Why Government by Coup d’État is Recidivist in Africa: Niger’s Counter-Coup as Coup against Nigériens

The future of liberal democracy in Africa may not be bright because it has the great potential to unnecessarily generate coups d’état. In international relations, coup d’état is illegal but the illegality is conveniently acquiesced to in protest against bad democratic governance. In order to promote democracy, France, generally supported by other European Union (EU) Member States, made the adoption of democracy a conditionality for the grant of development aid to African countries. President François Mitterrand made this clear at the 1990 sixteen Franco-African Summit, held in the coastal resort of La Baule in southern France. However, this conditionality has been selectively applied, and thus making non-democratically-elected governments to thrive and condoned.

Coup d’état, as a concept, dates back to antiquity. It dates back to the time of Julius Caesar’s march on Rome. Its modern usage began with the Coup of 18 Brumaire when Napoleon Bonaparte overthrew the French Directory on November 9, 1799. At that time, coup d’état was still defined as a sudden blow against the State or as an illegal overthrow of an existing government. In the late 1700s, it specifically meant a sudden strike by political or military insiders to seize power from the top. Coup d’état, unlike a revolution, is often carried out by a group of small, elite people. 

When elected politicians use their democratic freedom to misgovern, the people cannot but support military coup to change an elected government in spite of the fact that coups d’état are considered illegal. In the case of Niger Republic, the problematic is quite interesting: the incumbent president, General Abdourahmane Tiani, a former Chief of the Presidential Guard, came to power by coup on July 7, 2023. His government is therefore considered illegitimate. On August 29, 2026 there was a counter-coup against him but the coup was successfully resisted by the elite presidential forces and the Russian-backed Africa Corps personnel. What is the implication of a military coup against an unwanted military government in power? What essence is there in condemning coups d’état supported by the people? Why is coup unending in spite of the many legal instruments sanctioning unconstitutional changes in Africa?

Why Coup d’État is Recidivist  

The first dynamic of recidivist coups in Africa is difficulty in breaking the umbilical cord tying former colonial masters and their former colonies. When President Mitterrand made democratisation a conditionality for development assistance in 1990, it was to nip coups in the bud and help restore multiparty politics. By then most Francophone countries operated one-party system of government within which democracy was purportedly practised. In late November 2014, another French president, François Hollande, told the leaders of 57 French-speaking countries in Dakar, Senegal, as follows: ‘where constitutional rules are abused, where freedom is violated, where the alternation of power is prevented, I affirm here that the citizens of these countries will always find, in the Francophone sphere, the necessary support to uphold justice, law and democracy.’

What is the meaning and implication of President Holland’s statement? The interpretative meaning is that, in the event of abuse of constitutional rules, in the event of violation of rights of freedom, in the event of alternation of power is made impossible, France can always be relied upon for assistance within the Francophone community. The implication of the interpretation is also not far-fetched: Justice will be upheld. Law and democracy will be upheld. But what is the meaning of justice in this case? The answer should be understood in the context of developments within Niger Republic.

Relationship between Niger and France is fairly warm. Relationship among Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali, on the one hand, and France, on the other, is no longer warm as it used to be before the advent of the current military juntas in the three countries. All the three countries have strained their politico-diplomatic ties with France. In the eyes of France, there can never be anything good in terms of good governance in all the countries, especially in light of the replacement of France with Russia as a newly trusted ally. Consequently, in every attempt to prevent Russia from being able to consolidate its influence in West Africa, it cannot but be expected that France would continue to strengthen opposition to the three military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

A second dynamic is the conscious refusal to learn lessons from the past. Military intervention in politics in Africa began in 1952 with the coup organised by Egyptians against King Farouk. Since then, there has not been an end to coup making. This is because African leaders hardly look backward to learn lessons for the present. Africa has always been fraught with systemic corruption, sit-tight administration, resource mismanagement with particular emphasis on embezzlement of public funds rather than investing in productive sectors. For instance, the World Economics has it that Libya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Chad have the lowest governance grades (grade E). In Nigeria, the problems of governance are associated with weak public service execution, infrastructure deficits, and security challenges. And true enough, there was a coup d’état in Nigeria in October 2025 which was first denied by the Federal Government but later involuntarily admitted. 16 army officers were arrested and prosecuted. If lessons are readily learnt, the potential for fresh coups will be limited.

Thirdly, according to the Institute of Strategic Studies in South Africa, there are three major dynamics characterising coups in Africa: uneven distribution of frequency of the coups; the causes of individual coups which vary from one country to the other; and the outcome of each coup. Apart from these dynamics, there is still a complex interplay of internal decay. There is the issue of democratic deficit or façade democracy, at times referred to as democratic coup. This is not about rejection of democracy per se. This can involve rigging of election engineering corrupt judiciaries, amending constitution to enable continued stay in power. When there is no accountability, people cannot but look up to the military following public disillusionment. When democratic governments are unable to ensure national security, there is no way military intervention will not be contemplated.

A fourth rationale for the recidivist character of coup d’état is the nonchalant attitude of both the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union and the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the ECOWAS towards unconstitutional government in Africa.  In some cases, such as in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, they condemn unconstitutional changes of government. In some others, they turned away their eyes, such as it was the case in Chad. This is double standard against which the people are.

True enough, the ECOWAS did not recognise the military junta in power but the junta enjoyed the people’s support. The same story is true of the government in Burkina Faso and Mali. And without doubt, government by coup d’état is unconstitutional and unwanted, particularly by African leaders. It is against this backdrop that several agreements were done and that pronouncements against coups d’état were made. 

For example, the 36th Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly adopted the Lomé Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government on July 12, 2000. The cardinal objective was to establish a continental framework against illegal seizures of power in Africa. An illegal seizure of power is defined as a military coup d’état against a democratically-elected government, intervention by mercenaries to replace a legitimate government, replacement of a democratic government by armed dissident groups or rebel movement, and refusal of an incumbent leader to relinquish power to the winner after free and fair elections.

One point of emphasis on the Lomé Declaration is election as the definiendum of unconstitutionality. The point of emphasis is about a democratically-elected government which can only be achieved through election. Without it, there cannot be an elected-government. As such, the failed coup of August 29, 2026 in Niger Republic, even if it had succeeded, would not have fallen under the purview of unconstitutionality or illegal government in the eyes of the African Union. This is because the target of the August 29 coup is a military government and not an elected government. For as long as the objective of any coup, mercenary intervention, act of dissidence of a group, etc. remains the removal of an elected person, it is unacceptable because it is unconstitutional.

 In the same vein, Article 4(p) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union requires all Member Signatories to condemn and reject unconstitutional changes of government. The article is made a core principle of the African Union. In fact, Article 30 of the same Constitutive Act bars all governments coming to power by unconstitutional means from participating in the activities of the organisation. Again, the provisions of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) also codifies different norms against unconstitutional changes of government in Africa. As of today, unconstitutional change of government has been made an international crime to the extent that the Malabo Protocol has had the jurisdiction of the proposed African Court of Justice and People’s Rights expanded to include the prosecution of the international crime of unconstitutional changes of government.

A fifth rationale for the recidivist character of unconstitutional change of government is the formation of alliance of coup makers. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have not only put in place mechanisms for mutual support and solidarity, Gabon has also joined the entente. This understanding is now to the extent that democratic governments, especially Francophone countries, have been strengthening their politico-economic ties with the military juntas. By so doing, de facto legitimacy is unnecessarily conferred on the so-called illegitimate governments. The truth about the illegitimate governments is that the governments have also been promoting and developing on the basis of self-help, and to that extent, to the chagrin of the former development partners in Western Europe.

It is important to also note that the alliance of solidarity amongst the three countries of the Sahel that withdrew their membership of the ECOWAS does not encourage sustaining relationships with the ECOWAS. This means that the ECOWAS now has little or no means of influence over the withdrawing members: Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. In the absence of any authority overseeing coup making, the freedom to engage in coups cannot but thrive. It is against this background that we should explicate the failed coup of last August 29 in Niger. 

Niger Republic’s Coup within Coup 

The failed coup d’état of last August 29 in Niger raises fundamental questions about the future of regional integration in Africa, especially in light of the interlocking implications at the multidimensional level. First, it was a coup carried out by a mutinous military faction called Les Forces Armées pour la Restoration de la Patrie (Armed Forces for the Restoration of the Fatherland (FARP). The incumbent government of General Tiani answers Conseil National pour la Sauvegrde de la Patrie, that is, National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland. The incumbent government of General Tiani is concerned about the Homeland. The ‘soldats égarés sans foi nil loi (lawless, misguided soldiers) or les soldats mutins (the mutinous soldiers) as the Government of Niger prefers to call them, is also much concerned about the Fatherland. 

The Homeland and the Fatherland are the same. They both refer to Niger Republic as a territory and as a people. If General Tiani came to power by coup and the mutineers also want to remove the Tiani government by coup, do the mutineers have the type of popular support given to General Tiani when he took over power from President Mohamed Bazoum?  Second, at the level of political implications, President Tiani is given more opportunity to strengthen his regime by purging all perceived enemies and rivals, an exercise that also has the potential to tighten his inner circle’s grip on power. Besides, the failed coup provides an additional basis for deepening alignment with Russia and Algeria, thanks to the active support of Russia’s paramilitary Africa Corps and the dispatch of Su-30 fighter jets by Algeria. And perhaps more disturbingly, relationship between Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali, on the one hand, and the ECOWAS, on the other, has the potential to further deteriorate. The prospects of reconciliation with the ECOWAS in the immediate future is, at best, remote.

Third, at the level of economic implications, the confidence of international investors has the potential to be seriously diminished as a result of the internal military clashes. Already, the financial risk modelling groups have reverted Niger’s profile to long-term ‘extreme risk.’ This development cannot but threaten economic stability. The likelihood of the mutinous armed guys aiming to attack the critical oil facilities cannot also be ruled out. Economic ties between Niger and Nigeria are strong. The relationship is managed by the Nigeria-Niger Commission which was established in the early 1970s. With many Nigériens pointing accusing fingers to Nigeria as one of the sponsors of the failed coup, the future has the potential to be difficult.

Fourth, at the level of security implications, one major declared rationale for the coup is the alleged frustration of the mutineers over the inability of Government to contain jihadist violence which prompted the death of about 2000 people in 2025 alone. The likelihood of military purges can create fears and another form of insecurity. In the same vein, the uncovering of some weapons caches at the Base 101 following the mutiny, is another source of security concerns. For now, there is no indication of the pattern of ethnic involvement in the putsch. But when the purge takes place in the military and if one ethnic group appears to be more involved, there can be more sanctions for the ethnic community from where the coupists come. In this regard, ethnic division may be aggravated. 

Fifthly, and perhaps more importantly, if one reckons with the fact that the mutineers are young frontline soldiers and junior officers, if we also consider international reactions, the likelihood of unending coups in Africa is surely high. It is a stumbling problem that has to be eventually addressed. France was specifically accused and the French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Jean-Noël Barrot, responded that the allegation against France was ’pure fantasies.’ He noted further that ‘France does not have the intent or the means to conduct or support such an operation in Niamey. The failed coup targeted a military airbase, the presidential palace and the national television station, reportedly backed by network directed by President Emmanuel Macron.’ In other words, both France and the EU countries accused of having supported the coup have openly rejected the allegation. The vehement denial of Nigeria is particularly noteworthy.

First, Nigeria urged in a Press Statement number MFA/PR/2026/220 of Sunday, 30 August, 2026 the ‘Government and people of Niger to work together towards an inclusive and participatory return to stability and constitutional order in the interest of the country, regional peace and stability.’ Perhaps more importantly, Nigeria says, ‘as a neighbour with which it shares close historical, fraternal and cultural bonds, the Federal Government of Nigeria is keenly desirous to see that peace, security, democracy and development reign supreme in the country.’ And true enough, there is nothing to suggest that politics or diplomacy is being played with this statement, bearing in mind that Niger Republic is the only contiguous neighbour with which there has no territorial border dispute. Nigeria can be said to truly mean well. 

In this regard as well, if Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs Minister of State, Ambassador Sola Enikanolaye, vehemently denied any Nigerian involvement in the August 29, 2026 failed coup in Nigeria, the foregoing press statement cannot but be the justifying background. In the words of Ambassador Enikanolaye, ‘Nigeria will never support illegality or unconstitutional change of government anywhere, no matter who is involved or which country is concerned. For the avoidance of doubt, ‘Nigeria views with deep concern, any unconstitutional change of government. As a sisterly neighbour bound by close historical, fraternal and cultural ties, Nigeria desires only peace, security, democracy and development for Niger Republic, the sub-region and the Sahel.’ Consequently, in the eyes of Ambassador Enikaolaye, Nigeria ‘is a proud and committed member of ECOWAS. It is unfair, mischievous and entirely false to suggest that Nigeria endorses or condones the military coup.’ It was on this basis that Ambassador Enikanolaye asked the Nigerian public at home and abroad to discountenance all reports insinuating Nigeria’s involvement in the failed coup. Nigeria ‘will continue to work to defend democracy and uphold the rule of law,’ as well as promoting peace and stability in the West African region. 

In essence, as good and convincing as this statement may be, the public perception of Nigeria in Niger is completely different a story. Nigériens rightly or wrongly believe that Nigeria under President Bola Ahmed Tinubu is a puppet of France. This is one area of challenge that the Foreign Ministry has to urgently address.

Finally and without any whiff of doubt, coups d’état against General Abdourahmane of Niger cannot but be much expected at home, in the Sahel region or sub-region, and at the extra-African level. At the home, regional, and sub-regional levels, there are still many pro-former colonialists who easily accept to carry out the dirty job of coup making. They are people who do not believe in democratic freedom, political sovereignty of Niger, and self-dignity. General Tiani’s main offence is that he is waging war against neo-colonialism. He is resisting unending exploitation of his country’s natural resources. Who expects better understanding with Niger knowing well that Tiani already pulled out his country from the ECOWAS?  Why should anyone expect France to be happy with General Tiani, bearing in mind that he had severed military ties with France and has replaced France with Russia, a sworn diplomatic enemy of France? For Niger of General Tiani to have engaged in resource nationalisation and taking over the control of Niger’s uranium industry after 58 years of French mainmise cannot but be antagonising for France which left Niger by manu militari. France was accused of sponsoring the coup against the government but France denied it and said it is nothing more than ‘pure fantasies.’ But who are the sponsors of the coupists? Where do they come from? Time will tell. But while waiting, the August 29 countercoup was, stricto sensu, not against the government of Tiani, but against the people of Niger who have been giving active support to the military junta. It was not a palace coup but a well foreign funded anti-people counter-coup.