Whether Defence of Accident Avails Acts done Unlawfully, Wilfully and Recklessly

In the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Holden at Abuja

On Friday, the 27th day of March, 2026

Before their Lordships

Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju

Adamu Jauro

Moore Aseimo Adumein

Habeeb Adewale Olumuyiwa Abiru

Abubakar Sadiq Umar

Justices, Supreme Court

SC/1411c/2019

Between

Imo Denis Akpan Obot                                                                         Appellant

            And

The State                                                                                          Respondent

(Lead Judge delivered by Honourable Abubakar Sadiq Umar, JSC)

Facts

The Appellant was engaged in an argument with one Aniefon Patrick Umoh (the deceased) in front of the deceased’s residence, about whose house is bigger. Following the argument, the Appellant returned to his residence, armed himself with a machete and proceeded to the deceased’s residence, where he attacked the deceased as he emerged from the bathroom, inflicting a fatal injury to his neck. The deceased consequently, died from the injury sustained.

Following the incident, the Appellant was arrested and arraigned before the High Court of Akwa Ibom State, Ikot Ekpene, on a one-count charge of murder contrary to Section 326(1) of the Criminal Code, Cap. 38, Vol. 11, Laws of Akwa Ibom State, 2000. At the trial, the Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. In proof of its case, the prosecution called five witnesses and tendered documentary exhibits, including the Appellant’s extra-judicial statements, the deceased’s post-mortem report and photographs of the deceased’s corpse. The Appellant testified in his defence, as the sole defence witness. In its judgement, the trial court held that, the prosecution had proved the charge of murder beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the court convicted the Appellant and sentenced him to death by hanging.

Dissatisfied with the judgement, the Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, Calabar Division, which affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court. Still dissatisfied, the Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues for Determination

The Supreme Court considered the following three issues for determination of the appeal:

 i. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law, when they held that medical evidence was irrelevant to establish the guilt of the Appellant in the circumstances of this case?

ii. Whether the lower court was wrong to rely on the evidence led by the Respondent’s witnesses?

 iii. Whether PW1 was a tainted witness, and his evidence ought not to be relied upon.

Arguments

On issue one, the Appellant contended that medical evidence was necessary to establish beyond reasonable doubt, that the injury inflicted on the deceased caused his death. He submitted further that the Court of Appeal erred in treating the challenge to the competence of PW5 to give medical evidence as a fresh issue requiring leave of court, when he had raised the issue in his final written address before the trial court, on the ground that PW5 was not a pathologist. The Appellant argued that the competence of PW5 to give medical evidence under Section 55(1) of the Evidence Act was a substantial question of law, which could be raised without leave of court. 

Responding to the submissions, the Respondent argued that medical evidence was not necessary to establish the cause of the death of the deceased, as the testimonies of PW1 and PW2, together with the Appellant’s confessional statements, sufficiently established that the deceased died immediately after being attacked by the Appellant with a machete. The Respondent argued further that, the challenge to the competence of PW5 to give medical evidence ought to have been raised before the trial court. Having failed to do so, the Appellant could not raise the issue for the first time before the Court of Appeal, without obtaining leave. 

In his reply, the Appellant maintained that only a government pathologist was competent, to tender a post-mortem report in a criminal trial. The Appellant relied on STATE v AJIE (2000) FWLR (PT. 16) 2031 and reiterated that, the competence of PW5 was a substantial question of law requiring no further evidence or leave of court.

Regarding issue two, the Appellant submitted that the requisite intention to commit murder was not established, as the Appellant neither intended to kill the deceased nor cause him grievous bodily harm. He argued that PW1 was not an eyewitness to the incident, having neither witnessed the attack nor seen the Appellant inflict the fatal injury on the deceased. He posited that merely hearing the deceased’s cry and subsequently seeing the Appellant holding a machete, wasn’t sufficient to establish the Appellant’s culpability; submitting further that the Appellant acted in the heat of passion following the injury inflicted on him by the deceased, without sufficient time for his temper to cool, and was therefore, entitled to the defence of provocation. The Appellant argued that the contradictions in the testimonies of PW1 and PW4 regarding the time of the incident undermined their credibility, and rendered their evidence unreliable. 

Reacting to the submissions, the Respondent argued that a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his actions, particularly having regard to the nature of the weapon used, the part of the deceased’s body struck, and the severity of the injury inflicted. The Respondent submitted that the defence of provocation was unavailable to the Appellant, as sufficient time had elapsed between the alleged provocative act and the Appellant’s retaliation. Further, that any discrepancy in the witnesses’ accounts regarding the time of the incident was immaterial, and did not affect the substance of the prosecution’s case. 

On issue three, the Appellant argued that PW1, being a blood relative of the deceased, was a tainted witness whose testimony ought to have been treated with caution. He contended that the trial court failed to exercise the requisite caution or seek corroborative evidence, before relying on the testimony of PW1. He submitted that reliance on the testimony of PW1 by the lower courts was perverse, and occasioned a miscarriage of justice. 

The Respondent posited contra-wise, arguing that the Appellant failed to establish any basis for treating PW1 as a tainted witness, as no evidence was adduced to demonstrate that PW1 had any personal interest or ulterior motive in testifying against the Appellant. It maintained that the mere fact that PW1 was the deceased’s brother did not, without more, render him a tainted witness. 

Court’s Judgement and Rationale

In resolving issue one, the Supreme Court reiterated the settled principle of law that, in criminal proceedings, the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased died as a result of the act or omission of the Defendant. Although medical report or autopsy is the standard scientific method for establishing the link, such reports are not always indispensable. The court held that the most prominent exception to the requirement of medical evidence is based on the principle of obvious cause of death, such that even a layperson can reasonably infer it, without scientific expertise. The principle is often applied, in cases where the deceased was healthy before and died after sustaining the injury from a lethal weapon – SANSANI v STATE (2023) 3 NWLR (PT. 1871) 259.

The Supreme Court held that the court, in dispensing with medical report, can rely on cogent and credible confessional, direct or circumstantial evidence, to infer the cause of death. The court will also look at the nature of injury, if the injuries are so severe for which death is the logical outcome. Further, Pursuant to Section 40(1) of the Evidence Act as amended, a statement made by a person as to the cause of their death is admissible. If a victim in danger of death, identifies their attacker or describes the events leading to their fatal injury, this “dying declaration” can be used to prove the cause of death without the absolute necessity of a corroborating medical report, provided the statement is credible. Therefore, the testimony of PW1 about the dying declaration of the deceased that “Imo Denis has killed me” is cogent and admissible.

Deciding issue two, the Supreme Court held that for the defence of accident to avail a Defendant, he must show the following (a) that the act was done by accident; (b) that there was no criminal intention or knowledge; and (c) that the act was done in the course of doing a lawful means and with proper care and caution. The defence of accident does not avail an act done unlawfully, wilfully, recklessly as in the instant case, whereby the Appellant claimed he intended to stab the hands of the deceased.

The Supreme Court held further held that dying declaration is an exception to hearsay evidence. Under Section 39 of the Evidence Act as amended, statements made by persons who cannot be called as witnesses (including those who are dead) are admissible under specific conditions. The justification for this exception, is rooted in the solemnity of the occasion. For a statement to be admitted as a dying declaration under the Nigerian Law, certain conditions must be met, these include: (a) The declarant must have died, before the statement is offered in evidence; (b) the statement must relate to the cause of the declarant’s death, or the circumstances leading to it; (c) the cause of the declarant’s death, must be the subject of the inquiry; (d) the declarant, at the time of making the statement, must have believed himself to be in danger of approaching death – IDAHOSA v IDAHOSA (2020) LPELR – 52018 (SC).

The Supreme Court, relying on its earlier decision in IGENTI v STATE (2025) LPELR-80111 (SC) held that, the defence of provocation does not exonerate or exculpate the accused person. Instead, it acknowledges that the accused acted under a temporary loss of self-control triggered by the deceased’s action. Where the defence succeeds, it has the effect of mitigating the offence to manslaughter. For the defence of provocation to avail an accused person, specific conjunctive elements must be proven: (a) grave and sudden provocation; (b) heat of passion and loss of self-control; (c) absence of cooling time. From the statement of the Appellant, the defence of provocation can no longer avail him, because he did not retaliate on the spur of the moment; he had to run to his house to find machete, before heading to the deceased’s house. Within that period, there is enough time for the boiling passion to have cooled. It follows that the lower courts were right, in holding that the defence of provocation could not avail the Appellant in the circumstances.

With regard to the submission on contradiction of evidence, the court held that for a contradiction to invalidate the evidence of a witness or be fatal to the prosecution’s case, it must be material and touch upon the essential ingredients of the offence charged. In OLANREWAJU v STATE (2022) LPELR-57788 (SC), it was emphasised that a human being is not a supernatural being, and the human faculty may miss minor details due to the lapse of time and errors in narration. If every trial contradiction or put differently, minor discrepancies were to vitiate a trial, nearly all prosecutions would fail. Consequently, the defences of accident and provocation and the discrepancy in time the crime was committed raised by the Appellant, are not substantial to create a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court. 

Deciding issue three, the Supreme Court held that the law does not disqualify a witness, simply because they share a familial or biological bond with a victim or Defendant. Instead, the focus of the court remains on competence, relevance, and credibility of the testimony provided – Section 175(1) of the Evidence Act. Their Lordships held further that there is no law prohibiting a blood relation from testifying for the prosecution, provided the evidence is cogent enough to rule out the possibility of deliberate falsehood or bias. Blood relations of a victim are competent witnesses, and their evidence does not require corroboration. It would be unjust to classify them as automatic “tainted witnesses”, who have their own purposes to serve. Relying on its earlier decision in ILIYASU V STATE (2024) LPELR-62971 (SC), the court held that evidence of a blood relation is admissible and can be relied upon for conviction, but the court must be “wary and cautious”. Once the court warns itself of the relationship and is satisfied that the witness is speaking the truth, it can safely convict based on that testimony. It is not enough that PW1 is a blood relative, the Appellant ought to show that PW1 is indeed, a tainted witness with facts and material evidence, before the evidence of PW1 can be discountenanced.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, and affirmed the concurrent judgements of the trial court and the Court of Appeal, convicting the Appellant for murder and sentencing him to death by hanging.

Appeal Dismissed.

Representation

Chief Paul C. Obi, SAN and Luke Okpalike for the Appellant.

Godwin Udom, Assistant Director (Legal) M.O.J. Akwa-Ibom State for the Respondent.

Reported by Optimum Publishers Limited, Publishers of the Nigerian Monthly Law Reports (NMLR)(An affiliate of Babalakin & Co.)