Of Bad Leaders, Unpatriotic Followers

The Advocate

By Onikepo Braithwaite

Onikepo.braithwaite@thisdaylive.com

Lack of Love for Country: Vandalism, Imported Pride and Cultural Self-Neglect 

The things Nigerians do, whether the elite or masses, point to the fact that many of us have no love for ourselves or our country. The social contract between the State and the Citizens, has long been broken by both sides. Just as successive governments have failed to achieve the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy set in Chapter II of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended)(the Constitution), so also have the people failed in the duties set out for citizens in Section 24 of the Constitution, amongst others. 

For instance, when governments put in infrastructure such as expressways and trains for the benefit of all, and at inflated costs too (see Section 15 of the Constitution on the State’s mandate to abolish corrupt practices and abuse of power), the people go and steal the metal railings, under the bridge iron rods (which hold up the bridges along with concrete, without which a bridge can collapse), manhole covers and rail track clips (without which the trains can derail). Perpetrators couldn’t care less if fellow citizens die, as a result of bridge collapse or train derailment. I’m not interested in football, but I find it strange that no one talks about Enugu Rangers, IICC Shooting Stars, Kano Pillars or Stationery Stores anymore; it’s all about Arsenal and Manchester City or United! – our local brands that gave us pride back in the day, are nowhere to be found. We have got into the habit of loving imported things, and neglecting our own. 

In governance, Nigeria has also adopted foreign styles – laws from the British and the legislative system from the Americans, but they have been adulterated, distorted or spoilt in their implementation, being observed in their breach. 

Consensus Candidacy: Elite Anointing Dressed as Democracy 

Last week. I read Dr Dakuku Peterside’s article, “Elite Capture and the Death of Democracy”. He was spot on. He more or less stated that the Nigerian brand of consensus candidacy, not being what consensus candidacy should be in the true sense of the word, is killing democracy, and instead, entrenching autocracy, is fostering division, bitterness and the quest for revenge amongst the unfavoured aspirants who may have felt cheated out of their candidacies, on account of opaque and unfair processes – in short, eliciting the opposite of what consensus candidacy is supposed to achieve. 

The Obi/Kwankwaso ticket for the 2027 Presidency, and the candidacy of Alex Otti for Abia State Governor 2027 may be examples of consensus candidacy, where the Obi/Kwankwaso ticket appears to be agreeable to their party, NDC and for Otti, Abia State stakeholders generally.

Dr Peterside also referred to everlasting debts payable by present-day so-called consensus candidates to their godfathers who chose them, to the detriment of the Nigerian people. See Section 84(2) of the Electoral Act 2026 (EA) on direct primaries and consensus candidacy. I concur. 

Today, the concept of consensus candidacy has been abused. Many Nigerians watched a video where a direct primary was being conducted, and the person counting the number of those who were in the queue for the favoured candidate, shamelessly jumped from No. 54 to 101 in his count, while another counter in an Akwa Ibom State primary jumped from 12 to 1,000! Openly Cheating! We also saw videos of those who alleged that their supporters were denied access to venues where the direct primaries held, to vote for them. We saw former Minister, Isa Pantami, weeping like a new born baby because he didn’t emerge as the APC consensus Gubernatorial candidate of Gombe State. Will the losers end up engaging in anti-party activities? Or will their parties be able to assuage them, with promises of compensation?

To buttress Dr Peterside’s submissions, it can safely be argued that a combination of the EA’s Sections 29(5)(restriction to only fellow aspirants who partook in primaries, to challenge constitutional qualifications as a pre-election matter – meaning that those who emerge from ‘consensus candidacy’ cannot be challenged); 75 (powers of INEC to register political parties); 84(2)(direct primaries and consensus candidates); 60(3)(counting of votes and transmission of results); 138 (restrictive grounds of election petition) & 139(1) (effect of non-compliance with the provisions of the EA) and/or their faulty implementation, have the ability to make  elections less competitive and credible, thereby, further lending credence to the argument of anti-democracy, or civilian autocracy. 

Other Laws Observed in their Breach and Twisted Doctrines

It is unfortunate that, whether at the bottom or top of the ladder, many Nigerians appear to have a penchant for observing our laws in their breach, or manipulating provisions to suit their own purposes. Just as we see it in the ongoing election process, we also observe the same pattern in many other areas. How can Nigeria experience true progress, in such circumstances? 

Most concepts/doctrines that were developed to improve governance, are twisted in Nigeria. For example, instead of the doctrine of separation of powers which is part of the Constitution – see Sections 4,5,6 & 7 thereof, some are arguing that today, on a Federal level, the Executive, Legislature and sometimes the Judiciary are one, while on the State level, the four arms of government, Legislature, Executive, Judiciary and Local Government are all rolled into one, so much so that the landmark decision in AGF v AG Abia & 35 Ors (2024) LPELR-80019(SC) per Emmanuel Akomaye Agim, JSC, sought to pry away the Local Governments (LG) from the State Governments by removing the financial impediment caused by Section 162(5) & (6) of the Constitution. 

In any event, how can we really expect true, external democracy from people who are unable to practice internal democracy within their associations? We cannot. How can an internal system that is borne out of inequity, ‘elite cartels’, the highest bidder takes all, opaqueness and lack of accountability, give rise to legitimate, optimal democratic governance? It cannot. 

INEC Overreach 

Even INEC isn’t left out of the chicanery. Recently, we saw a Judgement Order delivered on 20/5/26 per M.G. Umar J. in Suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/517/2026 Youth Party v INEC, against INEC. It is at the least bizarre, that INEC would use its Guidelines to attempt abridge (shorten) statutory timelines, including, but not limited to the submission of the names of candidates (see Section 29(1) of the EA), particularly with a Professor of Law and a Senior Advocate of Nigeria at the organisation’s helm of affairs. It is actions such as this, that paint INEC in a bad light, as it gives the impression that INEC is trying to hem the parties/politicians in as quickly as possible, despite the fact that its actions were inconsistent with the EA. 

INEC, in its Revised Timetable and Schedule of Activities for the 2027 General Elections, tried to impose earlier timelines on conduct of party primaries; submission of candidates’ personal particulars and lists; withdrawal/replacement of candidates and  related processes like membership register submissions – even giving a May 10, 2026 deadline for submission of party membership registers, when they are to be submitted 21 days before each party’s primaries, congresses or conventions (see Section 77(4) of the EA), meaning that there’s even no universal date for submission of registers, as different parties are holding their primaries on different dates. 

It is trite law, confirmed by a plethora of authorities, that just as the provisions of a statute cannot supersede that of the Constitution (see Section 1(1) & (3) of the Constitution), the provisions of Guidelines which at best, may be referred to as subsidiary legislation, cannot supersede that of substantive legislation. In Nyesom Wike v Peterside (2016) LPELR-40036(SC), the Supreme Court held that the directives, guidelines and manual issued by INEC, cannot be elevated above the provisions of the Electoral Act. In INEC v PDP (2022) LPELR-57389(CA) per Ugochukwu Anthony Ogakwu, JCA, the Court of Appeal held inter alia that, though INEC’s timetable has the force of law as it is made subject to the provisions of the Electoral Act, it cannot override the Principal Act (which is the Electoral Act). 

For example, only in the case of death or withdrawal of  candidates, is substitution of candidates permitted by the EA. Section 31 of the EA gives a candidate a deadline of 90 days before the date of an election to withdraw, while Section 33 thereof gives the political party 14 days within the date of the death or withdrawal of a candidate, to conduct another primary. So, for the Presidential and National Assembly elections scheduled to hold on January 16, 2027, candidates have till sometime in mid-October to withdraw, while those for Gubernatorial and State Houses of Assembly holding on February 6, 2027, have up to early November to withdraw.

El Rufai Bail Irony and Rule of Law Hypocrisy

I saw a video of our learned colleague, Mrs Nasiru El Rufai, calling the public’s attention to the fact that her husband had been in custody for 89 days, and that his bail conditions are onerous. Her concerns are legitimate. Bail is a constitutional right, based on the presumption of innocence (see Section 36(5) of the Constitution). 

However, it appears that one of Malam’s bail conditions is that a Grade Level 17 civil servant who owns a property in Asokoro or Maitama, should be the one to stand surety for him. This is practically impossible, as it would certainly invite EFCC/ICPC scrutiny on such a surety. Granting an individual bail on conditions that may be impossible to fulfill, means that the court wants such a person to stay remanded in custody. Section 162 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 (ACJA) provides inter alia that a Defendant charged with an offence whose punishment exceeds 3 years imprisonment upon conviction shall be entitled to bail, except in certain circumstances such as a high likelihood of jumping bail, interfering with the investigation or witnesses. 

In Akaolisa v Okuma & Anor (2025) LPELR-81140(SC) per John Inyang Okoro, JSC, the Supreme Court held that: “…bail is a constitutional right available to an accused person, which effect is not to set the accused free from the criminal trial, but to release him temporarily from custody and entrust him to attend to his trial upon satisfying the conditions attached thereto”. Also see Suleman & Anor v COP Plateau State (2008) LPELR-3126(SC) per Niki Tobi, JSC. If bail is a constitutional right, then it cannot be taken away through the back door by the courts by setting impossible bail conditions.

However, isn’t it ironical that this is happening to Malam El Rufai? I remember in 2019, when the Kaduna State High Court granted bail to the El Zakzakys to travel to India for medical tourism, a trip that subsequently failed, the same Governor El Rufai/Kaduna State Government, under the guise of ‘strict supervision of the bailees’, sought to add their own additional bail conditions to those that the court had set, including asking for two prominent sureties – an Emir or First Class Chief and another, within Kaduna State. Now the shoe is on the other foot. 

If we had strong institutions, courts would set bail conditions  based on consistent legal principles, not extraneous considerations. 

Conclusion: Strong Institutions Over Strongmen

The moral of Nigeria’s story of self-sabotage, may have started with a mutual betrayal of the social contract between the Government and the people. Though the betrayal may be more on the side of government and on a larger scale in this country, it is however, not unique to Nigeria. The country is desperately in need of stronger/strong institutions, not strong persons/personalisation of power. 

Progress is possible, with a cultural shift from rewarding incompetence and corruption – playing straight mustn’t be allowed to continue to lose to shortcuts; accountability and better enforcement of laws; more autonomy for INEC, political party funding and expenditure reforms; a completely independent Judiciary; alleviation of poverty of the people thereby reducing desperation, by means of job creation/increased opportunities and more economic reforms, and most importantly, restoring security all over the country. 

P.S. Governor Uzodinma

The other day, I saw a post that Imo State Governor, Hope Uzodinma’s tenure ends on 15th January, 2028, and yet, he won the Imo West APC Senatorial ticket for an election that will hold almost a year before his tenure ends. The truth of the matter is that Section 66(1)(f) of the Constitution allows this, as it provides that Governor Uzodinma only has to resign 30 days before the date of the election! This type of move however, intensifies the perception that many have about politicians – that they desire perpetual incumbency.