State Police: When Numbers Add Up But Records Don’t
As 30 State Houses of Assembly back the constitutional amendment, a puzzling information gap over Abia and Kano states, and fears of political abuse ahead of 2027, demand urgent safeguards. Sunday Aborisade reports.
Nigeria’s search for a more effective policing architecture has entered a critical constitutional phase. The National Assembly reports that 30 of the 36 State Houses of Assembly have approved the proposed amendment establishing State Police.
That figure exceeds the constitutionally required two-thirds majority of 24 states.
Yet the way the approvals have been tallied has exposed an apparent communication gap between the federal legislature and some state assemblies, raising questions about how a reform of this magnitude is being managed.
The controversy began when Senate Leader, Senator Opeyemi Bamidele, told plenary last week that 30 state legislatures had approved the amendment.
From his record, the six outstanding states were Benue, Oyo, Cross River, Niger, Abia and Kano.
He explained that the National Assembly had discharged its duty by passing the proposal and transmitting it to all 36 state legislatures.
Abia quickly disputed the claim. In a statement the same day. The Chief Press Secretary to Governor Alex Otti, Ukoha Njoku Ukoha, described reports that the state had yet to approve the bill as inaccurate and misleading.
He insisted that the Abia State House of Assembly had passed it as part of a reform meant to strengthen community-based policing and improve the security of lives and property.
The government also reaffirmed its readiness to work with the Federal Government and other states towards implementation.
Kano presented a different wrinkle. During the same proceedings, Deputy President of the Senate, Senator Jibrin Barau, told colleagues that the Kano Assembly had submitted its response, which was being conveyed to the National Assembly.
He acknowledged a delay but maintained that the legislature had done the needful. Senate President, Senator Godswill Akpabio welcomed the news.
The developments pose uncomfortable questions: Why did the Senate list Abia as silent when its government says the bill was passed? Why did the Deputy Senate President have to offer fresh information on Kano from the floor?
Is the problem delayed transmission of documents, poor communication between the two tiers of legislature, or weak verification mechanisms in the National Assembly? And does the confusion matter at all, given that the threshold has already been crossed?
It does, because there is a vital distinction between a state assembly passing a resolution and the National Assembly formally receiving it.
Abia’s statement establishes the state’s position, but the Senate’s list suggests the communication was not reflected in official records when Bamidele spoke.
Barau’s intervention similarly indicates that Kano’s response had been delayed or not fully processed.
A constitutional amendment of this weight should not be managed through fragmented information, informal assurances or last-minute interventions at plenary.
Clerk to the National Assembly and the clerks of the affected state legislatures should establish a reliable verification mechanism so that official records accurately reflect the decisions of all 36 states.
The credibility of the process rests not only on securing approvals but on demonstrating transparency and institutional efficiency.
Bamidele disclosed that state legislatures have until November 15, 2026, to communicate their decisions. The Clerk to the National Assembly formally conveyed the request to all 36 Houses on October 15, giving them 30 days.
He warned that any assembly that failed to respond by the deadline would be deemed to have withheld approval, or face whatever constitutional implications might follow.
Akpabio had urged him to give the outstanding states a definite timeframe so that the National Assembly could establish whether they supported or rejected the alteration.
Section 9 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, prescribes the procedure for alterations, including approval by at least two-thirds of the State Houses of Assembly. The requirement is affirmative approval by the prescribed number.
With 30 reportedly on board, the threshold of 24 has been exceeded by six, so the remaining states cannot individually frustrate the amendment, although their decisions remain politically significant.
The National Assembly should therefore be guided by the Constitution rather than administrative assumptions about silence, and should concentrate on completing the process transparently instead of creating needless uncertainty around approvals already obtained.
Growing support for State Police reflects a recognition that the centralised policing arrangement has struggled to meet the country’s complex security challenges.
The Nigeria Police Force operates largely as a centrally controlled institution, with commands deployed across states and local government areas.
Although the Inspector-General of Police, Olatunji Disu, exercises operational authority through that structure, governors, who are constitutionally the chief security officers of their states, have repeatedly complained of limited control over police deployments.
The contradiction between their responsibilities and their powers has long fuelled the debate.
State Police could address some of these limitations. Its most immediate advantages would be better intelligence gathering and faster responses to threats.
The dangers facing communities in Borno, Katsina and Zamfara differ considerably from those confronting rural communities in the South-east, South-west and South-south.
Decentralisation could let states craft strategies suited to their geography, culture and criminal realities.
Officers recruited locally would better understand the terrain, community relationships, criminal networks and local security dynamics.
Formations in rural areas could build ties with traditional rulers, farmers, transport operators and residents who hold useful information, strengthening early-warning systems and encouraging prevention over reaction.
Delays in requesting federal deployments during emergencies could shrink, with adequately equipped states responding faster to kidnappings, communal clashes and armed robbery.
The reform could also create jobs for young Nigerians, spur investment in surveillance, forensics and specialised investigation, and foster healthy competition among states.
Better security, in turn, could attract investment, revive agriculture, strengthen commerce and restore public confidence.
These benefits, however, are not automatic. They depend on recruitment, training, funding, intelligence coordination, operational independence and accountability.
Despite the legislative momentum, opposition parties, civil society organisations and rights activists remain wary.
Their concern is less with decentralisation itself than with whether Nigeria’s political and institutional environment is mature enough to stop state-controlled police from becoming instruments of oppression.
With the 2027 general election approaching, opposition parties fear governors could use the formations to intimidate rivals, disrupt campaigns, harass supporters and shape the electoral environment.
In states with intense competition and powerful incumbents, partisan policing cannot be dismissed. A governor who controls recruitment, funding and operations could influence investigations involving political associates or opponents.
There are also fears that officers could be used to restrict freedom of assembly, block lawful gatherings or intimidate activists and journalists, a worry sharpened by Nigeria’s history of political violence, misuse of security agencies and selective enforcement of the law.
The central question is whether state police personnel will serve the Constitution and the people, or become extensions of the political machinery of whoever occupies Government House.
Rights groups point to the risk of abuses, including arbitrary arrests, unlawful detention and extrajudicial killings, in the absence of robust accountability.
Finance is another worry. Several states already struggle with salaries, pensions and other statutory obligations, yet State Police would demand heavy spending on recruitment, pay, training, vehicles, communications, forensic laboratories, intelligence systems, weapons management and welfare.
Underfunded states might field poorly equipped forces unable to confront sophisticated criminal networks, and gaps between rich and poor states could produce an uneven national security landscape.
Without clear jurisdictional boundaries and intelligence-sharing arrangements, rivalries between federal and state formations could emerge, which criminals operating across state lines would readily exploit.
Perhaps the most pressing challenge is timing. With another general election looming, State Police could significantly alter the political and security environment.
In states where governors seek re-election or back preferred candidates, the temptation to deploy officers for partisan ends could be considerable, while opposition parties will expect equal protection for all political actors.
The credibility of the reform will therefore depend on whether the amendment and subsequent legislation contain sufficient safeguards for political pluralism and electoral competition.
State police officers must not become the personal security apparatus of governors or ruling parties. They must remain accountable to the law, operate within defined constitutional limits and exercise professional independence.
The Independent National Electoral Commission must retain its authority over election administration, while security agencies protect voters, candidates, officials and materials impartially.
State Police must never hand incumbent governors additional political advantage.
Passing the amendment is only the beginning. A comprehensive legal framework must settle recruitment, command structures, funding, operational jurisdiction and accountability.
Five requirements stand out. First, recruitment must rest on merit, competence and transparent standards, not political loyalty, ethnic considerations or personal ties to state officials.
Second, state police must operate under clear human rights obligations, with effective disciplinary procedures and independent oversight, and complaints of unlawful arrests, torture, killings and abuse of authority must be promptly investigated and sanctioned.
Third, the appointment and removal of state police commissioners should not be left entirely to governors. A process involving independent oversight and legislative scrutiny would better shield the force from interference.
Fourth, the National Assembly must set minimum national standards for training, conduct, weapons management, intelligence coordination and inter-state cooperation, and define the relationship between federal and state formations, especially in cases of terrorism, organised crime and kidnapping networks that cross state lines.
The Federal Government must keep an effective coordination mechanism for national security threats without undermining state police institutions.
Fifth, funding must be sustainable. States must show they can maintain professional police services without diverting resources from education, healthcare, infrastructure and other essential needs.
Civil society, security experts and human rights groups must also take part meaningfully in designing the implementation framework.
The rising support among state legislatures is an important development in the search for answers to Nigeria’s worsening insecurity. But the discrepancy between the National Assembly’s records and the positions communicated by Abia and Kano shows that even the administration of the reform needs closer attention.
The National Assembly should urgently reconcile its records with the affected legislatures, particularly Abia, whose government insists its assembly passed the bill, and Kano, whose approval was announced by the Deputy Senate President.
The November 15, 2026 deadline must not become an excuse for administrative confusion or needless controversy.
With 30 approvals reported, the priority is to verify the resolutions, complete the remaining constitutional steps and prepare a comprehensive implementation framework.
President Bola Tinubu’s eventual assent, should the process conclude successfully, will mark a constitutional milestone, but it will not automatically deliver better security.
The real test is whether Nigeria can build police institutions that are adequately funded, professionally trained, politically neutral and accountable to the people.
The fears voiced by opposition parties, civil society and rights activists must not be dismissed as mere resistance to reform; they raise legitimate questions about civil liberties and the survival of democratic competition.
Ultimately, Nigeria needs a policing system that brings security closer to the people without bringing the coercive powers of the state closer to the political interests of governors. Done right, State Police could strengthen national security, deepen community intelligence and restore public trust in law enforcement.
Done carelessly, the country could simply replace one centralised policing problem with 36 opportunities for political interference and human rights violations.
The National Assembly must therefore look beyond the impressive count of approvals and confront the harder question: how can Nigeria decentralise policing without decentralising impunity?
The answer will determine whether State Police becomes a genuine security reform or another constitutional experiment whose consequences Nigerians may live to regret.
