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Nigeria in BRICS: Partner Membership as Means of Strategic Autonomy

Bola A. Akinterinwa
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) is an informal group of countries seeking a shift from the classical policy of ‘balance of power’ to ‘rebalancing of power’ in international relations, but the definienda of the new balance of power are yet to be well delineated. It should be recalled that the 16th Century witnessed much of colonialism and wielding of much power by religious monarchs. Legal scholars provided legal doctrines to guide international law and relations. Hugo Grotius’ writing on The Rights of War and Peace, in 1625, was noteworthy. He was considered the ‘Father of International Law’ by especially positing that inter-state relations was not only governed by law, but also that relations between States was also governed by altruism and morality.
More important, there was a shift from the religion-driven law to natural law. The doctrine of pacta sunt servanda was then a major feature. With the then 30-year old war dovetailing into the signing of the 1648 Peace Treaty of Westphalia, the doctrine of sovereignty was not only established, so was the state system. This state system continued with various politico-intellectual challenges until the Congress of Vienna of 1815 during which agreement was reached to have a ‘balance of power,’ which is about distribution of power with the aim of ensuring stability or equilibrium among countries in such a way that there would be no one with the capacity to impose its will on all others.
However, an enduring balance of power has not been possible since then in spite of the efforts of the 1919 League of Nations and those of the 1945 United Nations Organisation. As a result, there has been perception of ‘balance of power’ as an ‘imbalance of power.’ This is gleaned through the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions. Imbalance of power led to BRICS as an idea to begin with and establishment of a group that is now asking for the ‘rebalancing of power’ in international relations. The membership of the BRICS is currently generating concerns internationally, including Nigeria.
BRICS and Nigeria’s ‘Partner Membership’
Nigeria’s ‘partner country’ membership of the BRICS and the intellectual controversies it is currently generating cannot be well understood without first putting the understanding of the dynamics of the BRICS in context, especially the nexus between Nigeria’s partner membership and Nigeria’s ‘strategic autonomy.’ As submitted by Nigeria’s Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Yusuf Maitama Tuggar (HMFA-YMT), ‘strategic autonomy’ is the ‘fulcrum’ of the administration of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu (PBAT). Based on this submission, this column observes and posits that it is the quest for a new status of ‘strategic autonomy’ that not only explains Nigeria’s preference for the status of a ‘partner member,’ but also makes it a desideratum to seek the status of ‘partner membership.’
First, the origin of the word BRIC is traceable to 2001 when Jim O’Neill, Chief Economist with Goldman Sachs, coined the word in his prognosis of the BRIC as individual countries. As a group, the four countries adopted the acronym, BRIC, to found in 2009 an informal organisation. In this regard, the Foreign Ministers of the BRIC met informally on the margins of the UNGA in 2003 and for the first time in 2005, the BRIC, but without Brazil, met for a Standalone Summit in Vladivostoc, Russia. A standalone meeting is one that is held independently of the regular or recurring meetings for specific purposes.
Again on the side-lines of the UNGA, in 2006, the BRIC defence Ministers met. More significantly, in 2008, Russia played host to another Standalone meeting of the BRIC Foreign Ministers in Yekaterinburg. All these preparative meetings paved the way for the first BRIC’s summit held in Yekaterinburg in 2009. This was the genesis of the BRIC. South Africa was invited to join in 2010 and this enabled the addition of ‘S’ to the acronym, to form BRICS. Thus, the BRICS has been operating informally since then. In other words, it does not operate on the basis of a treaty or have an administrative structure like a secretariat to coordinate its activities. The administration of the group is done rotationally by the country hosting the annual summits.
Its cardinal objective is self-help by seeking a new order and rejecting the old. The BRICS wants to have an alternative, if not be the alternative, to the Bretton Woods institutions. Consequently, the West, and particularly the United States, sees the development as a major threat to the current international economic order. And true enough, the BRICS, as individual countries, can constitute serious threats because of their shared values.
As noted in the Commons Library Research Briefing of John Curtis on 11 November, 2024, the BRICS has many interesting shared values: enhancement of economic development; promotion of multilateralism and opposition to non-UN sanctions; and quest for global governance reform, especially at the level of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Bretton Woods institutions. In fact, the major concern of the BRICS is how to reduce reliance on the US dollar. In other words, if a country does not support multilateralism, is not opposed to non-UN sanctions, does not support the reform of the UNSC or does not support the reduction in the heavy reliance on the US dollar, the country does not qualify to be considered as a member, regardless of the country.
Without any whiff of doubt, Nigeria has been in the forefront in the advocacy for UN reform, fairness and justice in the conduct and management of global questions. In various ramifications, Nigeria is very qualified to have been invited as an originating member rather than membership by accession or conferment. It is therefore not a surprise that Nigeria sought membership of the BRICS and the status of a ‘partner country.’
In its Press Release No: MFA/PR/2025/5, the Federal Government of Nigeria ‘accepted the invitation to join BRICS as a Partner Country. The formal acceptance to participate as a Partner Country underscores Nigeria’s commitment to fostering international collaboration, leveraging economic opportunities, and advancing strategic partnerships that align with Nigeria’s development objectives.’ Explained differently, Nigeria sees the BRICS as a ‘unique platform for Nigeria to enhance trade, investment, and socio-economic cooperation with member countries.’
And perhaps more importantly, the Press Release says the ‘partnership also aligns with our national aspirations for inclusive growth, regional integration and active participation in shaping a fair and equitable global economic order in line with our ethos of strategic autonomy.’ From the foregoing, there are two critical issues that have not only paved way for intellectual lull between this Column, Vie Internationale, and Nigeria’s HMFA-YMT, especially in terms of the place of strategic autonomy in Nigeria’s foreign policy. The lull has generated further conversation amongst notable diplomatic scholars and will be discussed subsequently in this column.
Meanwhile, we are much enthused with the various right of replies to my position, and also much happier because the Press Release has lent much credence to my advocacy for the reconceptualization of the diplomacy of 4-Ds as foundational pillars and instruments of strategic autonomy as a foreign policy objective and grand strategy. As noted earlier by HMFA-YMT, strategic autonomy is the ‘fulcrum’ of the administration of PBAT. This is where what I have called ‘Tuggarisation’ in Nigeria’s foreign policy is relevant, particularly as a possible foundation for a foreign policy grand strategy.
Currently, Nigeria does not, stricto sensu, have any relevant foreign policy beyond tactical foreign policy that does not have a foreign policy focus to implement. What the 1999 Constitution as amended considers as foreign policy foci, either severally or collectively are not objectives. Notable real foreign policies of Nigeria include ‘No compromise with Apartheid’ formulated by Foreign Minister (Dr.) Jaja Nwachukwu; Nigeria’s formulation of exception to the rule of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other sovereign states as provided for under Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa made it clear that the brutal killing of President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo by mercenaries could not and should not be considered as an internal affair of any sovereign state. So should apartheid in Southern Africa not be seen as an exclusive preserve of South Africa.
In fact, when Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher violated the policy of ‘No Compromise with Apartheid,’ by selling Nigeria’s crude oil to South Africa using indirect means, General Olusegun Obasanjo promptly nationalised the British Petroleum and the Barclays Bank to the dismay of the British Prime Minister. The actions were manifestations of Nigeria’s foreign policy focus of defending black dignity. However, the policy is no more with the demise of apartheid. Non-intervention principle has also entered into désuétude with the right of the African Union and the international community to intervene in any country in the event of abuses in political governance. The International Responsibility to Protect (IR2P) is a case in point. The inclusion of the right in the African Union Act is another example. Consequently, there is the need to redefine what Nigeria’s foreign policy focus is all about in international relations.
Nigeria-BRICS Partner Membership
In this regard, we contend that ‘strategic autonomy’ should be capitalised on as a technique of political governance under PBAT but, more significantly as a foreign policy focus with the ultimate objective of evolving a foreign policy grand strategy. This is where the beauty of ‘Tuggarisation’ largely lies and why there is the need to further intellectualise the notion of ‘strategic autonomy’ to enable the use of foreign policy to address domestic questions. The BRICS may provide a first opportunity.
Currently, BRICS comprises eleven full members of which four are original members (Brazil, Russia, India, and China, that is , the initial BRIC); one member by accession (South America), and thus changing the acronym from BRIC to BRICS); and six members by kind invitation (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Iran, and Indonesia). Membership by invitation should have been seven had Argentina accepted to join. This means that those countries that accepted to join have compelling reasons, like those refusing to join also have their reasons.
The category of membership that is generating much interest and controversy is that of partner-country membership of which Nigeria is the ninth member after Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. Nigeria’s partner membership of the BRICS+ is quite interesting in light of the implications of international politics of it. On the one hand, there is the US-led Western hostility to the aspirations of the BRIC+ which requires a well-measured approach and response by Nigeria since she wants to join and use the BRICS+ for economic development purposes. This is where emphasis should be placed on strategic autonomy as a foreign policy objective and technique at the level of Nigeria.
And true, on the other hand, Nigeria maintains cordial ties with both the United States and its allies, as well as with China and Russia. Relationship with China is notable, especially in terms of Chinese investments in the area of infrastructural development. China is currently deeply engaged in the provision of rail infrastructure. The same is true of ties with Russia who promised in 2019 to assist Nigeria to complete the Ajaokuota rolling mills. This situation creates the challenge of how not to be the friend of the BRICS and the enemy of the traditional allies. This then raises the notion or concept of non-alignment and strategic autonomy policies at the level of Nigeria, on the one hand, and a ‘partner country’ at the level of the BRICS.
At the level of Nigeria, the principle of non-alignment was largely predicated on strategic autonomy. The notion of non-alignment presumes autonomy and independence. The autonomy necessarily becomes strategic when it is qualified: Nigeria would not ‘blindly follow the lead’ of any bloc and when there would be any need to follow anyone, the decision to do so would be based on ‘objectivity’ of purpose, and most significantly, it would be dictated by Nigeria’s national interest. Put differently, Nigeria’s non-alignment policy never meant that Nigeria would not take side. It only meant that if there was the need to align, objectivity of purpose and national interest would determine.
If strategic autonomy, as told by HMFA-YMT, is explained in the context of Nigeria’s foreign policy concentric circles, it will simply mean that strategic autonomy is in the innermost circle which comprises Nigeria and the immediate contiguous neighbours. It also implies that foreign policy focus shall ensure the autonomous status of the neighbourhood in decision-making towards the outside world. More importantly, the implication cannot but be that autonomy vis-à-vis any country or bloc must be articulated and the interests pursued properly defined.
In this particular case, strategic autonomy cannot mean being autonomous of anyone but independence of decision-making on the basis of Nigeria’s national interest. But how does Nigeria’s strategic autonomy and BRICS’ ‘partner country’ work? Is ‘Partner Country’ a framework for cooperation? If it is, how does it work? Put differently, in which way is BRICS’ ‘Partner Country framework’ different from the ‘Country Partnership Framework (CPF)’ of the World Bank. The CPF is what guides the activities of the World Bank in a given country. It is ‘the central tool of Management and the Board for reviewing and guiding the World Bank Group’s country programs… in alignment with the country’s priorities as spelled out in various policy and strategic documents…’ as recorded in https://openknowledge.worldbank.org.
Apart from the World Bank group’s CPF, there is also the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) which is the African Development Bank’s primary platform for designing its development operations at the level of member countries. In all these cases, Nigeria as a Partner Country cannot but be a special framework that is required to enable the struggle for reform in the UN, as well as the enablement of the BRICS as an alternative to the IMF and the World Bank.
And true, like the original members of the BRICS, Nigeria has many reasons for seeking to join the group. Constitutionally, Nigeria wants to promote and protect the national interest. The act of promoting and protecting is tactical in nature. The objective is the national interest which is not known. Consequently, the objective is at best ambiguous. Nigeria also wants to promote and protect African integration and support African Unity. The ultimate objective is again also ambiguous. The objective of promoting international cooperation and having respect for international law and treaty obligations is only good to the extent of the rule of pacta sunt servanda. The promoting of a just world economic order does not show the real economic objective beyond the general saying that economic development cannot thrive in an inclement, unjust, and unfair environment.
Thus, Nigeria, as noted in the said Press Release, sees the BRICS as a unique platform for her to ‘enhance trade, investment, and socio-economic cooperation with member countries. Nigeria wants to ‘leverage this platform to advance shared goals in trade and investment, energy, security, infrastructure development, technology, and climate change. More importantly, Nigeria ‘looks forward to engaging constructively with BRICS members to drive innovation, foster people-to-people exchanges in line with our national interests and strategic priorities.’ Again, it is about the protection and promotion of a national interest that is always left for Government to define.
In this type of situation, it is possible to construct a bridge between the diplomacy of 4-Ds and strategic autonomy as a pivot. In the words of the HMFA-YMT, ‘the fulcrum of the Tinubu administration’s foreign policy is Strategic Autonomy, providing us with the clarity to engage with any and all nations based on our national interests and not those of others.’ This simply means that the PBAT administration wants to have an epicentre of self-preservation by also being able to control and protect its national interests abroad without hindrance. The HMFA-YMT also said, ‘as a nation, Nigeria is adult enough and sophisticated enough to deal with countries without being unduly influenced, because that has been part of our historical and civic tradition.’ This statement is not different from Tafawa Balewa’s statement that Nigeria will not follow blindly anyone and that whatever decision to align or not to align will be taken objectively. This is acting without being influenced.
Even though both terms, non-alignment and strategic autonomy, are couched in words that gave similar meanings, there is no disputing the fact that the meaning of strategic autonomy being the fulcrum of Nigeria’s foreign policy is different in the context of PBAT’s general administration. It simply means that Government will not allow itself to be unduly influenced in decision-making; that policy decisions will be taken on the basis of objectivity; and that, in the context of Nigeria’s foreign relations, Nigeria will not be deterred by foreign influences. What is particularly noteworthy here is that such a strategic autonomy cannot exist in a vacuum. This is where the 4-Ds are quite relevant. How does each constituent impact on strategic autonomy as an objective? To be strategically autonomous, does Nigeria need to be democratic? What role can Nigeria’s demography play in the attainment of strategic autonomy? What about the Diaspora? The ultimate objective of the 4-Ds is development and so is the essence of strategic autonomy. The way forward cannot but be the conceptualisation of strategic autonomy as a special foreign policy objective to promote Democracy, the Diaspora, Demography, and Development. In other words, the quadrilateral pillars of strategic autonomy should be the 4-Ds.
In sum, as submitted by John Curtis, with the size and potential influence of the BRICs+, the group ‘is certain to expedite the rebalancing of global power away from the West.’ If this is true, Nigeria’s membership trial may be worth it. And true enough, the BRICS+ is currently doing well. For instance, the New Development Bank (NDB) was established in 2014 as an alternative to the World Bank and the International Monetary Bank. It has $100 billion worth of capital already.
And perhaps most interestingly, while the 2023 BRICS summit adopted new criteria for membership (support for UNSC reform; not having imposed non-UN sanctions on another member state of the BRICS, etc.), it was the 2024 Kazan summit in Russia that created the membership category of ‘Partner Countries,’ to which 13 countries have been invited, including Nigeria. The pros and cons of Nigeria’s partner country membership should therefore understand the various environmental conditionings involved it taking their stand.