NICN Overturning Supreme Court Judgements on Public Officers Protection Act: Judicial Activism or Rascality?

Introduction

On 19th December, 2025, the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (NICN), Enugu Division, delivered a ruling in the Case of Dr Mrs Regina Eze v Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & 3 Ors (Suit No. NICN/EN/13/2025) on the application of the Public Officer Protection Act (POPA) to contract of employment with statutory flavour. Against the principle of judicial precedent and stare decisis, the court overlooked the extant position of the law as established in the recent cases of Anolam v FUTO (2025) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1984) 651 (SC; (2025) LPELR-80027(SC) and Okoronkwo v INEC (2025) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1991) 131 (SC); (2025) LPELR-80425(SC), went ahead to distinguished same, and came to the conclusion relying on National Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission & 2 Ors v Ajibola Johnson & 10 Ors (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 247, an earlier decision of the Supreme Court, that POPA is not applicable to contract of employment with statutory flavour.

This case review is imperative because of the significant implications of the ruling for labour matters, judicial precedent and stare decisis. The research design adopted for this paper is the doctrinal methodology, in particular, content analysis. It is interesting to note that the scope of this case review is only in respect of the aspect of the ruling dealing with the application or otherwise of the Public Officer Protection Act (POPA) to contract of employment with statutory flavour.

1.Case Summary

The Claimant commenced the suit on the 26th June, 2025. The Claimant is seeking for a declaration that the suspension and termination of her appointment are unlawful. She further seeks for an order of the court for: reinstatement, payment of arrears of salaries and damages. The Defendants in response filed a Memo of Conditional Appearance together with Statement of Defence, wherein they raised preliminary objections against the Court’s jurisdiction. Further thereto, the Defendants filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection on the 9th September, 2025. The Claimant filed Reply on Points of Law to the Notice of Preliminary Objection on the 18th September, 2025. On the 24th September, 2025 both parties adopted their respective court processes on the Notice of Preliminary Objection and the case was adjourned to the 18th November, 2025 for ruling. The case was subsequently adjourned sine die to a new date to be communicated to the learned counsel to the parties as the ruling was not ready on the stated date. The ruling was finally delivered on the 19th December, 2025.

2. Background

The grounds of the Notice of Preliminary Objection amongst others are that the suit is statute-barred against public officers (the Defendants). This is premised on the facts as relied on by the Defendants/Applicants that the Claimant’s appointment was terminated on the 8th January, 2025 while the suit of the Claimant/Respondent was filed the 26th June, 2025. The Defendants/Applicants relied on and drew the attention of the court to the extant jurisprudence of the apex court on the issue, the case of Anolam v FUTO (Supra) 651 at 673, amongst others, one of the recent leading authorities by the Supreme Court. He submitted that POPA was applicable to public employments. The Claimant/Respondent relied and drew the court’s attention to the case National Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission & 2 Ors v Ajibola Johnson & 10 Ors (Supra) 247 at 253, amongst others. He argued that POPA does not apply to public employments.

3. Legal Issues

The primary legal issue as it concerns this case review submitted for determination was ‘whether or not the cause of action in the suit was statute-barred?’  The court adopted and slightly modified the issues to read ‘Is this suit statute-barred?’

4. Review of the NICN Analysis and Findings

The court in its analysis admitted that the issue raised was about Section 2(a) of the POPA divesting the Court of its jurisdiction, as the suit was filed outside the three-month moratorium. The cause of action the court finds arose 8th January, 2025 and the action was filed on the 26th June, 2025. The court stated that assuming the POPA applied, arguendo, the cause of action would ordinarily have lapsed before the action was filed. The court then went ahead to query: ‘but did the POPA actually apply to this action?’. This question with respect was unnecessary having regards to the provision of the POPA and the extant established jurisprudence of the apex court on the subject.

The court acknowledged that objectors’ learned counsel cited Anolam’s case, which he submitted was the latest Supreme Court’s authority that held that POPA was applicable to contracts of public employment. On the other hand, the learned respondent’s counsel, the court observed, cited RMAFC’s case to the effect that the POPA is not applicable to contracts of public employment.

The crux of the court investigation and voyage of discovery was whether the POPA applies to bar the action. Admittedly, the court was right when it observed that Anolam’s case was not the latest authority from the Supreme Court that held that the POPA is applicable to contracts of public employment. The latest authority on the issue the court rightly finds, was the case of Okoronkwo v INEC (2025) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1991) 131 (SC) which was delivered on Friday 7th February, 2025 as against Anolam’s case that was decided on Friday 17th January, 2025, just some weeks apart. Incidentally, both authorities are the most recent on the subject matter, as correctly observed by the NICN on the application of POPA to contracts of public employments. Interestingly, the court further correctly observed that RMAFC’s case cited on the issue by the learned counsel to the respondent was decided Friday Jul 13, 2018, seven years earlier. In fact, RMAFC’s position, the NICN rightly observed, remained the law until the year, 2025, when both Anolam and Okoronkwo’s cases overthrew it and the case of Rector, Kwara State Polytechnic v  Adefila (2024) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1944) delivered 2nd December, 2022 on the issue. By that, the NIC had no pressing reason to examine the position of the Third Alteration Act on POPA in detail since the precedents were in line’. It is submitted with respect that, with this finding of the NICN in the case under review, there was no legal basis to depart from the established precedent and stare decisis, especially in the most recent cases on the subject.

Unfortunately, against the established doctrine of judicial precedent and stare decisis, the NICN, in its wisdom was of the view that ‘but the reason arises now that the precedents have changed’, and thereafter proceeded to distinguish the three authorities (Anolam, Okoronkwo, and RMAFC’s) and came to the conclusion that they are not much relevant in the determination of the applicability of the POPA on the current state of the law. The NICN argued that the causes of action in the three cases arose before the Third Alteration Act and were decided on the state of the law, as applicable before the Third Alteration Act. And the NICN observed that, the actions leading to the authorities were not filed in the NICN, which had the primary jurisdiction over the Third Alteration Act. The NICN specifically stated that, though, the three cases were decided at the Supreme Court post-Third Alteration Act. None of them considered the effects of the S. 254C-(1)(b), (f)-(h) & (2) of the 1999 Constitution; the domesticated African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Application and Enforcement) Act [ACHPRA] and, the Nigerian ratified International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR]. The NICN further observed that all laws referred to directly impact the POPA and S. 17 of the Constitution. With due respect, this stands of the NICN was misconceived. This is against the background that, the point of objection was not whether the NICN has jurisdiction over the substantive claim. But the point of objection was whether the case was instituted within the time frame provided by law for a suit of the nature of the one under consideration. In any case, human right instruments contain general and specific exceptions wherein extant rights may be denied. The right to seek legal redress does not avail in vacuum, it is most times subject to limitations, POPA, inclusive.

The court stated that ‘now, in this instance, the cause of action arose under the currency of the Third Alteration Act and being industrial relations matter, the case was filed at the NIC, and the POPA was pleaded in limine as impacting it, the validity of the POPA must per force, be decided under the auspices of the Third Alteration Act; the ICESCR and the ACHPRA’. The NICN justified its position by relying on the Appeal’s decision in La Casera Company Plc v Ganghadaran (Unreported Suit No. CA/L/1059/2016) delivered Jul 9, 2025. It cited and relied on Adisa v Oyinwola (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 674) 116 (SC) 168, E-G as the law on when and how to distinguish precedents, wherein the Supreme Court held that “A previous decision is not to be departed from, or even followed, where the facts or the law applicable in that previous case are distinguishable from those in the latter case. Where relevant statute laws have changed since the previous decision, what is called for is ‘distinguishing’ rather than ‘departure’.” The NICN also relied on the Court of Appeal decision in J.P. v INEC (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt. 886) 140 (CA) 158, D-E wherein was it held that: “Past decisions in matters wherein similar facts and laws to the subsequent ones should inform the eventual decision of the court. But where the facts and/or the laws that had been applied in the previous case had differed from either the facts and/or the laws under consideration in the subsequent case, the enquiring court will not be bound to apply the principles enunciated in the earlier case.”

At this point, the question to ask is that, is it true that the facts and/or the laws that had been applied in the previous case differed from either the facts and/or the laws under consideration in the case under review?  The answer with respect is NO! The cases sought to be distinguished, and the case under review, are factually the same. The factual basis for the objection in the case under review was that, the cause of action the court finds arose 8th January, 2025, when the employment of the Claimant/Respondent was terminated and the action was filed on the 26th June, 2025. In Anolam’case, the cause of action arose on the 21st February, 2003 when the employment of the Claimant/Respondent was terminated and the action was filed on the 2nd September, 2003.  In Okoronkwo’s case, the cause of action arose on the 13th September, 1997 when the Claimant/Respondent was served with the letter of suspension and the action was filed in April of the year 2000. And in RMAFC’s case, the appointment of the Claimants/Respondents was terminated on the 6th December, 2000, when the cause of action arose and the action was filed on the 28th September, 2001. Against the background of the foregoing, one is left in shock as to the NICN findings on the factual difference. Thus, it is apparent that factually, the basis of the objection in all the suits is the same, as the cases were filed outside the time stipulated by law. POPA by law requires that actions challenging unlawful termination of employment or suspension must be commenced 3 months from the date of the occurrence of the termination or suspension and not beyond. Consequently, it is most respectfully submitted that the NICN lacks the factual basis to reach the conclusion that the facts of the cases differ. Anolam’case and Okoronkwo’s case were therefore appropriate authorities, judicial precedent and stare decisis to relied upon by the NICN for the case under review. By a smack of judicial rascality however, the NICN choose to act otherwise. This is against the background that it is trite law that decisions of Court draw their inspiration and strength from the facts which framed the issues for decision and once such decisions are made they control future judgment in like or similar cases, hence where the facts of two cases are the same or at least similar, lower courts are bound to follow it, State v Mijinyawa & Ors (2025) LPELR-81029(SC); State v Ardo & Ors (2025) LPELR-81141(SC); Ibiowotisi v Agbaje (2026) 1 NWLR (Pt. 2024) 115 (SC).

The NICN further stated that the Court of Appeal ‘reiterated the same principle with specific reference to the Third Alteration Act in Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v Oyebola [Supra] when it held that: “While the doctrine of stare decisis or binding judicial precedent enjoins the courts to follow the decisions of superior courts, it has to be remembered that what the earlier decisions established is only a principle, not a rule. Rules operate in an all or nothing dimension. Principles do not. Principles merely incline decisions one way or the other. They form a principium or a starting point. Where one ultimately land from that starting point will largely depend on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in hand: Fawehinmi v NBA (NO. 2) 2 NWLR (Pt 105) 558 at 650’. The NICN then came to the conclusion that, ‘it is in this wise that it becomes necessary to interrogate whether, in the light of the Third Alteration Act to the 1999 Constitution, wherein the National Industrial Court was fully structured into the Nigerian Judiciary as a superior court of record and a new labour jurisprudence emanated; the principle established in the cases prior to the said Third Alteration Act…still remains the regnant law in the diacritical circumstances; or whether indeed a new legal regime that demands a departure from the principle as it existed has been introduced in our corpus juris in employment and labour related litigations.’ The question to ask at this point is, was there a difference in the laws? The answer with respect is NO! The provision of S. 254C-(1)(b), (f)-(h) & (2) of the 1999 Constitution with due respect is not any far different from the provision of S. 7 of the NICN, Act, 2006. The import of the Third Alteration Act to the 1999 Constitution was meant to grant NICN a constitutional status of a superior court of record and further consolidate its substantive jurisdiction subject to sections 251, 257, 272. The alteration further conferred additional jurisdiction on the court. There is nothing however in the Third alteration that seeks to exclude the application of POPA in suits before the NICN.

The NICN then went on to examine in relation to the POPA, if the Third Alteration Act had wrought a change in the law under the new employment law regime. In doing so, the NICN sought to distinguish the three most recent Supreme Court’s authorities that held that POPA is applicable to contracts of public employments: Aba v Board of Directors NIPOST & Ors (2023) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1878) 475 (SC) [delivered Dec 2, 2022]; Anolam v FUTO (Supra) [delivered Jan 17, 2025]; and Okoronkwo v INEC (Supra) [delivered Feb 7, 2025] and came to the conclusion that they cannot be the authorities for the case under consideration, as the law under which they were determined has transmuted. The court in the case under review rather than focus on distinction it set out to undertake, dissipated valuable time in distinguishing the previous decision of other NICN with which it shares coordinate jurisdiction, wherein the applicability of the POPA to contracts of public employment was examined and struck down for being unconstitutional: Ekwo v INEC [1] & Ors (Unreported Suit NO. NICN/EN/04/2024) – delivered May 15, 2025 by the same Judge. The Court in the case under review interestingly referenced a subsequent case of another NICN with which it shares coordinate jurisdiction, wherein the application of POPA to public contracts was upheld following the recent precedent of the Supreme Court in Okorokwo v INEC [Supra]: that is the case of Nicholas v NDLEA [2] [Delivered Sep 24, 2025].  Its observation that the NICN in Nicholas v NDLEA, essentially agreed and followed the decision of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Anolam and Okoronkwo’s cases, in obedience to stare decisis did not engage with the rationes decidendi regarding stare decisis and when precedents can be distinguished, which he argued was carefully addressed in Ekwo v INEC was with due respect unfounded and misconceived. The court under review while distinguishing the cases of Ekwo v INEC and Nicholas v. NDLEA arrogated to itself the powers of the Apex Court and came to the conclusion that the case of Nicholas v NDLEA hereby accordingly overrule and that it is bound by the decision in Ekwo v INEC. This attitude, with respect, is a smack of arrogance and display of rascality.

The NICN in the case under review then proceeded on an unnecessary voyage of discovery with an introduction to the Third Alteration Act with a view to bringing out its essence and the jurisprudence it postulates. It relied on the case of Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v Oyebola [Supra]  to state that having regard to employment/labour law by the Third Alteration Act: “The goal of labour law is to ensure that no employer can be allowed to impose and no worker can be allowed to accept  conditions of work which fall below what is understood to be a decent threshold in a given society at a given time. Thus, labour law is not just a means of regulating the exchange between labour and capital as civil or commercial law does with respect to civil or commercial contracts; rather, it is a means (indeed it is the principal means) to operationalise what the International Labour Organisation (ILO) nowadays defines as ‘decent work’, which, in addition to protecting the worker, calls for the respect of democracy in overall labour relations, including at the workplace.” The NICN further referenced an erudite Indian author [Gunnala Swami Goud] who stated that “Moreover, the proliferation of international labor standards promulgated by organisations such as International Labour Organisation (ILO) underscores the global dimension of unfair labor practices, transcending national borders and jurisdictions. Through conventions, recommendations, supervisory mechanisms, the ILO seeks to promote the principles of social justice, labor rights, and decent work for all, thereby contributing to the harmonisation of labor laws and the eradication of exploitative practices worldwide (ILO, 2021).” With due respect to the court, this whole exercise has no contextual relation or connection to the issue of the interpretation of POPA submitted to it for determination.

Admittedly, the NICN stated that the fulcrum of the most recent Supreme Court’s decision in Okoronkwo’s case holding that the POPA is applicable to contracts of public employment is because, contracts of public employment are garnished with statutory flavours, hence, the POPA, as a statute, applies to them. It further cited the case of Bakare v NRC (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1064) 606 (SC) 650-651, F-A, where the Supreme Court held: “In determining the statutory provision on limitation of action against public corporation in an action brought upon a contract, the nature of the contract must be considered, if the contract in issue is one which is specific or special contract in which it might have been expected that the parties freely agreed to the terms of the relationship between them, the provision of the limitation law would not apply… However, it would apply on matters bordering on the day-to-day activities of the public corporation as protected by the provisions of the law”. It stated further that in Bakare v NRC, it would appear that contracts of public employment were regarded as statute regulated standard form contracts, but not special contracts and as such, the POPA regulates them. Hence, the common denominator is that the POPA regulates contracts of public employment because, they have statutory flavour. The NICN then posited that ‘but statutory flavour really seems to relate to protection for public servants against whimsical termination and not the POPA’. This position with due respect to the court is unfounded at this stage as it would amount to determining substantive matter at an interlocutory stage, which plethora of authorities of the apex courts have frowned against. The law is trite that it is not permissible in law at this stage that any comments be made on the merits of the substantive case that is yet to be heard: Buremoh v Akande (2017) LPELR-41565(SC); INEC & Anor v Oguebego & Ors (2017) LPELR-42609(SC). The issues of the protection for public servants against whimsical termination, ruffled feelings, mental agonies and psychological traumas as a consideration for the application of POPA at this stage with due respect is premature. The underlying consideration with respect should have been whether the suit was timeously instituted within the time stipulated by the law, the basis for the claim being one founded on a contract of employment with statutory favour.

As a basis for the NICN analysis which it stated directly falls for construction in answering the question in the case, it reproduces verbatim, S. 254C-(1)(b), (f)-(h) & (2) of the Constitution:

“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 251, 257, 272 and anything in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters –

… Relating to, connected with or arising from Factories Act, Trade Disputes Act, Trade Unions Act, Labour Act, Employees Compensation Act or any other Act or Law relating to labour, employment, industrial relations, workplace or any other enactment replacing the Acts or Laws;

… Relating to or connected with unfair labour practice or international best practice in labour, employment and industrial relation matters; Relating to or connected with any dispute arising from discrimination or sexual harassment at workplace; Relating to, connected with or pertaining to the application or interpretation of international labour standards;

… (2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, the National Industrial Court shall have the jurisdiction and power to deal with any matter connected with or pertaining to the application of any international convention, treaty or protocol of which Nigeria has ratified relating to labour, employment, workplace, industrial relations or matters connected therewith.”

The NICN added that ‘in addition to the above, S. 254B-(3) & (4) of the Constitution says only consummate experts in industrial relations law with considerable practical experience could be appointed NIC’s judges, with the objective of efficiently navigating and implementing the provisions of S. 254C-(1)(b), (f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution, which constitute the radical essence of the new jurisdiction granted the NIC to revolutionise industrial relations law in Nigeria in order to eschew unfair labour practices and bring up its industrial relations jurisprudence in tune with international best practices. It then went further to state that ‘in essence, the NIC has the primary responsibility of applying the provisions of S. 254C-(1)(b), (f)-(h) & (2) of the Constitution, as its core area of expertise. With respect to the court, the voyage on the interpretation of S. 254C-(1)(b), (f)-(h) & (2) was unnecessary and in fact was not achieved. This is against the background that the objection of the objectors/Applicant was not whether the court has jurisdiction to try the substantive suit, rather the objection seeks to question whether the suit was initiated in accordance with due process of law, same haven being filed outside the time limit stipulated by the law. It must also be pointed out that the NICN reliance on the Madagascar’s Supreme Court’s decision in Dugain v Air Madagascar  in which ‘it remanded back a labour case involving workplace discrimination in which the issue of the applicability of ILO C111 and CEDAW arose for the first time before it, to the lower court, saying the Supreme Court’s duty was limited to ensuring that relevant conventions were considered and applied by the lower court’, was out of context. this is against the background that, the question for determination before the court borders not on the interpretation or application of international laws to the case, but simply on the interpretation of the provision of POPA as it applies to the case, same having been initiated outside the time provided by the law. In fact, the reliance by the NICN on Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v Oyebola to substantiate its position further conflict the issues. The position by the NICN that the Court of Appeal in Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v Oyebola ‘endorsed the policy that firsthand decisions of the employment tribunals are sacrosanct and rarely disturbed because of their experience and expertise in labour relations’ with respect is misconceived and out of place as it seeks to elevate or equate the decisions of the NICN with that of the apex courts. Is the NICN by implication saying that it is constitutionally vested with the powers to overrule or override the decisions of the apex courts? Can this interpretation be read into the provisions of S. 254C-(1)(b), (f)-(h) & (2) of the Constitution? The answer, with respect, is NO! In any case, the operative wordings of the constitution is ‘Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 251, 257, 272’. The literal meaning of this is that the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court are excluded. The reason for this with respect is quite simple. It is because, the principle of judicial precedent and stare decisis is fully entrenched and recognised by the 1999 constitution. Interestingly, the NICN in its ruling admitted that precedents from the Supreme Court decided on labour causes of action that arose before the Third Alteration Act and decided under the erstwhile law, might continue to be cited, except if the NIC takes the initiative to bring out the new position of law for review by the Court of Appeal. If I may ask, what is the locus classicus in the ruling of the court in the case under review? Which of the international instrument (ICAO, ILO, International Maritime Organisation [IMO], CEDAW, ICESCR, ACHPRA, UDHR) cited by the court have direct bearing with the issues of limitation of action (stalled action) in judicial proceedings? Certainly, none with respect!

Assuming without conceding that the conclusion by the court under review that ‘by virtue of the constitutional innovation revolutionising industrial relations law in Nigeria, the gulf between master-servant employment and public employment has been severely narrowed to the extent that, all employments in Nigeria now have constitutional flavour, as posited by the Court of Appeal in Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v Oyebola is true, how does POPA translate into unfair labour practices? POPA with respect did not contemplates that an employee has no right of legal redress at all. It only mandates that employee who complain of the breach of their legal rights must be vigilant in instituting actions for the protection of the rights timeously. Consequently, an employee who sleeps over his or her rights cannot be heard to complain after the time stipulated to pursue the right has lapsed.

Limitation of action principle is both statutory and equitable rule of law applicable in international and national laws. It is founded on the long-established principle vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit, meaning ‘equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights (indolent)’. It applies to make claim(s) inadmissible if a party waits an “excessive” or “unreasonable” period to bring the claim, thereby prejudicing the defendant’s ability to defend themselves. The principle which applies under international law through the extinctive prescription (Equity and Laches) principle has been applied by international courts and tribunals to bar claim(s) due to excessive, unexplained delay, enhancing legal stability and evidence reliability. Rather than waiving rights, this principle renders claims inadmissible after long periods of inactivity. In ICS Inspection and Control Services Limited (United Kingdom) v The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2010-9, Award on jurisdiction, 10 February, 2012, para. 197 (Annex AC) the claim of Argentina was held to be stalled and inadmissible because, “despite the fact that the Claimant notified the Respondent of a BIT dispute and threatened international arbitration in its 27 November 2006 letter, the Claimant did nothing further until June 2009’. The ICJ in the Case concerning Certain Phosphare Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, 26 June 1992, ICJ Reports, 1992 pp. 253-254, para. 32 (Annex AF), held that “even in the absence of any applicable treaty provision, delay on the part of the claimant may render an application inadmissible”. Finally, the NAFTA Tribunal in Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd, et al v. United States, UNCITRAL, Decisions on Objection to Jurisdiction, 20 July 2006, para. 33 (Annex AG) held that ‘the principle of extinctive prescription (bar of claims by lapse of time) is widely recognised as a principle of law constituting part of international law, and has been accepted and applied by arbitral tribunals.’ Authoritative legal literature by scholars of international law like Professor Rosseau and Hober, also supports the contention that the passage of time is a bar to the admissibility of a claim, and that this constitutes a general principle of international law. It therefore submitted with respect that, NICN misconceived the application of the limitation rule under public international law. Interestingly, as rightly admitted by the NICN in the case under review, the principle has long been recognised and codified under Arts 8(1) & (3) of the ILO C158,  Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 (No. 158), while the convention seeks to promote security of tenure of workers, when it decrees thus: “Article 8(1) A worker who considers that his employment has been unjustifiably terminated shall be entitled to appeal against that termination to an impartial body, such as a court, labour tribunal, arbitration committee or arbitrator. (2) … sub (3) provides to the effect that, ‘A worker may be deemed to have waived his right to appeal against the termination of his employment if he has not exercised that right within a reasonable period of time after the termination (bold for emphasis).’ It is submitted most humbly and respectfully that the none stipulation of timeframe is immaterial. In Effiom v State (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 373) 507 (SC), reasonable time was held to mean ‘A reasonable time is such length of time as may fairly, properly and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty to be carried out or the nature of the subject-matter and also to the attending circumstances. What amounts to a reasonable time is a mixed question of law and fact and this is left to the discretion of the judges. (P. 569, paras. F-G) (bold for emphasis).’ Thus, it is submitted most respectfully that factually and legally, three (3) months stipulated by POPA for commencement of action is indeed a reasonable time. In Obasi v State (2021) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1766) 242,  it was held that “within a reasonable time” in section 36(4) of 1999 Constitution – The phrase “within a reasonable time” implies that the time for the determination of the matter should not be too short or too long…’. With respect, the period of three (3) months cannot be said to be too short or too long. It is therefore misleading to conclude that the POPA is incompatible with Article 8(1)&(3) of the ILO C158

Within the framework of the jurisprudence of our national courts, especially the apex courts, the principle of limitation on staled cases occupies a prime place. The Supreme Court unequivocally in the case of Aina & Anor v Dada & Anor (2024) LPELR-62505(SC) stated that, “Not only equity does not aid the indolent, the law also does not.” In this context, POPA does not aid the indolent who fails to pursue his grievance within the time stipulated by law. In Abdurahaman vKeystone Bank Ltd & Anor (2025) LPELR-81593(CA), the Court of Appeal succinctly held that “It is elementary law that the rules or principles of equity help only the vigilant and they do not assist an indolent party who fails to pursue his right diligently and within a reasonable time. Where this happens, the Courts regard such delay or indolence of the party either as fatal to his case or as amounting to a waiver of his right under the maxim that equity helps only the vigilant.’’ Thus, whatever the nature of the claim, including labour related matters, a party who is aggrieved must take proactive steps without delay in the pursuit of his or her claim or right. 

The blanket conclusion by the court in the case under review that the phrase “necessary salve” is synonymous with ‘statutory flavour’ and, being that this status is now directly conferred by the Constitution, it supersedes statutory flavour by reason of its grundnorm status to now give all types of employments in Nigeria, without exception, constitutional flavour. And this constitutional flavour, by dint of the compulsion to apply international conventions on industrial relations and international best practices/standards, has elevated the law of industrial relations in Nigeria to purely Public International Law thus, confirming without ambiguity, the sui generis of modern Nigerian industrial relations law is misconceived and unfounded. With utmost respect to the court, it is submitted most humbly that it is not the intention of the drafters of the Third Alteration Act to grant the NICN the power to apply international labour conventions and standards in blatant disregard of the domestication requirements of the Constitution. This is against the background that by the wordings of S.12 of the 1999 Constitution, it is very clear and does not make for ambiguity when it stated that, “No treaty between the federation and any other country shall have the force of law except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly”. This position was reaffirmed in M.H.W.U.N v Minister of Labor and Productivity (2005) 17 NWLR (Pt.953) 120. In any case, the entire analysis by the court in the case under consideration centres on matters of substantive rights, which comes into contemplation only when it can be established that the case was initiated by due process of law, POPA in particular. This is more so that as pointed out in the cases of State v Mijinyawa & Ors (2025) LPELR-81029(SC); State v Ardo & Ors (2025) LPELR-81141(SC); Ibiowotisi vAgbaje (2026) 1 NWLR (Pt. 2024) 115 (SC), the case of Geepee Ind. (Nig.) Ltd v The MV Kota Manis (2025) 15 NWLR (Pt. 2007) 143 (SC) [delivered Apr 25, 2025] cannot be an appropriate authority and precedent for the case under review as the facts, subject matter and laws differs markedly.

The position of the NICN that, the courts have discretion in the matter. It can extend time where a time is fixed and it means, absolute time bar without the discretion of courts to extend time in deserving cases, is an affront to this provision, which grants discretion to the courts and therefore, will be unlawful, is misconceived and unfounded. This is against the background that because a court of law is not a charitable institution or father Christmas; its duty in civil cases is to render unto everyone according to his proven claim.

A departure from the prayers sought in an application before it to import orders not sought or even implied and without considering any request for extension of time as in the instant case, would amount to judicial excesses, Nidocco Ltd. v Gbajabiamila (2013) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1374) 350 (SC); Angadi v P.D.P. (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 1 (SC). Thus, the reliance on foreign judgments (the Industrial Court of Republic of Botswana, case of Mapho C. Ganelang v Tyre World Ltd ; the Industrial Court of Trinidad and Tobago case of Bank and General Workers’ Union v. Home Mortgage Bank Georgia and the case of D.B. v Tblisi State University, the South African Constitutional Court in the case of Leach Mokela Mohlomi v Minister of Defence, the Kenyan High Court and Court of Appeal in the case of Kenyan Bus Services Ltd & Anor v Minister of Transport & Ors and in the case of Joseph Nyamamba & Ors. v Kenyan Railways Corporation respectively) by the NICN to reach it conclusions and overrule extant jurisprudence on the subject of application of POPA to the case under review, when there is abundance of decisions of the apex courts in Nigeria was an act of judicial recklessness. It is submitted most humbly and respectfully that, it is only where there are no known Nigerian decisions on a principle of law, that the courts should be persuaded to apply the decisions of foreign courts, Omega Bank Plc v Govt., Ekiti State (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1061) 445. The foreign cases cited and relied upon by the NICN cannot therefore serve as binding precedents for our courts. This is more so that the foreign decisions relied upon are not decisions of the Supreme Court in those countries.

Indeed, the findings of the NICN that the POPA creates discrimination against public employees within the national workforce by allowing the three-month limitation time in S. 2(a) of the POPA to apply to only public servants on account of their social class of being public employees without provable justification was unfounded. This issue was raised and determined by the court suo mutu, without affording the parties the opportunity to address it.  The law is trite that, where a court raises an issue suo motu, the court must give the parties the opportunity to be heard on it. Failure by the court to hear the parties or their counsel will amount to a denial of fair hearing, Uche v Orji (2025) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1988) 189 (SC). Indeed, there are so many instances the court was on the frolics of its own, raising issues and reaching conclusion without affording the parties the opportunity to address it. This includes the issue of whistleblowing, negotiation period, computation of the period of limitation, distinction between public officer and public authority, literacy level of workers, ADR, proportionality test, the issue of pre-action notice and violations of fundamental employment rights. Apart from being an unnecessary voyage, it reflects a display of judicial rascality all in a bid to overturn the extant decisions of the Supreme court. Interestingly on the issue of literacy level of workers, the Claimant/Respondent in the case cannot be said to have low literacy level as to not appreciate her rights and when they are due. Against this and the others issues addressed above, the conclusion of the NICN that ‘the POPA is roundly illegal, null, void and unconstitutional, and liable to be struck down. It is hereby accordingly struck down as unconstitutional,’ is manifestly reckless, unfounded, misconceived and unsubstantiated.

5. Implications/Conclusion

The decisions of the NICN does not by any stretch of imagination reflects judicial activism, rather, it represents an affront to the established doctrines of judicial precedent and stare decisis. This against the background that the well laid down position of the doctrine of precedence is that decisions of the Supreme Court are binding on all Courts, but where judgment of the Supreme Court is in conflict, all Coaurts are bound by the latest decision of the Supreme Court, Central Bank of Nigeria v Okojie (2015) 14 NWLR (PT. 1479)231 AT 263, Par. G. In Precision Associastes Ltd. v Federal Ministry of Finance & Ors (2025) LPELR-81019(SC), it was held that ‘the law is that under the doctrine of judicial precedents, as espoused by the maxim: “stare decisis et non quieta movere” meaning: “Literally, to stand by previous decisions and not to disturb settled matters; To adhere to precedents, and not to depart from established principles” Under this principle of law, it has long been acknowledged that this Court, the Supreme Court of Nigeria – “is the highest and final Court of Appeal in Nigeria. Its decisions bind every Court, authority or person in Nigeria. By the doctrine of stare decisis, the Courts below are bound to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court. The doctrine is a sine qua non for certainty to the practice and application of law”. It is therefore, sacrosanct that when there are conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court, the latest decision is the one that has a binding effect, Ojugbele v APC & Ors (2023) LPELR-60033(CA). Recently, the Supreme Court in Wema Bank Plc v Awotunde (2025) 18 NWLR (Pt. 2017) 273 (SC) succinctly stated that ‘where there are two conflicting judgments of the Supreme Court, the lower court or courts is or are bound by the latter decision and must follow and apply it. This is because if the latest decision is in conflict with an earlier one, it follows that the latest decision has overruled the earlier one (bold for emphasis). It is thus, indeed an act of judicial recklessness and rascality for the NICN to find that RMAFC’s case cited on the issue by the learned counsel to the respondent which was decided Friday 13th July, 2018, seven years earlier and that position remained the law until the year, 2025, when both Anolam and Okoronkwo’s cases overthrew it and the case of Rector, Kwara State Polytechnic v. Adefila (Supra) delivered 2nd December, 2022 on the issue, but still went on and refused to follow the extant established position of the law on the issue.

By virtue of the above, it is most respectfully submitted that, the NICN in the case under review had no pressing reason to examine the position of the Third Alteration Act on POPA in detail since the precedents were in line. The Apex Court in cautioning the lower court stated that, the principle of judicial precedent or stare decisis is designed to ensure orderliness, certainty and discipline in the judicial process. The principle holds inferior Courts to the Supreme Court of Nigeria bound by the previous decision(s) of the Court on similar facts in the consideration and determination of matters before them. Where the lower Courts are encouraged not to follow the previous decision(s) of this Court on similar facts, such an encouragement is designed to promote anarchy, chaos and judicial rascality which is not the design or purpose of the principles of the Rules of Law. It follows therefore that the lower Courts are bound in law to follow the previous decision(s) of this Court on similar facts to the case under consideration by them (underlined for emphasis). It is submitted with utmost respect that this caution was thrown to the wind under the guise of judicial activism, when the NICN on a frolic of its own, unnecessary voyage of discovery and display of judicial rascality proceeded to distinguish and overrule the extant jurisprudence in Anolam and Okoronkwo’s cases on the application of the POPA to contract of employment with statutory flavour. The decision of the NICN in Dr Mrs Regina Eze v Federal Polytechnic, Ohodo, Enugu State & 3 Ors (Suit No. NICN/EN/13/2025), must not be allowed to stand, it must with haste, be thrown into the dustbin of history.

Dr Amana Mohammed Yusuf, LLB, LLM, PhD (BUK), Cert. IHL (UNISA), BL (Abuja); Notary Public; Lecturer, Department of International Law & Jurisprudence, Faculty of Law, Bayero University, Kano, Nigeria. 08033340192. myamana.ilj@buk.edu.ng; amankg77@gmail.com