Businessman Challenges Army’s Powers to Probe Civilians, Seeks N120m Damages

Wale Igbintade

A businessman, Jonathan Nwanze, has challenged the Nigerian Army’s statutory authority to investigate civilians over alleged financial crimes, including money laundering and terrorism financing, seeking N120 million in damages over his alleged unlawful arrest, detention and invasion of his residence.

The businessman, in a fundamental rights enforcement suit before the Federal High Court in Lagos, is also asking the court to determine whether the military has the legal authority to investigate civilians suspected of committing offences that fall within the statutory mandate of civilian law enforcement agencies.

At the resumed hearing of the suit on Tuesday, counsel to Nwanze, Olawale Fapohunda, SAN, informed the court that the Nigerian Army had released his client without preferring any charge against him.

Fapohunda, however, told the court that the military was still withholding Nwanze’s international passport and other personal belongings.

He further alleged that when the applicant’s lawyers approached the Army to secure the release of the items, they were given certain conditions, including the withdrawal of the pending suit.

In response, counsel to the first and second respondents, O.E. Alaofin, undertook to facilitate the release of Nwanze’s international passport.

Fapohunda recalled that the matter was last adjourned to enable the respondents to file their defence, adding that the applicant was ready to proceed with the hearing, subject to the convenience of the court.

Alaofin, however, informed the court that the respondents had filed applications seeking to regularise their counter-affidavit dated October 27, 2026.

Justice Deinde Dipeolu observed that the third respondent, the Attorney-General of the Federation, was neither present nor represented in court, adding that the party should be afforded an opportunity to be heard.

The judge consequently adjourned the matter until December 2, 2026, for hearing.

In the suit, marked FHC/LAG/FR/485/2026, Nwanze is seeking a total of N120 million in damages against the Nigerian Army, the Chief of Army Staff, the Attorney-General of the Federation and the Commanding Officer of the 81 Battalion, Bonny Cantonment, Victoria Island, Lagos.

The applicant is demanding N50 million for his alleged unlawful arrest and detention, N40 million for the alleged violation of his right to dignity of the human person, and N30 million over the alleged invasion of his residence.

He is also seeking declarations that his arrest and detention without reasonable cause or suspicion violated his fundamental right to personal liberty guaranteed under Section 35(1), (4) and (5) of the Constitution.

Nwanze further wants the court to declare that the alleged invasion of his residence violated his right to privacy and family life under Section 37 of the Constitution.

He is also challenging the seizure and continued retention of his 2019 Hyundai Creta Evolution GLS and private documents, arguing that the actions violated his constitutional right to own property as protected under Section 44.

According to the applicant, his residence at Block E, Flat 1, Alpha Bay Estate, Agungi, Lekki, Lagos, was invaded on October 6, 2026, while he was arrested four days later, on October 10.

In his supporting affidavit, Nwanze alleged that the respondents denied his family members, friends, lawyers and personal doctor access to him during his detention.

Beyond the allegations of rights violations, Fapohunda, in a reply on points of law filed on November 5, 2026, mounted a legal challenge to the Army’s authority to investigate civilians over alleged financial crimes.

He argued that the Armed Forces Act primarily empowers the military to investigate offences committed by persons subject to service law and does not confer a general mandate on the Army to investigate civilians suspected of financial crimes.

Citing Section 270 of the Armed Forces Act, Fapohunda submitted that Nwanze did not fall within the categories of persons subject to service law as defined by the legislation.

He maintained that investigations into financial crimes, including fraud and money laundering, fall within the statutory mandate of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), pursuant to Section 6 of the EFCC Establishment Act.

According to him, where the Army arrests a civilian suspected of committing such offences, it is required to hand the individual over to the appropriate law enforcement agency for investigation and possible prosecution.

On allegations bordering on terrorism financing, the applicant’s counsel acknowledged that Section 64 of the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022, empowers the military to arrest, search and detain suspects, while Section 99 recognises the Army among the relevant agencies under the Act.

He nevertheless argued that Section 64 does not expressly confer investigative powers on the Army, insisting that his client ought to have been handed over to the EFCC or the Department of State Services for investigation.

Fapohunda also challenged the respondents’ reliance on an ex parte remand order allegedly obtained from the Federal High Court in Port Harcourt on October 16, 2026.

He contended that the order could not retrospectively legitimise Nwanze’s detention, which allegedly commenced on October 10, six days before the order was made.

The lawyer further argued that the existence of criminal allegations against his client did not extinguish his constitutional rights, maintaining that any arrest or detention must comply with the procedures prescribed by the Constitution.

He also opposed the respondents’ argument that the fundamental rights suit was premature because investigations and remand proceedings were allegedly ongoing.

According to him, the pendency of criminal investigations or remand proceedings does not deprive the court of the jurisdiction to examine allegations of violations of fundamental rights.

On the respondents’ objection to the inclusion of the Commanding Officer of the 81 Battalion as a party, on the ground that the office was not a juristic person capable of being sued, Fapohunda argued that even if the objection succeeded, it would not invalidate the entire suit, which could proceed against the remaining respondents.