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Interpretation of Insurance Contracts
In the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Holden at Abuja
On Friday, the 27th day of March, 2026
Before their Lordships
John Inyang Okoro
Adamu Jauro
Jummai Hannatu Sankey
Moore Aseimo Abraham Adumein
Abubakar Sadiq Umar
Justices, Supreme Court
SC/408/2015
Between
Standard Alliance Insurance PLC Appellant
And
Sami C. Haidar
(Carrying on business under the name
and style of Beity Office Mart) Respondent
(Lead Judgement delivered by Honourable Abubakar Sadiq Umar, JSC)
Facts
The Respondent who is the proprietor of an office mart by the name “Beity Office Mart” located in Abuja, took out a Burglary and House Breaking Insurance Policy with the Appellant in Abuja on 10th October, 2003. On 3rd April, 2004, a gang of armed robbers disguised as customers, robbed the Respondent’s mart of goods valued at about N10million. The Respondent reported the incident to the Police and thereafter, wrote to inform the Appellant of the development and also requested necessary action.
The Appellant engaged experts, to independently investigate the matter. At the end of the investigation, it was concluded that the Insurance Policy subscribed to by the Respondent did not cover liabilities incurred through the armed robbery incident, because the incident occurred without forceful entry in or exit out of the Respondent’s business premises.
Pursuant the dispute resolution clause in the Insurance Contract between the parties, they resorted to arbitration before a jointly appointed sole Arbitrator at the Abuja Multi-Door Courthouse. The issue for determination at the arbitration was the interpretation of the insurance policy, to determine whether or not the incident was covered by the policy. At the conclusion of arbitration, the Arbitrator rendered an award dismissing the Respondent’s claim. Dissatisfied, the Respondent filed an Originating Motion at the High Court, where she sought an order setting aside the arbitral award. The High Court however, dismissed the claims of the Respondent.
Consequently, the Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal. In its judgement, the Court of Appeal set aside the arbitral award and ordered that the Respondent was entitled to her claim of indemnity under the insurance contract. Dissatisfied, the Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Counsel for the Appellant filed the Appellant’s brief of argument and raised two issues for determination. Counsel for the Respondent filed the Respondent’s Brief of Argument, and also raised a preliminary objection therein.
Issue and Arguments on Preliminary Objection
The grounds of the Respondent’s preliminary objection were that the Appellant’s grounds of appeal are of mixed law and facts, for which the Appellant failed to obtain prior leave of court before raising them, and secondly, that issue 2 as contained in the Appellant’s Brief does not relate to Ground 6 from which it purportedly distilled from. Counsel for the Respondent submitted that there were no competent grounds of appeal in the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, that the Supreme Court could adjudicate on.
In response, the Appellant’s Counsel submitted that all the grounds of appeal in the Notice of Appeal, are grounds of law for which the prior leave of court is unnecessary. Counsel further submitted that, issue two did in fact arise from Ground 6 of the Notice of Appeal.
Court’s Resolution of Respondent’s Preliminary Objection
The Supreme Court held that an Appellant can appeal as of right, when the grounds of appeal involve questions of law alone. The Apex Court held Grounds 1, 4 and 5 in the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal were complaints on the application of law on established facts rather than a dispute over the established facts themselves, hence, they were competently raised without prior leave of court.
However, the Court found that Grounds 2, 3 and 6 complained of the findings of the lower Court, that the trial Court did not properly evaluate the documentary evidence before it, and the evaluation of evidence is fundamentally regarded as an issue of fact, for which leave must be sought to appeal against. The Apex Court found that the failure of the Appellant to seek leave to raise these grounds, invariably rendered them incompetent.
On the second leg of the Respondent’s preliminary objection, the Court held that the Appellant’s issue 2 is indeed, tied to Ground 6; however, considering that Ground 6 had been established as an issue of fact for which prior leave was not obtained, it was incompetent alongside issue 2 which was distilled from it. Consequently, the Apex Court struck out Grounds 2, 3 and 6, and issue 2.
The Court then proceeded to determine the sole surviving Issue 1, which it held to have been validly distilled from the competent Grounds 1, 4, and 5.
Issue for Determination
Whether the Court below was right in setting aside the decision of the trial court, which affirmed the Arbitral Award rendered by the Abuja Multi-Door Court House.
Arguments
Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the lower court was in error when it found that the trial court failed to evaluate the evidence before it, because the trial court is not expect to sit on appeal on the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal.
Counsel argued further that the case before the Arbitrator was the construction of a clause in the Burglary and House Breaking Insurance Policy, and mere entry into the Respondent’s business premises without force was excluded under the insurance policy and the insurance contract did not also contemplate armed robbery. Counsel contended that the lower Court erred when it held that the Arbitrator wrongly applied the Criminal Code Act instead of Section 346(d) and (e)of the Penal Code in the definition of “Housebreaking”, because there was nowhere in the insurance contract where the applicable law was expressly stated to be the Penal Code.
In response, Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Court of Appeal rightly set aside the arbitral award. Counsel argued that the Court of Appeal rightly found that the incident of armed robbery was covered by the insurance policy, and although the applicable law was not stated in the insurance contract; however, the word “theft” was used in the insurance policy document which was executed in the Federal Capital Territory, where the applicable law is the Penal Code and not the Criminal Code.
Court’s Judgement and Rationale
The Court held that in the construction of the terms of a contract, the meaning to be placed on it, is that which is the plain, clear and obvious meaning of the terms used; this where the words of a contract or document are clear, the operative words in it should be given their simple and ordinary grammatical meaning. The Apex Court referred to its decision in DANGOTE CEMENT PLC v AGER & ANOR. (2024) LPELR-61800 (SC). The Court held further that in the interpretation of Insurance Agreements, the Court must interpret the operative words used in the contract, in such a way that reflects the highest standard of honesty expected from both the insured and the insurer.
The Court held that it could be extrapolated from the express words in the operative clause in the Insurance Contract executed between the parties, that the Appellant becomes liable when there is theft of the goods contained within the insured business premises of the Respondent, particularly if the theft is accompanied by actual and violent breaking into the premises, or by actual forcible and violent breaking out of the premises, or any attempt to do so.
The Apex Court held that from the Police investigation report on the incident at the Respondent’s premises, although there was no forcible or violent breaking in as the armed robbers had entered the premises quietly disguised as customers, however, their exit from the premises after they had violently assaulted the sales girl and another member of staff and kept them in a state of fear and imminent danger till their departure from the premises, falls within the definition of “house breaking” under the Penal Code, which is the applicable statute in Abuja where the insurance contract was executed and where the armed robbery took place. The Court held that under Section 346(e) of the Penal Code, a person is said to commit housebreaking if he effects his entrance into or departure from a house he enters by trespass for the purpose of committing an offence, by using criminal force or committing an assault or by threatening any person with assault. The Court held that the armed robbers in this case, just as is typical in most cases of armed robbers, in the course of committing the offence of armed robbery also committed the offence of house breaking.
The Court found that there was therefore, no contention that the insurance policy covers the robbery incident that happened in the insured business premises of the Respondent, and the arbitral award was erroneously rendered because the Arbitrator and the trial Court failed to properly consider the operative clause contained in the Insurance Contract in its legal context.
The Apex Court held further that undoubtedly, the Courts do not interfere with arbitral award, in recognition of the principle of party autonomy and the finality of arbitration; however, a Court can interfere where it is shown that (i) the arbitration or award was improperly procured; or (ii) the arbitrator has misconducted himself, or (iii) the arbitral award contains decisions on matters that are beyond the scope of reference; or (iv) there is an error of law on the face of the award. The Court relied on BPE & ANOR v MESSRS U. MADUKA ENTERPRISES (NIG) LTD & ANOR (2025) LPELR-80698 (SC). The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal properly identified an error of law on the face of the award, which is the misapplication of the applicable substantive law to the interpretation of the Insurance Contract, and rightly set aside the decision of the trial court upholding arbitral award.
Appeal Dismissed.
Nasiru Tijjani for the Appellants.
Abdul Nasser Salau for the Respondent.
Reported by Optimum Publishers Limited, Publishers of the Nigerian Monthly Law Reports (NMLR)(An affiliate of Babalakin & Co.)






