NIGERIA’S FOOD PRICE SHOCK AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

 The Tinubu administration’s response aligns with the principle of responsive governance, argues ABIODUN OLUWADARE

In 2025, Nigeria confronted a moment of acute food insecurity that cut across geography, class, and livelihood. In both urban and rural markets, citizens complained of scarcity, soaring prices, and declining access to basic food staples. For millions of low-income households, food inflation ceased to be an abstract macroeconomic indicator and became an everyday survival challenge. Rising costs threatened not only nutrition but social stability, as food expenditure constitutes the largest share of household spending for the poor.

Faced with this reality, the government responded through a combination of domestic agricultural support and temporary food importation. It made available subsidised seedlings, fertiliser, and agrochemicals to farmers in order to boost production, while simultaneously opening controlled channels for food imports to address immediate shortages. Predictably, this dual approach generated controversy. Local farmers expressed concern over falling prices, while the wider population welcomed relief from crushing food costs. Critics framed the policy as contradictory and insensitive to domestic producers. Yet a closer and more theoretically grounded examination shows that the Tinubu administration’s actions reflect a rational crisis-management strategy rather than policy incoherence.

This episode illustrates a classic dilemma in political economy: how a state balances producer welfare with consumer protection during a sudden supply shock. Understanding this trade-off is essential to evaluating the government’s choices fairly.

At its core, Nigeria’s food crisis was the product of a negative supply shock, a sudden disruption in the availability of food caused by structural and environmental pressures rather than deliberate policy failure. Climate variability, insecurity in key food-producing regions, rising transportation costs, foreign exchange pressures, and long-standing underinvestment in agricultural productivity converged to constrain supply. At the same time, food demand remained highly inelastic. Unlike luxury goods, food consumption cannot be postponed or substituted easily. People must eat, regardless of price.

The result was a severe market imbalance in which demand significantly outpaced supply, leading to rapid price escalation. Left unchecked, such conditions historically produce malnutrition, social unrest, and political instability. Governments that hesitate during food crises often pay a heavy price in legitimacy and public trust. In this instance, the Tinubu administration chose speed over hesitation.

The government’s response can best be described as a dual-track food security strategy, combining short-term stabilisation with medium- to long-term capacity building.

On one track, the state intervened directly in domestic agriculture by lowering production costs through the distribution of seedlings, fertiliser, weed control chemicals, and other inputs. This approach aligns with state-led developmental intervention theory, which recognises that markets alone cannot overcome structural bottlenecks in critical sectors such as agriculture, particularly in developing economies. By reducing input costs and improving yield potential, the government aimed to strengthen farmers’ productive capacity and lay the groundwork for future self-sufficiency.

On the second track, recognising the immediacy of hunger and the social dangers of prolonged food scarcity, the government temporarily allowed food imports to bridge the gap between supply and demand. This decision was not a repudiation of local agriculture but an application of Keynesian stabilisation logic. When markets fail to deliver essential goods at socially acceptable prices, the state has a responsibility to intervene decisively to prevent welfare collapse. The outcome was a rapid increase in food availability and a sharp reduction in prices, precisely the intended result from a consumer-welfare perspective.

The decline in food prices following the influx of imported food is easily explained by basic supply-and-demand theory. An increase in supply, when demand remains constant, inevitably lowers equilibrium prices. While this adjustment can place pressure on producers, it delivers immediate relief to consumers, particularly urban residents and fixed-income earners who spend a disproportionate share of their income on food.

This is where political tension becomes unavoidable. Farmers, whose livelihoods depend on higher farm-gate prices, experienced income pressure, while consumers, who constitute the majority of the population, experienced relief. The state thus found itself at the intersection of competing social interests.

Political economy teaches that during systemic crises, governments must prioritise mass welfare and social stability. A policy framework that preserves producer prices at the expense of widespread hunger would be morally questionable and politically unsustainable.

This situation is well captured by the Producer–Consumer Welfare Trade-Off Model commonly used in development economics. Policies that benefit producers, such as import restrictions or price supports, often raise costs for consumers, while policies that lower consumer prices can compress producer incomes. In crisis conditions, most states choose to protect consumers first, especially where food security is involved. This is not an anti-farmer policy; it is crisis triage.

Crucially, the Tinubu administration did not rely solely on imports. By simultaneously supporting domestic producers with inputs, it acknowledged that long-term food security depends on sustained domestic production rather than perpetual reliance on foreign supply. The policy error would have been to pursue one track without the other.

The concerns raised by local farmers are genuinely legitimate and require policy attention, but the solution does not lie in reversing price stabilisation measures or abruptly closing import channels. Such actions would almost certainly reignite inflation and return millions of Nigerians to food insecurity.

Economic theory and international best practice instead recommend targeted compensatory mechanisms that protect farmers’ incomes while preserving price stability. These include guaranteed minimum price schemes for strategically important crops, which provide income security during periods of market volatility. Investment in storage and processing infrastructure can significantly reduce post-harvest losses that currently erode farmers’ earnings. Structured off-take agreements and institutional procurement for schools, hospitals, and strategic reserves can stabilise demand for local produce, while the expansion of agro-processing value chains can reduce dependence on raw produce markets and create higher-value income streams. Such measures address farmer welfare without sacrificing consumer access or macroeconomic stability.

What distinguishes this episode is not the absence of conflict but the responsiveness of the state. The government did not delay action in the face of a deepening crisis. It intervened first to prevent hunger and social breakdown, then moved to strengthen production capacity.

In political theory, legitimacy is derived not only from elections but from performance, particularly in moments of collective vulnerability. The Tinubu administration’s response aligns with the principle of responsive governance, where policy adapts to lived realities rather than ideological rigidity. Governments are often criticised for inaction; in this case, criticism has arisen largely because action disrupted entrenched interests.

Nigeria’s food crisis underscores a difficult truth: no food policy satisfies all stakeholders simultaneously. Good governance is therefore not about avoiding difficult choices but about making necessary ones transparently, strategically, and in the interest of social stability.

By stabilising food prices while investing in domestic agricultural capacity, the Tinubu administration has adopted a balanced and theoretically sound response to an urgent national challenge. However, this approach must be complemented by sustained support for farmers to ensure that temporary price adjustments do not translate into long-term rural hardship. Food security is a collective project that requires cooperation between government, producers, experts, and citizens alike.

Food security is not achieved by sentiment. It is achieved by strategy. And history will ultimately judge not who complained the loudest, but who ensured that Nigerians could eat.

 Oluwadare is a Professor of Political Science, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna