Whether a Condition Precedent to Instituting an Action Constitutes Bar to Access to Court

In the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Holden at Abuja

On Friday, the 12th day of December, 2025

Before their Lordships

Mohammed Lawal Garba

Tijjani Abubakar

Chioma Egondu Nwosu-Iheme

Haruna Simon Tsammani

Jamilu Yammama Tukur

Justices, Supreme Court

SC/143/2015

Between

Prince Olusegun Aderemi                                                                    Appellant

               And   

1.     Prince Adegoke Adeyemi                    …                   

2.     High Chief Amos Ajayi

       (The Oloje of Aramoko for and on behalf                  Respondents

       of the kingmakers of Alara of Aramoko)

3.     Attorney-General of Ekiti State

(Lead Judgement delivered by Honourable Chioma Egondu Nwosu-Iheme, JSC)

Facts

Following the death of Oba Oluwole Amele, the Alara of Aramoko in Ekiti State, the process for appointing a new Alara of Aramoko commenced. The Arakele/Arosoye Ruling House, being next in line to produce the traditional ruler, submitted a list of 12 (twelve) candidates to the kingmakers. After several unsuccessful attempts to reach a decision, the kingmakers eventually elected the 1st Respondent by a close vote of 7 to 6 on 10th August 2009.

In accordance with the applicable Chiefs Law of Ekiti State, the selection of the 1st Respondent was forwarded to the Ekiti State Government on 19th August 2009, which government approved the appointment and issued an Instrument of Appointment dated 20th August 2009.

On 24th August 2009, the appellant commenced an action before the trial court, challenging the emergence of the 1st Respondent, and seeking to nullify the decisions of the kingmakers, as well as to compel a fresh selection process. The Respondents raised different objections to the suit on several grounds. They also filed a motion seeking that the suit be dismissed owing to the failure of the Appellant to pay the mandatory N25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand Naira) security for costs required before instituting the action.

In its determination of the objection on payment of mandatory security costs before commencement of the action, the trial court held that this non-compliance with a condition precedent deprived it of jurisdiction and consequently struck out the suit. The Court of Appeal affirmed that decision, prompting the Appellant to further appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue for Determination

“Whether the lower court rightly affirmed the decision of the trial High Court in the light of the provisions of the sections of the Chiefs Law of Ekiti State, and the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria”

Arguments

The Appellant argued that his action challenged only the election conducted by the kingmakers and not the appointment of the 1st Respondent as the Alara of Aramoko. He argued that, since the suit was directed at the election process, he was not required to pay the N25,000 (twenty-five thousand Naira) security for costs under the Chiefs Law of Ekiti State, relying on the decisions in NKUMA v ODILI (2006) 2-3 SC 57 AT 61 – 62 and UZOUKWU v EZEONU II (1991) 6 NWLR (PT. 200) 708 AT 784 – 785. He contended that the actionwas against the process leading to the emergence of the 1st Respondent rather than the appointment itself. He argued that non-compliance with the security for costs requirement under Section 11(B) 1 of the Chiefs Law of Ekiti State could not oust the jurisdiction of the court because Sections 6(6) (b), 36(1) and 272(1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), takes precedence over the statute. He submitted, relying on BIYU v IBRAHIM (2006) 8 NWLR (PT.981) 1 AT 50 and IDRIS v ANPP (2008) 8 NWLR (PT. 1088) 1 AT 144-145, that the failure to pay the security for costs was a mere procedural irregularity that could be remedied by an order directing payment, rather than by striking out the suit.

Contrariwise, the 1st and 2nd Respondents submitted that under the relevant provisions of the Chiefs Law of Ekiti State, particularly Sections 8, 10 and 11, the kingmakers’ exercise necessarily culminated in the appointment of the king, with the State Government’s approval constituting the final stage of the appointment process. To establish that the exercise of the kingmakers culminated in the appointment of the king, they argued that the long title of the Chiefs Law of Ekiti State can be called in aid in giving proper construction to the provisions of the law. In support of this argument, they relied on the case of BELLO v ATTORNEY-GENERAL, OYO STATE (1986) 5 NWLR (PT. 45) 828. Further, they relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in ABEGUNDE v ONDO STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY (2015) 8 NWLR (PT. 1461) 314, that the general rule of interpretation of statutes is that where the words of a statute are plain, clear and unambiguous, the court shall give effect to the literal meaning. They submitted further that failure of the Appellant to pay the N25,000 (twenty-five thousand Naira) security for costs as required under Section 11B(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Chiefs Law before commencing the action constituted a failure to satisfy a condition precedent to the court’s jurisdiction, relying on MADUKOLU v NKEMDILIM (1962) 1 ALL NLR (PT. 4) 581. On this point, they relied on NWORA v NWABUEZE (2013) 16 NWLR (PT. 1379) 1, and ALADEJOBI v N.B.A. (2013) 15 NWLR (PT. 1376) 66, to the effect that where a statutory condition precedent to jurisdiction is not fulfilled, the court cannot validly entertain the action.

The 1st and 2nd Respondents rejected the submission of the Appellant that the court should have merely ordered payment of the security for costs, and not strike out the suit as done by the trial and lower courts. They maintained that once the court lacked jurisdiction, the proper order was to strike out the action, relying on B.L.L.S. CO. LTD v M.V. WESTERN STAR (2019) 9 NWLR (PT. 1678) 489 and ATTORNEY-GENERAL, LAGOS STATE v ATTORNEY-GENERAL, FEDERATION (2014) 9 NWLR (PT. 1412) 217.

Court’s Judgement and Rationale

The Supreme Court identified the crux of the appeal as the interpretation of the provisions governing the selection and appointment of an Oba under the Chiefs Law of Ekiti State, particularly the selection process, State approval, and the mandatory security for costs required to challenge an appointment.

The Supreme Court held that under the Chiefs Law of Ekiti State, the appointment of an Oba occurs in three stages: selection by the ruling house, appointment by the kingmakers, and subsequent approval or rejection by the State Executive Council. Therefore, from the relevant provisions of the Chiefs Law of Ekiti State, the decision of the kingmakers to appoint the 1st Respondent on 10th August 2009 constituted an appointment, even though State approval had not yet been given. The court also agreed with the 1st and 2nd Respondents that the long title of a statute, as in this case, the Chiefs Law of Ekiti State, can assist the court in properly interpreting its provisions, as established by the Supreme Court, per Karibi-Whyte, JSC, in BELLO v ATTORNEY-GENERAL, OYO STATE (1986) 5 NWLR (PT. 45) 828 AT 871.

Accordingly, and based on its interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Chiefs Law of Ekiti State, including the long title of the Law, the Supreme Court held that the kingmakers are responsible for appointing the chief, as demonstrated by the repeated use of the words “appoint” or “appointment” in the Law.

 In reaching this conclusion, the court reiterated the established principle that where statutory words are clear and unambiguous, courts must give them their ordinary and literal meaning without resorting to extraneous interpretation, relying on ABEGUNDE v ONDO STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY (2015) 8 NWLR (PT. 1461) 314, ODENEYE v EFUNUGA (1990) 7 NWLR (PT. 164) 618, and CORECNA INTL LTD v CHURCHGATE (NIG.) LTD (2010) 18 NWLR (PT. 1225) 346.

Consequently, Their Lordships held that the Appellant, having challenged the  appointment of the 1st Respondent by the Kingmakers, was required by Section 11B(1)(a) of the Chiefs Law of Ekiti State to pay the mandatory N25,000 (twenty-five thousand Naira) security for costs. His failure to do so meant that he had not fulfilled a condition precedent to commence the action, thereby rendering the suit incompetent.

Importantly, the Supreme Court also rejected the argument of the Appellant that the security requirement violated his constitutional right of access to court. The court noted that even Section 274 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered), makes provision for the State House of Assembly and Chief Judge of a State to regulate court practice and procedure, but these regulations do not necessarily prevent or restrict a person from accessing the courts.

Relying on the decision in ATOLAGBE v AWUNI (1997) 9 NWLR (PT. 522) 535, and OSAKA v ADIGUN (2003) 5 NWLR (PT. 812) 95, the Supreme Court, held that a court is competent upon the fulfilment of any condition precedent to the exercise of its jurisdiction, and that any defect in competence is fatal, as the proceedings are rendered a nullity, however well conducted and decided. Accordingly, any condition precedent may regulate the exercise of jurisdiction, without necessarily denying access to the court – TANKO v UBA PLC. (2010) 17 NWLR (PT. 1221) 80.

The Supreme Court also clarified that a condition precedent is not a bar to accessing the court, but a legal requirement that must be fulfilled before a person can validly institute an action. It does not affect a person’s legal rights or the court’s jurisdiction; rather, it delays the exercise of the right until the required condition is satisfied – ADAMS v A-G, LAGOS STATE (2020) 17 NWLR (PT. 1753) 281.

Finally, the Supreme Court held that once a party fails to satisfy the mandatory condition precedent, the proper order was to strike out the action, as held in B.L.L.S. CO. LTD v M.V.  WESTERN STAR (2019) 9 NWLR (PT. 1678) 489 and A-G., LAGOS STATE vs. A-G., FED. (2014) 9 NWLR (PT. 1412) 217, rather than give the party an opportunity to subsequently pay the security. Accordingly, the trial court was correct to strike out the suit, and there was no constitutional breach thereby.

Appeal Dismissed.

Representation

Ademola Adesina with Maxwell Omeje for the Appellant.

 Akinlolu Makinde with Ayuba Kawu; Ope Muritala and Oluwasola Adesina for the 1st and 2nd Respondent.

Gbemiga Adaramola, Director of Civil Litigation, Ministry of Justice Ekiti State with A.E. Arogundade DCL, CC– Law Commercial & Corporate Law for the 3rd Respondent.

Reported by Optimum Publishers Limited, Publishers of the Nigerian Monthly Law Reports (NMLR)(An affiliate of Babalakin & Co.)