State Police: Matters Arising
Fola Arthur-Worrey
After many decades of debate and contention, it is the alarming state of insecurity across the country that has finally pushed us as a nation into accepting the concept of state police. And as the draft bill works its way, again finally, to the table of President Tinubu, (the prime advocate, as far back as 2000 when he was governor, of the creation of state police as a fundamental element of federalism and security), there is the hope that we would have solved most of the major challenges faced by our internal security and law enforcement systems, and thus would be able to return to the situation we used to enjoy in the past, i.e., the relative absence of fear.
Many people believe, fervently, that the establishment of state police, without more, will solve the problems of farmer-herder clashes, communal conflicts, kidnapping, ritual murders, armed robbery, cult clashes and crime in general. They believe that a formal police service that is essentially drawn from and supported by the local community (and will replace the many pseudo police agencies that states have created to address local security problems, but which do not have full police powers and capacity) would be highly responsive to security challenges, would understand the local environment and terrain, and would be committed to the safety of the community. But we are not creating vigilante commando, clapped together with almost overnight speed, and with no formal training or rules; rather we hope to establish modern, well trained, professional, well behaved and well equipped agencies, that will fully replace the often uncontrollable and unaccountable/vigilante/hunter groups that have managed to insinuate themselves into Nigeria’s overstretched formal security system, and which, as we have seen in recent times, often fuel tribal conflicts. And we should not think that this would be an overnight process, and so the sooner we establish the ground work for the creation of state police, the better.
Challenges of Police Reform
Police reform, especially decentralization and reorganisation, is a complicated, demanding, time consuming, and expensive process that has to be midwifed and birthed very carefully and delicately. In one country, things were so bad, the police force so corrupt, that the parliament, at the pleading of the president, abolished the whole police force and started all over. We do not want, surely, to replace one problem with a greater one. The challenges of dismantling, recruitment, administration, orienting, resourcing, financing and management, will meet us full in the face when the process of establishment, sustainability and viability of state police kicks in. We do not want state police services that will adopt some of the bad habits of the federal police and so training and orientation will be key. In the area of recruitment, we must ensure that we avoid the risk of unwittingly recruiting rival gang members, cultists and other dubious characters, which could down the road result in internal conflicts or racketeering. I recall some years back when a burglar who was caught in the process of stealing a satellite antenna from the roof of a building was, when searched, found to have on his person a due and newly issued police identity card. We must avoid a situation where politically exposed people (peps) and other influential persons take over the recruitment of personnel.
Indeed, in establishing state police units, we will be embarking on one of this nation’s most challenging constitutional reform efforts ever. We will have to balance local concerns with issues of national cohesion, avoid creating ‘indigenes only’, especially in states that have over time become largely multicultural and cosmopolitan and have large populations of non-indigenes (like Oyo, Lagos, Kaduna, and Abuja), and ensure that whatever systems we adopt do not threaten national unity or foster divisions.
There will also be the issue of disengagement of federal officers and structures from the beats they have exclusively covered since 1966, because, surely, given the jurisdictional divides, we won’t need the numbers and spread of federal officers that we currently have in the states that opt for state police, and that will pose a massive challenge to the administrators of both levels. Yes, I did say “states that opt” for state police, because the sponsors of the state police bill have very wisely made the creation of state police an optional and voluntary one for the states by making it a concurrent item in the constitution, because police now becoming a concurrent issue, states must be the ones to decide whether they feel compelled to establish their own police, or whether, as the eastern region did in the first republic, to rely on the federal police for their law and order needs, especially in view of their financial or political realities.
In terms of physical structures and equipment currently in use under the centralized system, such as divisional police stations, area commands, vehicles and arms, it is expected that the federal authorities will surrender most of them as the federal police shrinks in size and jurisdictional spread, retaining only a few for its specialized units, thereby avoiding waste, and in any event, most were donated to the central police by state governments and local authorities, and it would be ridiculous and wasteful for the federal police to hold on to them while substantially shrinking in size and functions. Also, it will be hoped that states will be allowed quick access to the kind of arms that it considers appropriate to the kind of challenges they face, and that the federal government will not interfere in this process unless of course the type of weaponry procured seems unnecessarily military in design. We realize that firearms are an exclusive item on the legislative list, and so issues of procurement and permission would have to be worked out between the federal government and the states.
Additionally, we know that at least 80% of operational equipment supplied to the police today at their state commands comes from state funds, (as an unfunded mandate) and when a new commissioner is deployed to a state and pays the usual courtesy visit to the governor, the first thing he asks for are patrol vehicles, even if his predecessor had been given some. Radios, ballistic gear, uniforms, boots, rain gear, armoured personnel carriers, patrol boats, fuel and the like are provided for by the state; and so it would be ridiculous and oppressive if the states that opt to establish state police agencies to be expected to continue funding a reduced federal police along with their own police, with its broader jurisdictional mandate, and especially now that there is a Police Trust Fund to cater for the federal police’s extra-budgetary needs.
Deep and critical analysis would have to take place within both the federal and state police ministries or commissions so as to develop a structure with agreed rules for both forces to operate under, and subsequently an independent national police commission to enforce these rules and assure institutional justice and fairness, determine the nature of police public relations so as to protect citizens’ rights, and even some tweaking of the constitution so as to find the right jurisdictional and structural balance as between the federal police with its anticipated highly specialized functions, and the state police, with its main function of local law enforcement and community safety. The boundaries between these functions must be clear, so as to reduce overlap and conflict.
It is important that we focus on the complexities and practicalities of disengagement, re-establishment, and restructuring of existing police architecture, which will require strong administrative measures, measures we have not proven to be that effective with in most fields of governance. You know us: great conception, great plans, a lot of talk, but poor execution. And we know the implications of poor execution, especially in the areas of law enforcement, i.e., policing and operation of courts. We see and feel the impact of poor management of these critical but sectors every day in poor and slow response by the police and endless delays in the courts, and although many reforms have been proposed, and new legislation passed, we are confronted with the same problems of under-resourcing, corruption, poor oversight, incompetence, poor organisation, half-hearted application of the rules, politicization and ethniticization in decision making. It would be exceedingly dangerous to the nation if we adopt such a careless approach to the most significant change ever to our law enforcement architecture, a change designed to fundamentally address our security problems and reestablish law and order.
And these changes are beyond merely putting together a bunch of people, dressing them in uniforms and handing them weapons. Policing, like healthcare, is a very demanding and often dangerous profession, a 24/7 job that requires special skills such as good judgement, and the full support of the authorities as officers carry out their challenging duties, It involves establishing an efficient administrative structure, robust accountability mechanisms, efficient management, the provision and maintenance of cost effective and quality equipment (especially tech), and competence and speed of response as the dominant culture; an ideal and modern working environment, equal opportunity, and the kind of rigid enforcement of disciplinary rules required to face the many challenges we have today. And the officers must receive a good salary and vastly improved working conditions working conditions. Since most of the officers in a state police structure will be permanently deployed in their state, accommodation will be a critical element of improved working conditions. Any state that takes up the challenge of establishing state police would have to think constructively about how to house its police service, and I would think a housing allowance would be the best way to go. It is clear, given the appalling state of barracks today, and the likely cost of maintenance, that some kind of housing scheme might be the way forward, and that the ideal situation would be to have officers living amongst the population, so they can protect the community and gather intelligence.
Police officers, to be effective, must not be perceived by the general public to be low income workers, no matter their ranks, and this is very important if we are to create a new class of policemen that abhor corruption and oppressive behaviour.
Another area of vital importance, and one pointed out by those against state police, is the resolution of jurisdictional issues, i.e., who polices what and where? The federal police are used to having almost total jurisdiction over criminal matters, and reconfiguring the existing structure will be quite a challenge. Ideally, federal police would handle crimes that cross state lines or crimes that arise out of legislatively exclusive items such as currency counterfeiting, aviation, seaports, banking (including robberies), and federal highways (outside of urban areas); and would collate and manage central data bases for DNA, finger prints and other critical data sent to them from the states or recovered by themselves. State police would handle the much wider brief of local law enforcement and community safety such as traffic management, public order, violent crimes such as murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, grievous bodily harm, assaults, domestic violence, property crimes (burglary, theft), serious damage to property, and acts that endanger lives in the public space. It is expected that state police will have the capacity to respond quickly and decisively to bring communal conflicts and the type of deadly attacks we’ve seen in some central states to a halt and reduce the fatalities, and indeed, collect enough local intelligence beforehand to prevent them. That is expected to be one of key the advantages of state police.
All of these jurisdictional changes will require quite some detailed administrative and legislative input, and the safest way to avoid conflict or confusion would be for the national assembly to pass legislation that would set out these divisions and reconfiguration in detail, and which would supersede any of the legislation passed by state houses of assembly in relation to state police.
Because of the anticipated reduction in jurisdiction for federal police, there would necessarily be a concurrent reduction in the number of structures and personnel in each state, and more of an emphasis on specialized policing as is the case with the NDLEA, the EFCC, ICPC, and so on, which are essentially federal units exercising police powers, and effectively, if we look at the constitution, they are federal police with another name. It would, in my respectful view, be very challenging to have large numbers of federal police officers in each state under the new arrangement, as they would be idle most of the time, or would be tripping over each other’s and the state polices’ feet and contesting functions and duties. The police, unlike the armed forces, are not designed to stay permanently in the barracks until called out. A police officer is essentially on 24/7 beat and so it will be the expectation that the managers of the system will find ways to redeploy personnel in such a manner as to get them out of the way of state officers dealing with their own jurisdictional issues, which, as we have said, is much wider, and place them in structures where they are fully and usefully deployed. One way of reducing the number of federal officers, it is hoped, is that improved conditions of service will impel a large number of trained federal officers to move into the ranks of state police, bringing with them experience and service culture (minus corruption and assaults on innocent citizens), which will also help in developing the ethics of the service. If we do not manage the down-sizing of the federal police in a clever way, we are going to find ourselves continually paying for a service that is too large for its purpose. At present we have a police force operating across nearly 3000 divisions spread across all wards and local governments in the country, and while it is true that there will be expected collaboration as a key component for maintaining law and order across jurisdictions, we must avoid a situation where there is a lack of clarity as to who has jurisdictional authority within certain areas, and avoid a situation where power relations come to the fore, when there might be a tendency for federal officers to try and ‘pull rank’ as they say.
In the constitutional arrangement of federal and state police, the federal arm must not be left to hold the opinion that they are the superior arm. Rather, it should be made very clear to them that their functions are limited to the matters set out in the relevant legislation. We must realize that it will take a long time before federal officers come to accept the reality of state police, and that in the new order, state police have supremacy in the areas that the law or the constitution confers on them. If the state police is to have general control over local law enforcement and community safety issues and have the salutary effect on security matters as is expected, then they must be left alone to carry out their duties without interference unless they request it. However, in a situation wherein a crime is taking place and there is no response by state police, then it will be expected that the federal police will intervene to stop the crime and arrest the perpetrators, and then hand them and any exhibits recovered to their state police colleagues, and it is expected also that the state police will do the same. It is important also to expect that, where the federal police are on a national security mission, the state police will stand aside and let them do their will, but only if all the relevant protocols are fulfilled.
It is probable that the federal police develops a regional approach to its duties, i.e., that each geopolitical zone will house a hub, like the current zonal arrangement, and federal officer will operate from there in relation to cross-border and other crimes placed at their table. Patrol of federal high ways would be one of such duties, and so the continuous attacks on victims plying the Kara Bridge in Ogun State for instance would be brought to an end by a well kitted, fast-reaction federal highway patrol on constant patrol in the area. And where armed robbers or kidnappers drive into any state, having committed the crime in a neighbouring state, which will make the crime a cross border one, the federal police will move in, join the pursuit if there is one, and take over apprehension and investigation. A lot of federal work will also be undercover since offences such as currency counterfeiting or bank fraud are done secretly. Meanwhile, policing within the state by state officers will be visible and robust, so the two elements working in collaboration will be quite effective.
With regard to governors calling on federal police to intervene and step in where the state police are overwhelmed in terms of maintaining law and order, it presumes that there is a component of mopol type police somewhere in the vicinity, ready to step in with the capacity to deal with such a situation. But what happens if the situation is beyond their capacity? Do they then request that the army be called in? I think this provision of calling in the federal police needs to be reviewed because I would think that the states would have some capacity to deal with breakdown of law and order, and the army would be their first call if things are getting out of control, rather than a much reduced and highly specialized federal police force, which are probably established in regional hubs perhaps, as I have presumed, according to geopolitical zones.
The current proposal presumes that the federal police is the superior force in terms of size and capacity, reinforcing the belief that the federal police is the stronger and senior of the two structures, the one to be relied upon when things get tough. I think we need to avoid creating a dependency culture, which will just take us back to where we are coming from. But the ideal position ought to be that state police can manage events in their states, and if events are spiraling out of control then the military should be called in or perhaps the civil defence force. The provision providing for federal police intervention means retaining a sort of standby mobile police force in each regional hub, that will be essentially idle until such a time as a governor requests their intervention; and this will be wasteful in terms of men and costs. A streamlined federal police will surely not need a complement of officers who will be actioned only when something is happening in a requesting state, except to deal with cross-border crimes like robbers or kidnappers striking in one state and fleeing into another. And we do not want to create a situation where federal police believe they can step into any matter and take it over because they have misread the rules or they are motivated by politics.
But on a positive note, unburdening the clearly overstretched federal police from virtually all routine police functions, and vesting them on state police is a venture long overdue and ought to improve the internal security situation by multiples. The decentralization of the police will enable it to become more flexible and more accountable. In the past the reference to governors as ‘chief security officers’ was a meaningless appellation as they had no or little control over any of the federal security agencies, but they could create the impression of control in some positive circumstances, or could escape responsibility for security failings by claiming not to have such power in negative circumstances. Now, with state police directly under them and the commissioner appointed by them, they will have to take direct responsibility where there are avoidable failures.
Policing generally should improve with state police generally policing the whole geographical areas of a state, and operating under strong collaborative models where state and federal agencies form multi-jurisdictional taskforces to tackle complex crimes like drug trafficking, terrorism, human trafficking and cybercrime. This should put sufficient pressure on gangs to put them out of business. As federal police units like the federal CID, NDLEA, EFCC, ICPC, NAPTIP and the like pool more resources, personnel and intelligence, they will certainly increase effectiveness, and once the federal and state governments fully implement their police budgets, things cannot but improve.
Federal police will typically host data bases like DNA, finger prints, and intelligence on the movement of hardened criminals and terrorists, and such intelligence would be shared amongst all security and law enforcement agencies nationwide. Federal and state police would exchange data through secure networks and this should help to anticipate threats and coordinate responses to criminal activity across regions.
Fola Arthur-Worrey,
Former Lagos State Director of Public Prosecutions & Former Chief Executive Officer, Lagos State Security Trust Fund,
