General Yusuf Ali: Operation Safe Corridor Not Designed to Prioritise Ex-terrorists over Victims

The National Coordinator of Operation Safe Corridor, Brigadier General Yusuf Ali, clarifies that the non-kinetic effort of the federal government, code-named Operation Safe Corridor, to counter terrorism and other forms of violent extremism is not intended to prioritise ex-terrorists over victims. Linus Aleke brings the excerpts:

In the light of evolving security threats, what reforms or improvements are being considered to strengthen the credibility and outcomes of Operation Safe Corridor?

Let me begin by stating that Operation Safe Corridor is not static; it is continuously evolving in response to the changing security environment and the realities across different theatres of operation in Nigeria. What we are doing now is strengthening the programme along several critical lines. First is our screening and classification process. We are deepening inter-agency collaboration to ensure that only properly assessed, low-risk individuals are admitted into the programme. This involves close coordination with security agencies, intelligence services and the Ministry of Justice to ensure due process is followed, and that individuals who should face prosecution are clearly separated from those eligible for rehabilitation. We are also working with partners such as the International Committee of the Red Cross to strengthen humanitarian standards, documentation processes and compliance with international best practices in handling individuals associated with armed groups. Second is transparency and strategic communication.

We recognise that many misconceptions exist around Operation Safe Corridor, and these can undermine public trust. As a result, we are making deliberate efforts to clearly communicate what the programme is and what it is not. It is not amnesty, it is not a shortcut to evade justice, and it is certainly not a recruitment pathway into the Armed Forces. Through strengthened engagement with stakeholders, media platforms and partners such as the Office of the Special Presidential Envoy on Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, we are ensuring that the public better understands the safeguards, structure and objectives of the programme. Third is the expansion and decentralisation of our Deradicalisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DRR) infrastructure.

We have moved beyond a single-theatre approach. The establishment of the DRR camp in Tsafe, Zamfara State, is specifically designed to address the peculiar security dynamics of the North-West, while the planned facility in Benue is intended to serve the North-Central region. Other zones are also in the pipeline as part of a broader national framework. This expansion is informed by research conducted by our partners, which shows that over 60 per cent of foot soldiers within terrorist and bandit groups are not ideologically driven, but are individuals who were coerced, abducted or caught up in the dynamics of conflict. This insight is critical, as it underscores that a one-size-fits-all approach is no longer sufficient and that interventions must be tailored to regional realities. Closely linked to this is the strengthening of post-reintegration monitoring and community engagement. Reintegration is not a one-off event; it is a process. We are working closely with state governments, community leaders and local structures to ensure continuous follow-up, support systems and accountability mechanisms for those who have passed through the programme. Finally, and very importantly, the programme is evolving to become more victim-sensitive.

We recognise that sustainable peace cannot be achieved if victims of conflict feel neglected. This is why we are advancing the establishment of Victims’ Rehabilitation and Reintegration Camps, particularly in the North-Central and North-West regions, where communities have experienced significant trauma, displacement and loss. Many victims live with deep psychological scars, and addressing that trauma is just as important as rehabilitating ex-combatants. In summary, the evolution of Operation Safe Corridor is moving in three key directions: stronger screening and accountability, expanded and region-specific infrastructure, and a more balanced approach that addresses both disengagement from violence and healing for affected communities.

Given the ongoing controversy surrounding Operation Safe Corridor, how do you respond to concerns that the programme may be perceived as lenient towards former insurgents?

I understand those concerns, especially from communities that have suffered deeply, and they are valid and must be acknowledged with empathy and responsibility. However, let me be very clear: Operation Safe Corridor is not about leniency; it is about national security strategy and, more importantly, it forms part of a broader, structured response to counterterrorism in Nigeria. Operation Safe Corridor serves as the operational arm of Nigeria’s non-kinetic counterterrorism strategy. While the military continues to apply the necessary kinetic pressure on terrorist and bandit groups, this programme provides a controlled and structured pathway to disengage individuals from violence, reduce the fighting strength of these groups and ultimately weaken their operational capacity from within. In every conflict, there are different categories of individuals. Not everyone found within these groups is a hardened or ideologically committed combatant. A significant number, based on research and field experience, were coerced, abducted, manipulated or forced into participation. Some were children at the time of recruitment, while others were caught within conflict dynamics with very limited choices. For such individuals, de-radicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration are not merely security measures; they also represent a form of restorative justice.

For many of them, the programme offers an opportunity to transition from a cycle of violence to lawful living, while undergoing a structured process that includes screening, accountability, behavioural assessment and rehabilitation. It is important to emphasise that this is not a blanket approach. Those assessed as high-risk, or who have committed prosecutable offences, are not simply reintegrated. There is a clear distinction between those who must face the justice system and those who qualify for rehabilitation based on established criteria. If this pathway were removed entirely, many individuals would remain trapped within violent systems with no incentive to surrender. This would prolong the conflict, sustain recruitment pipelines and increase the burden on kinetic operations. By providing a controlled exit, the programme effectively reduces the manpower available to these groups and encourages further defections.

Therefore, the programme is not about rewarding wrongdoing. It is about reducing violence, disrupting recruitment, encouraging surrender and supporting long-term stability. It also reflects the reality that modern counter-insurgency and counterterrorism cannot rely on force alone; they must combine security operations with rehabilitation, reintegration and community-based recovery. At the same time, we remain mindful of the need to maintain public trust. That is why we continue to strengthen our screening processes, improve transparency and expand engagement with communities and victims. Ultimately, the success of Operation Safe Corridor is measured not by the number of participants, but by how much safer our communities become and how effectively the cycle of violence is broken.

What specific criteria are used to determine which ex-combatants are eligible for deradicalisation and reintegration under the programme?

Let me first clarify this very important point, as there is often misunderstanding surrounding it. Only individuals who voluntarily surrender are considered within the framework that may lead to the Deradicalisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration process. Those who are captured do not automatically go through this pathway. Surrender is a critical starting point because it reflects a willingness to disengage from violence. It is also important to situate this within the framework of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Under IHL, once an individual expresses an intention to surrender or is no longer taking part in hostilities, they are entitled to humane treatment and protection. Nigeria, as a signatory to key international humanitarian instruments such as the Geneva Conventions, has an obligation to uphold these standards. Recognising and properly processing surrendering individuals is therefore not merely a policy choice; it is also a legal and moral obligation in the conduct of armed conflict. Once individuals surrender, they undergo a comprehensive profiling process conducted by both military and civilian intelligence agencies. This stage is thorough and structured, designed to establish the individual’s identity, level of involvement, background and any potential security concerns.

The process then moves into what may be described as a transitional and criminal justice phase, where the Federal Ministry of Justice plays a central role. It is important to state clearly that Operation Safe Corridor does not select or admit participants into the programme. Eligibility is strictly determined by the Federal Ministry of Justice following due legal and administrative review. All individuals who pass through Operation Safe Corridor are those recommended by the Ministry of Justice as eligible for the Deradicalisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration programme under existing legal frameworks. Admission is therefore neither arbitrary nor discretionary. The process is underpinned by a rigorous multi-agency system involving over 17 ministries, departments and agencies, ensuring that decisions are not taken in isolation. In determining eligibility, three key factors are considered. First is the level of involvement, which distinguishes between core fighters, support elements and individuals who may have been associated under duress or coercion.

Second is the risk profile, with individuals carefully categorised as low, medium or high risk based on intelligence assessments and behavioural indicators. Third is the legal status, with the Ministry of Justice determining whether an individual has prosecutable offences or should be processed through the rehabilitation pathway. Only those assessed as low risk and eligible under the law are admitted into Operation Safe Corridor. High-risk individuals are not reintegrated through this process but are handled through appropriate legal and security channels. This clearly demonstrates that Operation Safe Corridor operates within a structured legal, security and institutional framework, and that every individual who passes through the programme has undergone multiple layers of scrutiny, in line with both national procedures and Nigeria’s international obligations.

How do you ensure that individuals who pass through Operation Safe Corridor do not relapse into extremism after reintegration into society?

This is a very important question, and let me state from the outset that no system anywhere in the world can guarantee zero risk. However, within Operation Safe Corridor, we have established a multi-layered safeguard system that significantly reduces the likelihood of relapse and strengthens long-term stability. First, within the camp environment, participants undergo a structured and comprehensive rehabilitation process. This includes religious reorientation to counter extremist narratives, psychosocial support to address trauma and behavioural conditioning, vocational and skills training to prepare them for economic independence, and continuous behavioural assessment to evaluate readiness for reintegration. This phase is not rushed; it is deliberate and designed to ensure that individuals are not merely processed but are genuinely disengaged from violent ideologies. Second, once participants exit the camp, the process does not end there.

Reintegration is carefully managed in collaboration with state governments, community leaders, traditional institutions and security structures. Their biometric data is captured, and community-based monitoring and support mechanisms are put in place. This ensures visibility, accountability and early detection of any signs of relapse. Beyond monitoring, the most critical factor is what we describe as sustainable reintegration. Experience has shown that relapse is rarely just a security issue; it is often driven by economic vulnerability, social rejection or unresolved trauma. If a reintegrated individual returns to a community where there is no acceptance, no livelihood and no support system, the risk naturally increases. That is why we are placing stronger emphasis on the economic livelihood component of the programme. Under the leadership of the Chief of Defence Staff, there is a deliberate effort to expand this aspect so that reintegrated individuals are not left idle or economically disadvantaged. The goal is to ensure that each person leaves the programme with practical skills, livelihood opportunities and, in some cases, start-up support that enables them to become productive members of society.

When an individual is economically empowered, socially accepted and psychologically stable, the incentive to return to violence is significantly reduced. In essence, we are not only removing people from conflict but also providing them with a viable alternative to it. Going forward, the focus remains on strengthening the entire cycle—from rehabilitation to structured reintegration, and ultimately to sustained livelihood support and community acceptance. This is what ensures that those who pass through Operation Safe Corridor remain successfully reintegrated and do not relapse.

Critics argue that victims of insurgency often feel neglected compared to rehabilitated ex-fighters. How is the programme addressing this perceived imbalance?

This concern is valid, and we do not dismiss it. In fact, it is something we take very seriously and are actively addressing as part of the evolution of Operation Safe Corridor. Let me be clear: Operation Safe Corridor is not designed to prioritise ex-fighters over victims. The ultimate objective is peace, stability and healing for affected communities as a whole—both victims and returnees.

Sustainable peace cannot be achieved by focusing on one group while neglecting the other.

We recognise that many victims of conflict, particularly in the North-East, North-West and North-Central regions, are living with deep trauma, displacement, loss of livelihoods and, in some cases, long-term psychological scars. If these realities are not addressed, they can create a sense of imbalance and undermine trust in the entire process. This is why we are deliberately expanding our approach to include structured victim support systems.

These efforts include strengthening psychosocial care, improving access to livelihood opportunities and supporting community-based recovery programmes that benefit both victims and host communities.

In addition, there are ongoing efforts to establish Victims’ Rehabilitation and Reintegration Camps, particularly in the North-Central and North-West regions, to provide a more focused and institutional response to the needs of victims. These centres are designed to address trauma, support recovery and help victims rebuild their lives in a dignified and sustainable manner. We are also working closely with partners, government institutions and community structures to ensure that victim support is not treated as an afterthought, but rather as a core component of the broader peacebuilding framework. If victims feel neglected, it can create resentment, weaken community acceptance of reintegrated individuals and potentially fuel new cycles of conflict. Therefore, the approach going forward is clear: the reintegration of ex-combatants and support for victims must go hand in hand, reinforcing one another as part of a balanced and sustainable pathway to peace.

Can you point to measurable successes or impact indicators that demonstrate the effectiveness of Operation Safe Corridor since its inception?

There are several ways to measure our progress, and it is important to consider both quantitative and strategic perspectives. First is the number of individuals who have been successfully processed, rehabilitated and reintegrated over the years, which runs into thousands. This reflects not only capacity, but also consistency and operational sustainability over time. It demonstrates that the programme is not merely theoretical; it is delivering tangible outcomes. Second is institutional strengthening. Over the years, we have significantly improved our screening processes, refined our rehabilitation modules and enhanced coordination across more than 17 ministries, departments and agencies. We have also aligned our processes with international best practices, earning recognition from global partners. For instance, the International Committee of the Red Cross has acknowledged Operation Safe Corridor’s compliance with humanitarian standards, which speaks to the integrity of the process. Beyond this, Operation Safe Corridor has attracted international attention and recognition.

We have received delegations from other countries and international organisations seeking to study the model, understand how it works and explore how similar approaches can be adapted within their own contexts. This positions Nigeria not only as a participant in global counterterrorism efforts, but also as a contributor of practical solutions. Third, and very importantly, is strategic impact. One of the clearest indicators of success is the increasing number of surrenders. The existence and credibility of the Deradicalisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DRR) programme has created a viable pathway for disengagement.

As a result, over 10,000 individuals have surrendered to Nigerian troops over time. This represents a significant shift, as it directly reduces the fighting strength of these groups and weakens their operational capacity. We have also seen the replication of the model at sub-national levels, such as the Borno State-led reintegration approach commonly referred to as the “Borno Model”. The emergence of these state-driven initiatives is largely influenced by the successes and lessons of Operation Safe Corridor, demonstrating that the concept is both scalable and adaptable. Ultimately, however, the most important measure is the long-term impact. For us, success is not defined solely by numbers, but by the extent to which we reduce recruitment into violent groups, encourage disengagement, strengthen community stability and contribute to sustainable peace across affected regions.

What role do local communities play in the reintegration process, and how are their concerns and security fears being addressed?

Communities are absolutely central to this process. Reintegration does not occur in the camp; it takes place within the community. It is important to clarify that Operation Safe Corridor does not directly carry out reintegration. Rather, it provides a controlled and enabling environment for deradicalisation, rehabilitation and preparation for reintegration. Following this process, clients are formally handed over to state governments, which have the constitutional responsibility to receive, manage and support their reintegration into society. However, the process does not end with that handover. There is a coordinated framework involving relevant ministries, departments and agencies, as well as partners, who continue to monitor, support and provide periodic feedback. This includes agencies such as the DSS, the Nigeria Police Force and the NSCDC, alongside partners like the International Organisation for Migration, all working within their respective mandates to ensure that reintegration is properly managed and that any early warning signs are promptly addressed.

For this reason, even before reintegration takes place, we invest significantly in community sensitisation and engagement. We organise town hall meetings and consultations with traditional rulers, religious leaders and other community stakeholders to prepare the ground. This helps communities understand who is returning, the processes they have undergone and the safeguards in place. We also recognise that communities have legitimate concerns and fears, particularly in areas that have experienced significant trauma. These concerns are not dismissed; rather, they are addressed directly through transparency in screening processes, clear communication of monitoring structures and sustained engagement with community leadership to build confidence. Going forward, we are strengthening this approach by ensuring that communities are not merely passive recipients of reintegration decisions, but active partners in the process. Ultimately, successful reintegration depends on acceptance, support and shared responsibility at the community level.

How do you assess the successes of Operation Safe Corridor in countering violent extremism through non-kinetic means, compared with other countries facing similar challenges?

I believe the best way to assess the success of Operation Safe Corridor is to look beyond the number of individuals who have passed through the programme and ask a more strategic question: has this initiative helped to reduce violence, encourage disengagement and weaken terrorist and bandit groups from within? On that basis, I would say the programme has made significant progress. Globally, there is now a clear understanding that military force alone cannot defeat violent extremism. Countries that have made meaningful gains combine kinetic operations with structured non-kinetic approaches such as rehabilitation, reintegration and community stabilisation.

Operation Safe Corridor represents Nigeria’s contribution to this global approach and serves as the operational arm of the non-kinetic component of our counterterrorism strategy. One of the key successes of the programme is that it has created a credible pathway for surrender and disengagement. Because this pathway exists and is trusted, we have seen increasing numbers of individuals choosing to surrender rather than continue fighting. So far, over 10,000 individuals have surrendered to Nigerian troops. This represents a major strategic gain, as every surrender reduces the manpower available to these groups and weakens their operational capability. In comparative terms, countries such as Somalia have implemented disengagement programmes for groups like Al-Shabaab, focusing on low-risk defectors. The lesson from such experiences is that where screening is weak, programmes can face setbacks. In Nigeria’s case, we have strengthened a multi-agency screening and legal process to ensure that only eligible individuals are admitted, thereby reinforcing the credibility of the programme. In a different context, Colombia—particularly following the FARC peace process—placed strong emphasis on community-based reintegration and long-term livelihood support. This is an area we are also strengthening, especially under the leadership of the Chief of Defence Staff, by expanding the economic livelihood component to ensure that reintegrated individuals become productive and do not relapse. Another important indicator of success is institutional recognition and replication. Operation Safe Corridor has attracted international attention, with several countries and organisations visiting Nigeria to study the model. It has also influenced state-level initiatives such as the Borno Model, demonstrating that the concept is both adaptable and scalable within our national context. At the same time, we do not claim that the programme is perfect.

Like similar initiatives globally, particularly in active conflict environments, it faces challenges—especially in relation to community acceptance and balancing victim support with reintegration. This is why we are continually evolving the programme to include stronger community engagement and more victim-centred interventions. In summary, compared with similar efforts in other countries, Operation Safe Corridor stands as a structured, institutionalised and strategically relevant non-kinetic tool. It is helping to reduce the cycle of violence by encouraging surrender, supporting disengagement and complementing military operations. Going forward, our focus is to deepen its impact through stronger livelihood support, enhanced community ownership and sustained monitoring to ensure long-term stability.