Resolving Political Party Disputes through Alternative Dispute Resolution
The Nigerian political party landscape been bedevilled with both pre and post-election contentions, often leading long drawn out litigation, party factions and confusion. This unfortunate phenomenon is peculiar to Nigeria, as no other African country goes through these contentions, at least, not on the massive scale that Nigeria does. Though a plethora of judicial authorities have held that intra-political party disputes are not justiciable, there are still some exceptions to this rule, often leading to litigants putting a spin on their intra-party disputes, so that they fit into the mould of justiciability. In a system that is already clogged, so much of the court’s precious time is wasted on these disputes. Festus Okoye sheds some light on the genesis of these disputes, how they escalate into violence, expulsions and counter-expulsions, formation of new parties and defections, citing lack of internal democracy, imposition of candidates on the party and its members, wrongful and illegal candidate substitutions, abuse of incumbency powers, amongst others, as the reasons for the disputes. He recommends the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution, for the speedy resolution of disputes within political parties
Introduction
It is widely recognised that many political parties in Nigeria face leadership and organisational challenges, leading to crises, deep divisions, suspensions, expulsions, and factional litigation.
Some parties consist of multiple factions and leaders. Some have all their party executives in place, while others operate with caretaker committees. Some have established National Executive Committees, whereas others maintain ‘permanent National Executive Committees’. Individuals own certain parties, and some individuals and groups own multiple parties, aligning them according to the interests they seek to serve.
Certain factions have expelled the party’s national leadership, and those expelled have retaliated by expelling those who expelled them. These actions occur regardless of the constitutional provisions in the parties’ laws, concerning the process for suspending and expelling members. Some minor crises escalate into major divisions, leading to the formation of new parties, defections to them, and bitterness and violence among members.
Some issues that have shaped disputes within Nigerian political parties and affected elections include the lack of internal democracy, the imposition of candidates on the party and its members, wrongful and illegal candidate substitutions, abuse of incumbency powers, divisions within political parties, the authority of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to qualify or disqualify candidates, and electoral irregularities and misconduct.
Most political parties seem unable to utilise their internal dispute-resolution mechanisms effectively, to settle disagreements. Resolving disputes through the judicial system and election petition tribunals often takes years without reaching a conclusion, and the Courts frequently refuse jurisdiction, as most issues are internal party matters. Sometimes, what appears to be a solution simply causes additional problems and increases bitterness and cyclical conflicts.
Therefore, it is crucial to develop innovative methods to assist political parties, their candidates, the executive committees of political parties, and other stakeholders involved in the electoral process in resolving disputes. It is also important to enhance the capacity of members of INEC, support them in acquiring new skills to perform their regulatory roles, and ensure that parties follow the provisions of their constitutions regarding leadership succession, the organisation of meetings, congresses, conventions, and party primaries.
In doing so, it becomes crucial to establish the legal basis for intervention, assess whether amendments to the Constitution and the Electoral Act are needed to incorporate compulsory automatic resolution mechanisms into political parties’ constitutions, and determine if the Electoral Management Body is adequately positioned to assist parties in resolving their internal disputes.
Contentious Issues in the Running of Parties
Some individuals and groups believe they have established and own certain political parties, and must retain leadership indefinitely. They resist efforts to organise meetings of the party’s organs and to hold elections, fearing they will lose their seats. This ‘sit tight’ syndrome causes difficulties, for some political parties.
Although political parties are voluntary associations of individuals, they are subject to constitutionally mandated registration requirements and rules they must follow. Section 223 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) states that the constitution and rules of a political party must provide for the regular election of the principal officers and members of the executive committee or other governing body of the party, on a democratic basis; and ensure that the members of the executive committee or other governing body, reflect Nigeria’s Federal character.
For the purposes of Section 223 of the Constitution, the election of officers or members of the executive committee shall be considered regular, only if held at fixed intervals not exceeding four years; and the members of the executive committee or other governing body shall be deemed to reflect Nigeria’s Federal character only if they come from different States, with not less than two-thirds of all States and the Federal Capital Territory represented.
In Usman v Labour Party (2025) 16 NWLR, Part 2010, 101, John Inyang Okoro, JSC, advised political parties and their members to consistently ensure that their constitutions, rules, regulations, and guidelines guide them in selecting their officers and candidates. This approach would help minimise the frequent internal disputes, that often escalate to court. If a political party’s constitution stipulates a specific term for an officer’s tenure, such an officer should humbly step down once that term expires.
In the same case of Usman v Labour Party (Supra), Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju, JSC. also stated that “In recent times, the stand of this court reinforced since Ufomba v I.N.E.C. (2017) LPELR-42079(SC) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1582)175 is that a political party is like a club or association you join of your own free will. Of course, it has its own constitution, rules and guidelines, just like any other association. The fact that the stakes are high when it comes to election of the leadership of the party, or the executive of the party which takes decisions for other members, does not remove the fact that party members must learn to obey the rules of their party that they voluntarily subscribed to. Most free associations do not allow outsiders-like the Judiciary to determine who manages their affairs. The members of the 1st Respondent, must agree to obey the rules and constitution of their party. The courts will no longer be the peace maker, where the internal wrangling of a political party is concerned”.
For political parties, more complex issues arise when primaries are held in violation of the constitution and party rules. The law is clear: political parties are responsible for organising and conducting primaries to nominate candidates. However, the primaries must be conducted in accordance with Section 84 of the Electoral Act, and the party is legally required to submit the names of the candidates who win the primaries.
The 1999 Constitution, the Electoral Act and Political Conflicts
Conflicts are a natural part of human society and existence. They can lead to positive societal changes, or result in destructive outcomes. The key aspect of conflict, is how it is resolved to prevent it from escalating out of control.
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Electoral Act, 2026, recognise that conflicts may arise during political events and that these conflicts must be resolved for society to progress, or else political disorder will result.
Section 285 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), addresses the resolution of pre- and post-election disputes. Coterminous with Section 29 of the Electoral Act, the Federal High Court holds jurisdiction over pre-election matters as outlined in Section 285(14) of the Electoral Act. Section 285 of the Constitution establishes Election Tribunals, their jurisdictions, and the timetable for resolving electoral disputes.
The Constitution, the Courts, and the Electoral Act, grant political parties exclusive authority to resolve their internal disputes using their own procedures. The parties are responsible for managing issues related to their membership, leadership succession, candidate screening, and decisions on who becomes the party’s candidate. The Federal High Court will only intervene in such matters, if it falls within the scope of Section 285(14) of the Constitution and Section 29 of the Electoral Act.
The Constitution grants the Election Tribunals of the Governorship and Legislative Houses exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions concerning the validity of elections for legislative members. For these elections, the Court of Appeal is the final authority. In contrast, for Presidential Election Petitions, the Court of Appeal acts as the court of first instance. The Supreme Court remains the highest arbiter in cases involving the offices of Governor, Deputy Governor, or Presidential Elections.
The 1999 Constitution and the Electoral Act, 2022, recognise that mistakes can occur, and a candidate who is not eligible to contest elections might still be allowed to stand. It acknowledges that a political party might submit the name of a person, who did not win a valid primary. It also recognises that the National Executive Committee of the party responsible for organising primaries, could be in office unlawfully and unconstitutionally.
A candidate can also win through a blatant violation of the Constitution or the Electoral Act, which may raise issues that must be resolved by the Federal High Court in a pre-election matter, or by election petition tribunals.
Has Litigation been Effective, or are there Alternatives?
Following the 2007 general election, aspirants, candidates, and political parties submitted a total of 1,282 petitions to various election petition tribunals. By 2011, 769 petitions had been filed with the election petition tribunals. In 2015, a total of 663 petitions were lodged with the tribunals. Of these, 87 (13.1%) were annulled by the tribunals, and INEC was instructed to conduct re-run elections in certain polling units or entire constituencies. In 2019, 807 petitions were lodged, prompting the tribunals to order re-runs in 30 (3.71%) constituencies — comprising 3 Senatorial Districts, 13 Federal Constituencies, and 14 State Constituencies. In the same year, the Commission was involved in and defended over 890 pre-election cases. In 2019, candidates and their parties submitted a total of 807 petitions.
As of 6 February, 2023, and before the 2023 general election, the Commission was involved in 1,241 intra-party lawsuits. In the 2023 general election held in February and March, a total of 1,209 petitions were filed, of which 206 were withdrawn, leaving 1,003. A total of 804 appeals were submitted to the Court of Appeal, and 21 appeals were lodged at the Supreme Court regarding the Governorship election, while two appeals were filed at the Supreme Court concerning the presidential election.
Although litigation is part of the normal judicial and democratic process, some candidates in specific elections, political parties, civil society organisations, groups, and key stakeholders in the electoral process are dissatisfied with the performance of the Courts and Election Petitions Tribunals in resolving electoral disputes. The main concerns of stakeholders, centre around how the Courts and Tribunals have handled pre-election and election issues.
The Courts, Pre-Election Issues and Domestic Matters of Political Parties
Regarding pre-election issues, the Federal High Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide matters outlined in Section 285(14) of the Constitution. In this area, the Judiciary has, at times, issued judgements that support democracy and elections. Conversely, in other cases, their decisions have favoured internal party dictatorships and blatant violations of the Constitution and law.
Section 285(14) of the Constitution, has altered the way internal party disputes are managed in Nigeria. It clearly specifies pre-election matters and the internal functioning of political parties. It restricts the courts’ jurisdiction over internal party affairs, yet some courts still assert authority over nearly all issues involving political parties. The Supreme Court has clarified that political parties are voluntary associations, and anyone who disagrees with a party’s operation can choose to leave.
Before Section 285(14) of the Constitution, the courts clarified that their jurisdiction did not extend to internal political issues of political parties. They stated that they could not interfere in political matters, emphasising that such concerns are purely internal party affairs. The cases in this category include those of Dalhatu and Turaki (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 843) 310 and Onuoha v Okafor (1983) 2 SCNLR 224.
However, following amendments to the Electoral Act, the Federal High Court gained jurisdiction to adjudicate on specific actions of political parties, as demonstrated in the cases of Ugwu v Ararume and Amaechi v I.N.E.C. The Court’s limited jurisdiction, must align with Section 285(14) of the Electoral Act.
With amendments to the Constitution and the Electoral Act, pre-election matters continue to flood the Federal High Court. The number of post-election petitions keeps rising, indicating that political parties’ internal conflict-resolution mechanisms remain ineffective, and that litigation has not resolved issues within their internal operations. It also shows that parties and candidates are still dissatisfied with the current mechanisms, for resolving post-election conflicts.
The Electoral Act, 2026, seems to adopt a strict approach that requires litigants and their Counsel to carefully assess whether the Federal High Court has jurisdiction over the pre-election matter they wish to bring. This is because, after filing and litigating, and once the Court determines that the matter relates to internal party affairs, the consequences for the litigant and their Lawyers can be substantial. In other words, Section 83 of the Act, excludes the jurisdiction of the Courts over internal party matters. It also prohibits courts from issuing any interlocutory or restraining order, while the issue is being resolved.
Section 83 of the Electoral Act, 2026, provides that:
(1) The Commission shall keep records of the activities of all the registered political parties.
(2) The Commission may seek information or clarification from any registered political party in connection with any activity of the political party which may be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution or any other law, guidelines, rules or regulations made under an Act of the National Assembly.
(3) The Commission may direct its enquiry under subsection (2) to the Chairman or Secretary of the political party at the national, state, local government or area council or ward level, as the case may be.
(4) A political party which fails to provide the required information or clarification under subsection (2) or carry out any lawful directive given by the Commission in conformity with the provisions of this section is liable to a fine not more than N 1,000,000.
(5) Subject to the provision of subsection (3), no Court in Nigeria shall entertain jurisdiction over any suit or matter pertaining to the internal affairs of a political party.
(6) Where such action is brought in negation of this provision –
(a) No interim or interlocutory injunction shall be entertained by the Court, but the Court shall suspend its ruling and deliver it at the stage of final judgment and shall give accelerated hearing to the matter.
(b) The Court shall, at the conclusion of the matter, impose costs of not less than ₦10,000,000.00 on the counsel who filed the action and not less than ₦10,000,000.00 on the Plaintiff/Applicant and in addition to payment to the Commission of any cost, including solicitors’ fees incurred by it where joined as a party.
With this heavy-handed approach, can litigants and their Counsel explore alternative means of resolving internal party disputes? Or will Section 83 of the Act firmly and unequivocally establish the dictatorship of party godfathers within political parties?
What is to be done?
It is evident that unless we create a new constitutional and statutory framework for resolving pre-election disputes and petitions arising from contested elections, the issues of calling endless witnesses, legal manoeuvres, exhausting appeal procedures, and seeking jurisdiction in election petition matters are likely to continue.
When addressing certain pre-election issues and disputes, we must consider specific variables. Some disagreements within political parties relate to internal management, and to failure to comply with the dictates of the Constitution and the Electoral Act, 2026. Some parties are factionalised, with multiple candidates and nominations for both party and elective offices. Certain parties operate in ways that conflict with established democratic principles. Power and its trappings, particularly in Nigeria, offer a straightforward route out of poverty, and some candidates see securing their parties’ nominations and winning elections, as a matter of survival.
Most political parties’ constitutions, include mechanisms and procedures for resolving internal conflicts. Unfortunately, some leaders responsible for activating these conflict-resolution mechanisms are the source of the ‘conflict’, and lack the moral authority to resolve such disputes. The aggrieved may leave the party, since it is a voluntary organisation, resort to the courts, or remain within the party. Ultimately, the party collapses or is weakened.
The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Political Matters
Given the emotional and emotive nature of political challenges and conflicts, the parties’ inability to resolve them, the penalty embedded in law for activating the jurisdiction of the Court in internal party disputes, and the lack of trust in Courts and Tribunals, are there other methods and mechanisms to address these issues? In other words, can Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms succeed, when parties hold contempt for their own constitutions and rules? Can they function effectively, when parties do not trust the Courts?
Alternative Dispute Resolution includes various procedures or methods that serve as alternatives to court litigation for resolving disputes, often involving a neutral, impartial third party. In some definitions, and more commonly in most jurisdictions, it excludes not only litigation, but all forms of adjudication.
It can be described as a non-binding dispute resolution system, meaning no sanctions are imposed. In other words, the parties are not obliged to comply with any decision or determination resulting from the process, if any. Additionally, the parties are not compelled to participate in or continue with the process, unless specific contractual provisions require them to do so.
The word “alternative” in ADR, generally refers to options other than litigation. Arbitration was initially widely regarded as part of ADR. However, as arbitration has become mainstream in dispute resolution and, due to its adjudicatory nature, the current trend has shifted away from viewing arbitration strictly as part of ADR processes, instead limiting the term to consensual methods. Therefore, arbitration is not considered part of ADR processes.
Most standard works on ADR mainly emphasise mediation or conciliation, rather than arbitration. Effective mediation relies on negotiation skills. A common feature of mediation and conciliation, is that disputes are resolved by consensus. It is entirely a decision made by the parties, not by the third-party neutral, such as the conciliator or mediator.
Alternative Dispute Resolution is employed to ensure that disputes, particularly political ones, are genuinely resolved. Turning to the Courts can be lengthy and severe. Ultimately, parties either succeed or fail. The winning party celebrates, while the losing party retreats to tend its wounds and sometimes, develops counterstrategies to challenge the winner’s mandate.
Alternative Dispute Resolution, however, relies on the competence of arbitrators who may have extensive knowledge of the complex realm of politics. It depends on the level of informality and the quality of procedures. It is quick and cost-effective. It ensures the confidentiality of proceedings, and safeguards the Party’s issues and secrets. It depends on arbitrators’ integrity to prevent bribery and corruption, and to deliver fair justice.
Legal Framework for an Alternative Approach
INEC can settle certain disputes, within its regulatory scope. During registration, each political party submits its constitution and rules to the electoral management body. This constitution outlines mechanisms for leadership succession and dispute resolution. Section 223 of the Constitution also mandates that parties include provisions in their constitutions, for regular democratic elections of key officers and members of the executive committees or other governing bodies of the political party.
Section 223(2) of the Constitution further states that the election of officers or members of the executive committee of a political party, shall be deemed periodic only if it occurs at regular intervals not exceeding four years.
Item 15(c) of the Third Schedule to the Constitution grants the Commission the authority to oversee the organisation and operation of political parties, including their finances, conventions, congresses, and party primaries. This aligns with Section 83 of the Electoral Act 2026, which requires the Commission to keep records of all activities undertaken by registered political parties.
The electoral management body can utilise its regulatory powers, to ensure compliance with constitutional and legal provisions. Any political party that disobeys the instructions and directives of the Commission, risks de-registration under Section 225A of the Constitution.
Issues in Need of ADR
INEC can issue guidelines for resolving internal disputes within political parties, and encourage them to incorporate Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms into their party constitutions. Part of these guidelines and regulations may include the use of ADR Lawyers to settle disputes. The guidelines can specify minimum qualifications and experience for arbitrators. They can also recommend the use of standing institutions and professional ADR practitioners in dispute resolution.
The Guidelines and Regulations may also recommend, including an ADR Contract Clause in the Constitution of Political Parties. This clause would enable parties, through agreement, to resolve disputes using one or more ADR processes. It could be a straightforward, concise clause or an outline of a detailed, complex procedure. It might specify a particular ADR method, such as negotiation, mediation, or arbitration, or leave it to the parties to select a suitable process when disputes arise.
The presence of the clause strongly justifies proposing, discussing, and entering into ADR willingly and on equal terms, without assumptions about each party’s case strength.
However, for ADR to effectively resolve political disputes, certain conditions must be satisfied. Confidentiality is essential in resolving political and electoral disagreements, as parties may wish to keep concessions private. Parties need to trust the arbiters. In other words, the arbiters should not take sides, but simply help and guide the parties in resolving their disputes away from public view.
Conclusion
Alternative mechanisms for resolving challenges within political parties must be established, as these issues can escalate and weaken the electoral process. Political parties should be supported in developing alternative conflict-resolution methods, and encouraged to settle their disputes. The regulatory powers of the electoral management body, when properly exercised, can help prevent a descent into dictatorship and authoritarianism by leaders of some political parties.
Festus Okoye, Legal Practitioner; former INEC National Commissioner
