PDP vs Lamido: Is the Apex Court Interfering with Internal Party Affairs?

The internal crisis that has bedevilled the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) for a while now, has a greater possibility of ensuring that what used to be Nigeria’s main opposition railroads itself into self-destruct mode. The recent judgement of the Supreme Court in PDP v Sule Lamido & Ors, is a clear attestation that the party may be its own worst enemy. The several factions of the party which consequently emerged, are a salutary pointer to that fact that the party’s chances in the 2027 general elections may be almost non-existent. Dr Sam Amadi gives an in-depth review of the Supreme Court judgement, and what it portends for PDP’s  chances in the forthcoming elections, making suggestions to the Supreme Court to develop a more coherent jurisprudence that lower courts can follow, on adjudication concerning the internal affairs of political parties

Introduction 

The recent decisions by the Supreme Court on the matter of disputes about leadership in the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), try to clarify an important new lexicon in political jurisprudence in Nigeria. That lexicon is ‘internal affairs of a political party’. Of course, this is not the first time the Supreme Court of Nigeria has used the phrase in determining matters relating to management of a political party and the conduct of elective primaries. In the famous case of Onuoha v Okafor (1984) SCN, the Supreme Court held that choosing the candidate for an election is an internal affair of the party, subject to its internal mechanisms and constitution. The court cannot impose a candidate on a party, because it is a voluntary organisation to be managed according to rules made by the party. Since then, the highest court in the land has varied its position. In some cases, it has asserted authority to review decisions of parties relating to what may appear as ‘internal affairs’ of the party. In other cases, it has restrained itself from reviewing such matters, in deference to the political branch.

The problem with Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in relation to what is loosely called ‘internal affairs of a political party’ is that, it is not stable and principled. The Supreme Court has vacillated between extreme deference to no deference, from insisting on compliance with internal rules before deference, to full deference without compliance with internal rules. The most damaging aspect of the Supreme Court decisions on non-justiciability of internal affairs of political party, is that they do not provide for lower court a coherent analysis of the issues which will constitute an intelligent guidance for lower courts faced with suits arising from partisan activities. The result of this incoherence, is that we see a disarray in the decisions of lower courts. This creates uncertainty with party management, both on the side of the election management body and the party managers. 

The uncertainty and unpredictability, are unbearable burdens to the development of democracy in Nigeria. The present effort by the Supreme Court in the case of PDP v Alhaji Sule Lamido and Ors (Appeal No: SC/CV/164/2026) to clarify the concept of ‘internal affairs’ of a party, has not succeeded. It has left a problem for application, for lower court Judges. The fact that the court is divided in its decision as to whether the subject- matter of the case is justiciable, further complicates the applicability of the decision to complex political cases in the future. This piece will review the decision, in the light of political jurisprudence of the court.

The Supreme Court as a Political Institution

The starting point of this review of the Supreme Court decision in PDP v Lamido, is to say that it further confirms that the Supreme Court is a ‘political institution’. This description is from Professor Robert Dahl, the eminent US political scientist. In his justly famous article titled “The Supreme Court and National Decision-Making”, he argues that the work of the Supreme Court goes beyond adjudication to policymaking. In his views, the court also protects political dominance, and occasionally, blocks the policies of the ruling coalition from attack. 

In the Nigerian context, the idea of the Supreme Court as a political institution goes to the notion that in its adjudicatory function, the Supreme Court is guided by strategic considerations of national cohesion, stability, and democratic progress. These commitments vary with seasons, and the pedigree and personality of the leadership of the court. Because Nigeria is not deliberately and deliberatively ideological in its politics, we do not see the full colour of ideological divides, and muscular expression in the decisions of the court. But, anyone who has a keen eye, could easily see the variation in the decisions of the court, when they are about democracy and development. 

The Supreme Court as a political institution, is the idea that the court plays a political role of signalling to the rest of the political sector the values and ideals that should regulate politics. The most important role in this regard, is for the court to establish certainty about what each actor in the political landscape can do, and how the relationship between the actors is regulated. The lack of clarity about the principles that guide political actions diminishes legal certainty and, ironically, increases the intervention of courts in the political domain. The courts often lament that, political disputes readily find their way into the courts. But, they fail to trace this crisis of judicialisation of politics, to the indeterminacy of Supreme Court’s decisions. 

This phenomenon of judicialisation of politics reechoes Alexis Tocqueville who argues in Democracy in America that, in America, no soon does a political dispute arise than it becomes a legal dispute. There may be something in the political culture of the United States, that makes it liable to transform all political disputes into legal fight. It may be its extreme individualism, that feeds into litigiousness. For Nigeria, the reason might be legal indeterminacy. The Supreme Court recently, has become ad hoc and contingent in its decisions. The reason is that, oftentimes, its decisions are incompletely theorised. It does not take time to logically establish the basis for the differences it draws between two concepts, such that the lower court or political managers may know with significant precision when one concept is applicable and not the other. I will illustrate this problematic behaviour with the distinction the court tries to draw between matters that are internal affairs and therefore, not justiciable and those that are pre-election matters and therefore. justiciable. This theoretical failure is also a problem arising from too much focus on statutory provisions, and less on concepts and theories.

What is an Internal Affair of the Party and What Does it Matter?

The major issue in the PDP v Lamido case, is whether the matter relating to nomination to political leadership is a matter that the court can adjudicate. The ancillary issue is whether the Federal High Court can exercise jurisdiction on a matter not substantively against INEC, or related to pre-election matter or any of the issues which it has exclusive jurisdiction.

The facts of the case are straight forward. Mr Sule Lamido, a notable leader of PDP wanted to contest party position in a proposed party congress. He made efforts to purchase the nomination form, but was denied one. He went to court to force the party to allow him to purchase the nomination form, and participate in the elective congress. The Federal High Court exercised jurisdiction and granted an order stopping the proposed congress, and requested the party to answer to the suit. In the suit, the Plaintiff joined INEC, asking for a prohibition order against it.   

The Defendants disobeyed the court order, and went ahead to hold the congress. The Court of Appeal nullified the congress on the basis of disobedience of court order, upholding exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court. This decision came to the Supreme Court for review on appeal. The appeal challenges the decision of the Court of Appeal, on the ground that the subject-matter of the suit was not justiciable, because it is an internal affair of the party which a court should not adjudicate. A slim majority of the five Justices of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the matter was justiciable. The court also dismissed the appeal because of the disobedience of court order, in holding the congress. The minority disagree on both the justiciability of the subject-matter of the suit, and the dismissal of the appeal based on disobedience to court order.

It is difficult to clearly analyse the decisions of both the majority and the minority, as regard setting clear judicial policy on management of party affairs. Some of the distinctions the court draws about pre-election matters and internal affairs of the party are not convincing, and do not provide an intelligible guide to lower court Judges and party managers.

The majority, especially the lead Justice, Stephen Jonah Adah, seems to argue sensibly that any matter that relates to failure of party officials to follow the provisions of the party constitution or laws, is a matter that the court can exercise jurisdiction. He argues that “Lawlessness in the political arena, also manifests in the brazen conduct of party affairs in defiance of internal rules and statutory prescriptions. Political parties, though voluntary associations, are subject to the discipline of the law when their actions affect civil rights and obligations of their members and others. Internal democracy is not a slogan; it is a legal imperative. The courts will not hesitate to intervene where party actions breach statutory or constitutional provisions”. This paragraph contains wide range of considerations. 

First, there is no doubt that where the actions of a party breach the Constitution or a provision of the law, it is reviewable. Even if it is an internal affair of the party, it is justiciable. When the party breaches its internal rules, it can be adjudicated by the court at the request of an aggrieved member. Where the party’s management violates the civil rights and obligations of its members and other, the court can exercise jurisdiction. The list is comprehensive. So, what is then excluded from the categories of matters that are not internal matters of the party? 

The argument of Justice Adah is that where, as in this case, a member of a party in good financial standing as a member is denied the opportunity to be nominated for election into the party leadership – something that people would reasonably call ‘internal affairs of the party’- the aggrieved member can seek judicial redress. The minority decision rejects this argument. It does not agree that, such matters should trigger the jurisdiction of the court. They are matters of internal affairs of the party. As the minority thinks the only political matters that are justiciable are pre-election matters, and actions in the nature of injunction and specific performance against INEC. At page 33 of the dissenting judgement, Justice Haruna Simon Tsammani argues weirdly that you cannot sue INEC for its constitutional and executive functions.   

The case revolves around interpretation of Section 283(4), 252 and 223(1) of the Constitution and Section 83 of the Electoral Act. Citing such landmark cases like Magaji v APC (2024) and Ufomba v INEC and ors (2017) the court restated its distinction between internal matters, which are non-justiciable and pre-election matters, which are justiciable. But, these distinctions are not convincing. The logic seems to be that, because internal matters do not arise from codification, they are not justiciable. Pre-election matters are codified; therefore, they are justiciable. This distinction goes to the source of the right that is being claimed or the wrong being complained against, and not about the nature of the right or the wrong. The court’s logic in the distinction it makes about pre-election matter is that it relates to primaries. And, because the statute (Section 83 of the Electoral Act) provides for the right of an aspirant who is aggrieved about a primary election to challenge it in court, that removes it from internal matter of the party and therefore, justiciable. This is not the best way to comprehend pre-election matter. Pre-election matter should include all matters that arise before election, and relating to the conduct of electoral process before the actual voting. Pre-election matters are readily justiciable because the electoral law has provided for right and process for remedy. But, they are still internal matters. But those cognisable by statute. 

The problem with the decisions by the Supreme Court about internal matters of the party, is failure to clearly define what is internal matter, before clearly establishing what kind of internal matter is justiciable and which is not. In dissenting with the majority opinion, Justice Tsammani cited APC v Bala Suliaman and Ors (2022) where the Supreme Court made the distinction between conducting of congress and primary. Conduct of congress to elect party leaders is internal matter, and not justiciable; conduct of primary to elect candidates is not internal affair, and justiciable. In a memorable phrase, he interpreted Section 82(3) of the Electoral Act 2022 to state that whereas, there is a right to vote, there is no right to be nominated. So, the failure of the party to provide Lamido with nomination papers is an internal affair of the party, and not justiciable. As he puts it, “It follows therefore that, while primary elections of political parties are justiciable, matters relating to party congresses or conventions of political parties are non-justiciable” (page 41). This is oversimplification.

Argument in Search of Logic

The problem with the Supreme Court’s varied decisions on how courts should handle what it calls ‘internal affairs’ of political parties is that it confuses the concepts of ‘internal matters’ and ‘political question’. Internal matter of a political party, is anything that relates to its governance and internal directions. Political parties, as voluntary organisations, have a right to make their own rules for self-regulation. As long as those rules do not violate the Constitution or statutes, and are not unlawful for other reasons, the court should not override or anyway interfere in the working of the rules. This is deference. And, the logic is that, the members of the party are entitled to manage themselves as they choose. This is in furtherance of the rights to self-determination and political association. 

The court approach of blanketing ‘internal affairs’ of a political party as non-justiciable, and then struggling to distinguish internal matters from pre-election matters, or distinguishing ‘right to vote’ from ‘right to nomination’ is not logical. All of them are internal matters of the court, by proper definition. The difference is between which is a political question that is not amenable to judicial determination, and legal questions that are judicially manageable. Whether a matter is a pre-election matter in the technical sense in which the Electoral Act defines it, or an internal matter in that it relates to contest over leadership of the party, the yardstick for determining whether it is justiciable is whether it is a matter that relates to whether the party failed to apply its rules to the detriment of members, or whether it relates to an exercise of discretion or outcome of a political processes that are not amenable to judicial determination. Even when the matter is a claim of violation of the rules of game in a political party, the court may undertake other considerations before exercising jurisdiction. Like, determining whether the applicant for judicial review has exhausted available remedies before approaching the court. The problem will not be that it is an internal matter that is non-justiciable. But, that it is not ripe for judicial determination or that it is better handled politically.

It is conceptually wrong to argue that internal matters of political parties are non-justiciable, as the Supreme Court has been suggesting for a long time. The incoherence of such argument shows in the fact that, the court has never been consistent in applying the label to real facts. Sometimes it lets in a matter that is an internal matter of a political party, under a dubious categorisation or differentiation. For one, there is nothing inherently different, between disputes about primary and disputes about congress. They are all internal matters of the party. What the court could say is that, where a statute has provided who should vote in a primary, then violations of such provisions lend to judicial determination as a matter of statute. But, where the right to participate in a congress is derived from the constitution of the party or other established conventions, the justiciability of claims founded on that is not readily justiciable based on statute, but on the determination of the rights and obligations of member of a political organisation. Whether the court will take on such a matter will depend on the substantiality of its legal element and whether the claim is judicially manageable, not that it is an internal matter of the party. Normatively and semantically, an internal matter of a political party is justiciable, once it is founded on some claim of right.

Call for a Better Jurisprudence

It is important that the Supreme Court recovers clarity, in the jurisprudence of political actions. It is good that the judicial policy would be for politicians to be allowed to make their own mistakes and learn from them, as one of the Justices put it. It should be good policy to limit judicial involvement in political disputes. But, the right approach to solving the problem of judicialisation of politics is not to confuse the language of adjudication. Internal matters of political parties should be justiciable once they relate to alleged breach of internal rules of the party, or deny of right or entitlement in an irregular or wrongful manner. The court can control the flow of political questions, by developing a theory of substantiality. What level of legal breach could trigger judicial oversight? In what circumstances should the court refer the dispute to the political branch for determination, and how would it assess which matters require such reversion to the political branch? 

It will be difficult, to establish a proper jurisprudence of political actions. But, it will serve the fortunes of democracy in Nigeria if the Supreme Court as a foremost political institution, develops a more coherent jurisprudence that clarifies to lower courts when to adjudicate internal matters of parties and when not to do so.  

Dr Sam Amadi