
5.Cooperation with ongoing investigations.
6.An appropriate custodial or other proportionate sentence.
It is important to emphasise that, full restitution should not automatically guarantee a reduced sentence. The court must independently consider the seriousness of the offence, and the interests of justice.
Strengthen the use of unexplained wealth and asset-tracing mechanisms
Anti-corruption agencies should intensify the use of lawful financial investigation tools to identify assets acquired during and after public service.
Where the evidence supports the relevant statutory proceedings, agencies should pursue asset forfeiture and other appropriate remedies.
However, unexplained wealth should not automatically be equated with criminal guilt. Any investigation or forfeiture must respect the constitutional presumption of innocence, property rights and fair hearing.
Introduce transparent plea-bargaining procedures
Every plea agreement involving public funds or politically exposed persons should be documented, and subjected to rigorous judicial scrutiny.
The following should be made available to the public, subject to legitimate restrictions. This will help prevent secret arrangements and improve public confidence.
Strengthen prosecutorial capacity and witness protection
Prosecuting former political office holders can be difficult because of their financial resources, political connections and influence over potential witnesses.
Nigeria must strengthen witness protection, ensure the security of investigators and prosecutors, and prevent intimidation or interference with witnesses.
Prosecutors should also receive specialised training.
Enforce accountability for offences committed by previous administrations
A change of government, should not bring an end to investigations involving the preceding administration.
The prosecution of former political office holders, should be guided by a consistent national policy.
Establish a national public assets recovery and accountability register
Nigeria should maintain a central, publicly accessible register of recovered assets and funds, arising from corruption investigations and prosecutions.
The register should disclose, as appropriate:
• The originating criminal investigation or proceeding.
• The amount recovered.
• The description and value of forfeited assets.
• The date and legal basis of recovery.
• The agency responsible for recovery.
• The government account into which recovered funds are paid.
• The eventual utilisation of recovered public funds.
This will address the recurring concern that money recovered from corruption cases, disappears into another cycle of opacity.
Strengthen international cooperation
Grand corruption frequently involves the movement of funds across national boundaries.
Nigeria must improve cooperation with foreign financial intelligence units, law enforcement agencies, banks and international asset recovery institutions.
The use of mutual legal assistance, extradition procedures, international asset tracing and cross-border evidence gathering, should become an integral part of prosecuting complex corruption cases.
Introduce performance-based evaluation of anti-corruption agencies
The effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies should not be measured merely by the number of arrests, press conferences, investigations commenced or amounts announced as recovered.
Their performance should be evaluated by:
• The quality and sustainability of convictions.
• The proportion of cases concluded within reasonable time.
• The value of assets actually recovered.
• The successful prosecution of principal offenders.
• The prosecution of accomplices and beneficiaries.
• Compliance with constitutional rights and fair hearing.
• The prevention of repeat offences.
This will discourage publicity-driven prosecutions, and encourage professional case preparation.
The role of the Judiciary in combating corruption
The Judiciary has a critical responsibility, in ensuring that plea bargaining does not become a means of subverting justice.
Under Section 270 of the ACJA, the court is not merely a rubber stamp for agreements negotiated between the prosecution and the defence.
The court must examine the agreement and exercise its independent judicial discretion.
The fight against corruption must be firm but constitutional. An accused person must not be punished merely because he or she previously occupied a political office. The prosecution must establish criminal responsibility, in accordance with the law.
Proposed reforms to the Administration of Criminal Justice Act
The Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 should be reviewed to address the weaknesses in the current plea bargaining framework.
I recommend the following legislative reforms:
1) Mandatory plea bargaining guidelines: The Attorney-General of the Federation should issue comprehensive guidelines specifying the circumstances in which plea bargaining may be considered and the factors governing prosecutorial discretion 2) Classification of offences 3) Exceptional treatment of grand corruption: Plea bargaining in cases involving substantial diversion of public funds, should be subject to stricter conditions and independent review 4) Mandatory publication of Plea agreements involving substantial public funds should be published, subject to legitimate confidentiality requirements 5) Victim and public interest considerations: The government, affected public institutions and identifiable victims, should have an opportunity to make representations before an agreement is approved 6) Independent review: Agreements involving former governors, ministers and other senior public office holders should receive an additional independent review to guard against political influence and improper concessions 7) Appropriate sentencing 8) Monitoring of restitution. These reforms would preserve the useful aspects of plea bargaining while addressing the weaknesses that have undermined public confidence in its application.
A Fundamental Question: Is recovery of stolen money enough?
This is perhaps, the most important philosophical and constitutional question arising from the debate.
Suppose a former Governor is accused of diverting ₦20 billion belonging to the State. After investigation and prosecution, the individual agrees to return ₦10 billion and pleads guilty to a lesser offence. Should the government consider the matter satisfactorily resolved?
My answer is that it depends on the circumstances, but ordinarily, no.
The reason is simple: the criminal justice system has two distinct responsibilities.
• To recover what has been unlawfully taken.
• To hold the offender accountable for criminal conduct.
These responsibilities are complementary, not interchangeable.
The State must also remember that, public corruption is not simply a financial transaction between an individual and government. It is a breach of public trust, an injury to the economy and, in many instances, a denial of essential services to millions of citizens.
The consequences of corruption extend far beyond the amount of money involved.
Conclusion
Nigeria Needs Accountability, Not Negotiated Impunity
The Nigerian experience demonstrates that a mechanism introduced to promote speedy justice and recover criminal proceeds can become counterproductive when applied without sufficient transparency, consistency and accountability.
The problem is not necessarily, the existence of plea bargaining. The problem is, the way it is sometimes exercised. It would be a mistake to abolish plea bargaining completely, just as it would be dangerous to retain the existing system without substantial reforms.
More importantly, the prosecution of former political office holders, must not depend on the political circumstances of the day. The standard must be evidence, not political convenience.
The ultimate objective should be, to establish a system in which public office holders understand that the misuse of public resources carries real and proportionate consequences.
My final recommendation is that Nigeria should retain plea bargaining for appropriate criminal cases, but substantially restrict and regulate its use in grand corruption cases. It should complement this approach with specialised anti-corruption prosecution, effective asset recovery, transparent sentencing guidelines, stronger financial investigations and expedited criminal trials.
A country cannot win the war against corruption, by merely recovering stolen money. It must also demonstrate that those responsible for stealing public resources, will face the consequences of their actions.
The ultimate test of an effective criminal justice system, is whether the system consistently delivers justice without fear or favour.
Justice must not be for sale. Public office must not be a licence to steal, and the return of stolen public funds must not become the price for escaping criminal responsibility.
Norrison Quakers, SAN, Constitutional Lawyer, Lagos






