NIGERIA’S BATTLE AGAINST INSECURITY
ABIODUN KOMOLAFE argues the need for special forces as well as an increase in specially-trained ground troops to destroy the terrorists
The roots of the current crisis stretch deep into the past. To truly discern these origins, one must look all the way back to the Justice Alexander Ovie Aniagolu Report on the Maitatsine Riots in Kano (1981), whose findings clearly harbingered the events that were to come. Four decades later, we are facing the fatal consequences of unheeded warnings.
Between 1980 and 1985, the Maitatsine Riots encompassed a series of violent religious uprisings in Northern Nigeria. It was initiated and led by Muhammad Marwa (Maitatsine), whose followers belonged to the militant Islamic sect, Yan Tatsine. The conflict began in Kano and spread to other cities, resulting in thousands of deaths before it was suppressed by the Nigerian military.
The crisis Nigeria currently faces was foretold in the Maitatsine and other Reports. The deepening poverty and woes in the North and parts of Nigeria were largely caused by the destruction of the agricultural value chain. This destruction was exacerbated by the termination of the 1963 Republican Constitution in 1966, and the irresponsible fixation on a misplaced depiction of an oil boom. The inability to reverse the destruction of the rural economy in Northern Nigeria, alongside the failure to make education free and compulsory from the age of 16, starting around 1977, ultimately led us to where we are today.
Former Military President Ibrahim Babangida’s misconceived and now-discredited Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) also added salt to the North’s festering injury. And, as if the gods were angry, SAP deconstructed its nascent industrial base, wiping out fundamental industries such as textiles. Nobody should be surprised, in view of this that we landed in the era of Boko Haram. Indeed, it would have been absurd had we not landed in that era. Having landed in that era, the political will to tackle the root cause was lacking. Instead, what became depicted as an insurgency opened a vast new avenue for making money by members of the connected political and military establishment.
The military industrial complex arose out of the war against terror. Without parliamentary oversight worth the name, a never-ending war found a stool and sat comfortably in the country. Sadly, the Return on Investment (ROI) for those profiting from this war might be as high as an investment in Oil and Gas. Even a primary school student can do a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) of the profiteering and conclude, beyond any reasonable doubt, that Nigeria has been badly defrauded in the pursuit of what is now a phantom war against terror.
The National Assembly must now, as a way out of terror, do a forensic audit into spending on the war against terror, stretching back 15 years. This will reveal everything and show conclusively that even if we quadruple expenditure on Defence spending, the war will go on ad infinitum. This is simple common sense, for no turkey votes for an early Christmas. We have an entrenched business encompassing the high and the mighty, and dismantling it would be a determined Herculean task. If we do not dismantle the business framework, we will be fighting the war against terror until the Year 2050, and beyond.
Worryingly, Nigeria does not have the much needed Unexplained Sources of Wealth Act, even though, commendably, Senator Ali Ndume from Borno South is proposing one. It is only by asking people to account for their wealth that we can really get to the root of the profiteering and racketeering industry that has arisen from the war against terror over the past 15 years.
In addition to the forensic audit, the country must now have the intellectual humility to admit that it’s been fighting the war in a wrong way. Faced with guerilla warfare, we need to develop a framework centered on Special Forces as well as an increase in specially-trained ground troops to destroy the terrorists. For example, it is clearly absurd to pursue fleeing terrorists on motorbikes with heavy armour. We should have developed our own Special Forces with their own specially-configured motorbikes, perhaps even using electricity, to pursue, overtake and dismantle them.
It is clear that the development of Special Forces is not in sync with the profiteering and racketeering in Defence expenditure. We must now quickly develop Special Forces as well as strengthen the intelligence framework at the local level and use technology to monitor the movements of the terrorists. Satellite sensors could have monitored the movement of scores of motorcycles moving symmetrically. We must also investigate the failure of intelligence.
Nigeria is in a very terrible situation and the entire sector of the war must now be configured in order to defeat terrorism. The top echelon of the Nigerian Defence system must study unconventional warfare, dating back about 80 years, to see how modern armies had to configure their methods to fight insurgents.
A key example is Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam. Seventy-one years ago, on the paddy fields of Vietnam, a lightly-armed, barefooted guerrilla army, led by a lawyer named Võ Nguyên Giáp, not only defeated but also destroyed the French Army, which had air power, armoured tanks, and the most modern weaponry at its disposal.
The Battle of Dien Bien Phu (March-May 1954) was the decisive engagement of the First Indochina War. Apart from changing the conception of warfare forever, it also showed that a revolutionary ragtag army can defeat one of the best armies in the world. Most importantly, it showed that guerrilla warfare is fundamentally different from state-on-state wars like Nigeria versus Ghana or Togo versus Niger Republic.
The French surrender ended its colonial rule in Vietnam and led to the country’s temporary partition. We must therefore study this as well as other examples of asymmetric warfare to resolve the ugly situation we now face. To put it succinctly, there must be a complete overhaul, for it is now clear that the constant changing of personnel is not the issue. The issue is that the strategy must change! It means that we must have a different force structure within the army!
It must also be noted that an insurgency movement mutates. When insurgents quarrel, which is not unlikely, divisions set in and the groups mutate, moving into different sectors. This means that, instead of fighting three groups, a country may eventually face ten or eleven. So, a country worth its vision and mission on security must anticipate this and nurture its strategic plans.
Eni tó kàn ló mò! (Only the wearer knows where the shoe pinches!). For yours sincerely, the argument that heightened insecurity is merely a pre election narrative for 2027 is too lazy to sound as an excuse. Do we think the parents whose children were kidnapped care a hoot about any election? Have we counted how many of the Chibok girls’ parents are still alive? What of the parents whose children were abducted from St. Mary’s Catholic School in Niger: do we know how many have ended up in the hospital? For God’s sake, when will this madness come to an end?
Again, consider the ancient wisdom: “Àgbàrà òjò kò l’óun ò n’ílé wó. Onílé ni kò níí gbà fun.” (The intent of a heavy storm and flood is to wreak havoc, and that of those to be affected is to prevent it.) This dynamic defines all conflict. It stands to reason that nobody has ever waged unconventional, or even conventional, warfare without successfully infiltrating the security apparatus of the opposition. Unfortunately, this tactic takes a sinister turn in a religious war. Here, there are people who view it as a divine calling, making infiltration a sacred duty.
A school of thought contends that Nigeria’s current crisis is rooted in three interrelated factors: the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, the expansion of Sharia law in several Northern States, and the abandonment of Sir Ahmadu Bello’s vision of a secular penal code. Proponents argue that this shift coincided with a period in which some strands of international Islam turned towards militancy. A good example was the emergence of Osama bin Laden and the broader “war on terror” that reshaped global alliances.
This school of thought, which includes figures like Ayo Osunloye, also points to the perceived alignment of NATO members with Israel’s policies towards Arab and Muslim peoples. They suggest that such external dynamics have reverberated within Nigeria’s borders. According to this view, the 1999 Constitution imposed a largely unitary system that concentrates power at the centre.
Furthermore, they argue that the dominance of a particular religious and ethnic bloc in government, the weakening of independent intelligence institutions, and the absence of egalitarian principles have further eroded the social contract.
The result, they say, is a cascade of symptoms – insurgency, poverty, religious intolerance, ethnic oppression, and discrimination – that have failed to – and cannot – be solved by security measures alone.
The tragedy of our situation is a complex one, as it finds expression in the failure to address key allegations, such as the “clear sabotage” claim raised by Governor Bello Idris of Kebbi State regarding the Maga matter. This silence forces a deeper question: Are we content to remain paralyzed by inaction?
Well, those whose flexible heels have been oiled by the speculative notion that Donald Trump’s ultimate interest was Nigeria’s oil exhibited their hypocrisy by overlooking the fact that our country was a disaster waiting to happen. Trump, in fact, merely drew attention to the calm before an inevitable storm. Had Nigeria acted with the required political will years ago, we would have already tackled the social miasma currently threatening the national fabric. Now that the consequences have materialized, the focus must shift entirely to domestic defense and reform, not to seeking external saviours or breeding scapegoats.
In his Farewell Address on January 17, 1961, former President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against the military-industrial complex – the immense, intertwined power of the defense industry and the military establishment. Eisenhower cautioned that its unwarranted influence could threaten democratic processes and liberties. He urged an alert and knowledgeable citizenry to maintain balance between security and freedom.
After Eisenhower’s speech, John F. Kennedy, who succeeded him, decided that the only way the country could have an effective Defence budget was to bring in Robert McNamara from Ford Motors as Secretary of Defence. McNamara was not a General in the American Army, but he was one of the best managers of his generation. At that time, leaving Ford Motors as President/CEO to become the Secretary of Defence (a post he held from 1961 to 1968) was a pay cut of around 99%. But McNamara accepted the offer.
Remember also General Sir Frank Kitson, formerly the Commander-in-Chief, UK Land Forces, who authored the influential book, Low Intensity Operations. This work details the complexities of guerrilla warfare and describes the various functions the British Army employed to contain insurgencies in different theaters. Because of its practical insights, the book is strongly recommended reading for Ministers Christopher Musa and Bello Matawalle, and, indeed, the entire rank and file of the Nigerian Defence Forces.
