KWAM 1 and the ‘Ultimate’ Misbehaviour

The Advocate By Onikepo Braithwaite
Onikepo.braithwaite@thisdaylive.com

The Advocate By Onikepo Braithwaite Onikepo.braithwaite@thisdaylive.com

The Advocate

By Onikepo Braithwaite


Onikepo.braithwaite@thisdaylive.com

Introduction

The ugly incident that occurred between the musician, Wasiu Ayinde Anifowoshe aka KWAM 1/K1 de Ultimate and Valuejet Airline, its Staff and aviation security personnel last week, is rather unfortunate. KWAM 1 claims that the contents of his flask which was the subject of the dispute, was water. If it was, why was it required? The first thing that you are served once you board Valuejet, even before the aircraft takes off, at least in Premium or Business Class, which I would imagine was what KWAM 1 was travelling, is water – any quantity you require. The truth is that, had KWAM 1 been at Heathrow Airport, London,  or Dulles Airport, Washington DC, he could never have tried what he did at Abuja Airport. He would have been arrested.

So, it was a matter of bemusement, amazement and bewilderment, watching the videos of how the KWAM 1 incident was at sixes and sevens, with ground staff pleading and talking to KWAM 1 on the tarmac, where he shouldn’t have been, in the first place. He should have been bundled away by ground staff/security, for his own safety and that of others. They were obviously ‘star struck’ or acting under the fear of ‘Bigmanism’, because, if that was you or me, we would almost certainly have been bundled away from the tarmac, had we refused to follow instructions. KWAM 1 even had his hand on the aircraft as if it was a motor vehicle, while he was trying to call someone in authority to ensure that he got on the flight, regardless of whether or not he was breaching aviation rules. The errors/inaction of the ground staff, led to the the somewhat bad ending of the incident. Do our airport personnel, even undergo proper training in international best practices at all? Surely, safety protocols on an airport tarmac should be strictly adhered to, with absolutely no exceptions. 

KWAM 1: Matters Arising

1) The Over-100ml Flask 

KWAM 1 appeared to be the cause of the ensuing altercation, between himself and airport ground staff/crew of Valuejet Airline.

He was said to have attempted to board a Valuejet aircraft bound for Lagos from Abuja, with a flask which was not only bigger than 100ml, but opaque (allegedly containing an alcoholic beverage), contrary to aviation rules which require that any liquid to be carried on board an aircraft mustn’t exceed 100ml, and must be clearly displayed for inspection by aviation security officers or any other authorised person on demand. KWAM 1 was also alleged to have assaulted Valuejet Staff, by splashing the contents of his flask on them. One even  wonders how he got that far, to the foot of the aircraft with the offending flask in hand. See the Nigerian Civil Aviation Security Programme and Annex 17 particularly Article 4.4 (Measures relating to passengers and their cabin baggage) to the Convention on International Civil Aviation Tenth Edition of 2017 (ICAO) & Section 45 (1)-(3) of the Civil Aviation Act 2022 (CAA). 

ICAO recognises the airlines’ duty to protect their passengers, and obviously, this is done by proper screening of passengers, their cabin baggage, and even the luggage that goes into the hold of the aircraft. 

In the first place, KWAM 1 had no right to refuse to submit the offending flask for whatever inspection was required. Section 84 of the CAA recognises the fact that it is possible to carry a toxic substance onto an aircraft, which could prove to be a danger to passengers. Also see Section 35(1)(c) of the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (TPPA). Although the TPPA has similar or corresponding offences as the CAA with regard to aviation offences, it is obvious that this whole KWAM 1 fiasco had nothing to do with terrorism, but was a case of Bigmanism gone wrong. For instance, radioactive material could be in liquid form; it is hazardous to the health of people if they are exposed to it, while flammable liquids that can damage or destroy an aircraft and everyone on it, or prevent it from flying, are dangerous liquids that terrorists could attempt to sneak on board an aircraft. By virtue of Section 84(1)(c) of the CAA, a person convicted of placing dangerous substances on an aircraft which results in damaging or destroying it, or prevents it from flying, is  liable to life imprisonment with no option of fine. It therefore, shows how important it is to adhere to the rules concerning screening of passengers, to prevent harmful things from making their way into an aircraft to cause havoc.  

2) Assault 

In Lawal v State (2010) LPELR-4622(CA) per Joseph Shagbaor Ikyegh, JCA, the Court of Appeal used the definition of assault in Section 15 of the Robbery and Firearms Act thus: “…striking, touching, moving or otherwise applying force, including heat, light, electrical force, gas, odour, or any other substance or thing whatever, if applied in such a degree as to cause injury or personal discomfort to the person of another, either directly or indirectly without his consent….”. KWAM 1 was seen to not only be in a heated argument with the airline staff, intimidating them with “do you know I am?”, but, he was also alleged to have splashed the contents of his flask on the ground staff and even Captain Ogoyi who had disembarked to de-escalate the tension, thereby causing them personal discomfort. See Section 264-265 of the Penal Code Act 1960 (PCA) on assault, and the punishment of one year imprisonment or a fine or both upon conviction. 

3) Trespass and Nuisance

KWAM 1 also trespassed on the tarmac, contrary to Section 75(1) of the CAA, a misdemeanour that carries upon conviction, punishment of a fine of at least N500,000 or 6 months imprisonment or both. He stood in front of the Valuejet aircraft, obstructing it, in a bid to prevent it from moving (we don’t know if the Pilots were able to see this from the cockpit). This kind of nuisance or trespass is also contrary to Sections 473 and 459B of the PCA and Criminal Code Act (CCA) respectively, and attracts a punishment of 3 months imprisonment upon conviction under both laws and/or an unspecified fine under the PCA or N40 fine under the CCA. Additionally, Sections 472 and 459A of the PCA and CCA respectively, prohibit any person, inter alia, from obstructing, hindering or impeding the movement of an aircraft which is in motion; such a person is guilty of a misdemeanour and is liable upon conviction to 2 years imprisonment under both laws, or a fine or both under the PCA  . 

4) Hijacking

Be that as it may, KWAM 1’s actions do not fall within the purview of hijacking an aircraft as many have labelled his actions, at least, not within the provisions of Section 83(1) of the CAA, which provides inter alia that the offender must be ‘onboard’ the aircraft in service, to commit the offence of hijacking by threatening to or seizing control of it. KWAM 1 wasn’t onboard the Valuejet aircraft, he was clearly outside it. Again, Section 34 of the TPPA requires an offender to be on board an aircraft which is in flight, seizing control or exercising control over it, to qualify as the offence of hijacking, which upon conviction, attracts life imprisonment, and also a N25 million fine by virtue of Section 83(1) of the CAA. Take Singapore’s Hijacking of Aircraft and Protection of Aircraft and International Airports Act 1978 (revised in 1996)(HAPAA), in Section 2(2)(a), it defines the period when an aircraft is in flight, inter alia, as from when its doors are closed following embarkation until when they are opened for disembarkation. But, just like the CAA, Section 3(1) of the HAPA also provides that the hijacker must be onboard the aircraft. 

Remember the 1993 Nigerian aircraft hijack case? When 4 Youths, Richard Ogunderu, Kabir Adenuga, Benneth Oluwadaisi and Kenny Rasaq-Lawal, hijacked an Abuja bound Nigeria Airways flight, which they planned to divert to Frankfurt, Germany. Their demand was that Military Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida, GCFR, resign and handover to Chief MKO Abiola, GCFR, or they would set the aircraft ablaze in 72 hours. The plane had to stop in Niamey, Niger Republic to refuel. There were 149 people aboard, 138 passengers and 11 crew members. After initial negotiations, 129 hostages were freed. Eventually, Niger Gendarmes stormed the aircraft. A female crew member lost her life during the rescue operation, while one of the hijackers was injured. The hijackers were tried and convicted in Niger, where they served out their prison sentences. 

Unlike KWAM 1, the hijackers were on board the Nigeria Airways flight; they seized control of the aircraft, altered its course, diverting it from going to Abuja and instead, taking it to Niamey. They also made demands, and threatened consequences if they weren’t met. Their actions fell within Sections 83(1) of the CAA and Section 34 of the TPPA. See the case of R v Abdul Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570 where the Defendants hijacked a plane going from Sudan to Jordan, and diverted it to London. They were found guilty of hijacking a plane, contrary to Section 1 of the Aviation Security Act 1982. Their appeals were however, subsequently allowed. 

Captain Oluranti Ogoyi & First Officer Ivan Iloba

Section 84(3)(a) of the CAA makes it an offence for anyone using a device to commit an act of violence against another at an aerodrome, which is likely to cause serious injury or death to another. The punishment for this under the CAA upon conviction, is a fine of at least N2 million or imprisonment of at least 5 years. Some have argued that this is what the Pilots of Valuejet did to KWAM 1, as they started taxiing on the runway while he and the ground staff were still standing and arguing by the aircraft. They believe that Captain Ogoyi couldn’t have got clearance from the Marshaller to move, when there was a commotion still going on by the aircraft. How do they know that, for a fact? Was the Control Tower, aware of the disturbance outside the aircraft? They could have cleared Captain Ogoyi, for takeoff. The investigation will reveal the response to this. 

Though, all reasonable people believe that the aircraft should not have moved with the commotion still going on around it, one cannot conclude that Captain Ogoyi intended to physically hurt KWAM 1 or anyone else, as such conclusion doesn’t make  sense.  KWAM 1 was in the midst of airport staff, standing quite close to each other, and he certainly wouldn’t have been the only casualty. Again, why would the Pilots want to hurt or kill fellow Valuejet staff or airport security, by running into them with the aircraft?

Someone asked if provocation could be a viable defence for the Pilots. In Sunday Jackson v State (2025) LPELR-80692(SC) per Mohammed Baba Idris JSC, the Supreme Court held that the plea of provocation wasn’t exculpatory, and was only a mitigating defence that could reduce punishment from murder to manslaughter. Provocation involves a loss of self control, based on the action of the adversary. Loss of self control, is certainly not expected from a Pilot-in-Command or any Pilot for that matter, while it is unlikely that any reasonable person would lose their self control, based on an issue such as that of KWAM 1 and his Bigmanism at the airport that day. Pilots are trained to manage stress, and make unimpeachable decisions, even under stress; they are also trained, to manage their emotions. 

So, what could it have been?

Have we considered the most valid defence? That Pilots have a limited amount of visibility directly under the aircraft when they are taxiing, because of the aircraft design, the height of the cockpit and their position of sitting in the aircraft? And, this is why when Pilots start to taxi, they do so at a slow speed until they reach the deserted area, the runway, to take off. This allows them to minimise risks and react, if the need arises. This appears to be a more reasonable and tenable explanation of what happened, on the part of Captain Ogoyi and FO Iloba. That maybe the Pilots, couldn’t see under the plane. In any event, no rational person would remain beneath or by an aircraft, after the doors have been shut for take off.

Conclusion 

KWAM 1 rendered a public apology, for his ‘ultimate’ misbehaviour, particularly as a titled Chief of Ijebuland. His predecessor-in-title, Otunba Michael Olasubomi Balogun, CON, the former Olori Òmò Òba Akilè Ijebu, would certainly not have been caught dead in that kind of public altercation with anyone; he comported himself with the dignity that his title required. And, if the late Awujalè of Ijebuland, Oba S. K. Adetona, GCON, for reasons best known to himself, had conferred KWAM 1 with Otunba Balogun’s title even before his burial, to the chagrin of some Ijebuites, KWAM 1 has succeeded in somewhat ridiculing the confidence reposed in him by the late Awujalè, less than a month after his death, with his reprehensible behaviour. 

KWAM 1’s apology was probably insincere but necessary, since he had behaved odiously, and this had resulted in his condemnation by some right thinking members of the public. The statement of the Minister of Aviation, Festus Keyamo, SAN, showing that what is good for the goose, is also good for the gander, would have also been a motivating factor for his hollow show of remorse. If the Pilots were suspended pending the outcome of the investigation, KWAM 1 has also received no-fly punishment from the Minister. 

For those who have condemned the Pilots without hearing the outcome of the investigation, they are pre-empting the investigation, and drawing conclusions without all the facts. Let’s wait and see what happens. 

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