Electoral Act 2026: The Pros and Cons

Last week, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, GCFR, signed into law, the Electoral Act 2026. There have been .sharp divisions about the Law, and the recently released timetable for the 2027 elections, with some complaining that the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), shouldn’t have scheduled the elections to hold during the period of Ramadan, the Muslim fasting period, although it also coincides with the Christian Lent, which is also fasting season for Christian faithfuls. After all, the 2023 elections were held during Lent. But, before the speedy assent to the Electoral Act 2026 by the President, there had been so much strife and debate over certain provisions in the Bill. Festus Okoye; Dr Monday Onyekachi Ubani, SAN; Jonathan Gunu Taidi, SAN; Samson Itodo; Jide Ojo and Ferdinand Oshioke Orbih, SAN analyse some salient provisions of the Act, in the face of these apprehensions  

Constitutional Timelines and Electoral Certainty

Festus Okoye

On Friday, 13th February, 2026, the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Professor Joash O. Amupitan, SAN, announced the Timetable and Schedule of Activities for the 2027 General Election. In accordance with Sections 76(2), 116(2), 132(2), and 178(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the Commission set the Presidential and National Assembly Elections for 20th February, 2027 and the Governorship and State Houses of Assembly Elections for 6th March, 2027.

 Through a stroke of electoral craft, the National Assembly Conference Committee on Electoral Matters finished its work on Monday, 16 February, 2026. The Senate and the House of Representatives deliberated on and approved the Committee’s recommendations on Tuesday, 17 February, 2026, and the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria gave assent to the Bill on Wednesday, 18 February, 2026. 

 To properly understand the context of our electoral process and the issues at stake, it is important to emphasise that, constitutionally, INEC does not share the task of setting election dates with any other government body, agency, or commission. The only condition is that, it must perform this duty in accordance with the Electoral Act. The Electoral Act 2022, which underpins the Commission’s release of the Timetable and Schedule of Activities, no longer exists, and has been replaced by the Electoral Act 2026. Therefore, the Commission must review the items in the Timetable and Schedule of Activities, to ensure they align with the provisions of the Electoral Act 2026. 

 Two related issues, are at stake. The first is that a symbiotic relationship exists between the powers of INEC to set the dates for the Presidential and National Assembly Elections and the Governorship and State Houses of Assembly Elections under Section 132(1) of the Constitution, and the constitutional restriction imposed under Section 132(2) in setting those dates. 

For context and a clear understanding of the issues, it is important to outline the provisions of Section 132(1) and 132(2) of the Constitution. Section 132(1) provides that “An election to the office of the of President shall be held on a date to be appointed by the Independent National Electoral Commission in accordance with the Electoral Act”. Section 132(2), on the other hand, provides that “An election to the said office shall be held on a date not earlier than one hundred and fifty days and not later than thirty days before the expiration of the term of office of the last holder of that office”.

Therefore, in full compliance with these existing legal and regulatory provisions, the Commission scheduled Saturday, 20 February, 2027, for the Presidential and National Assembly Elections, and Saturday, 6 March, 2027, for the Governorship and State Houses of Assembly Elections. As noted by the Commission, the INEC Regulations and Guidelines for the Conduct of Elections, which have been in place since 2019, specify that elections for the offices of President and Vice President, as well as the National Assembly, shall be held on the third Saturday of February in any general election year. Elections for the offices of Governor, Deputy Governor, and the State Houses of Assembly shall take place two weeks later.

 Therefore, it is crucial to analyse the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), and the Electoral Act, 2026, regarding the issues involved in setting dates for the Presidential and National Assembly Elections, as well as the Governorship and State Houses of Assembly Elections, and other miscellaneous matters arising from the signing of the Electoral Act, 2026. A clear understanding of the significance and democratic value of these issues will emphasise the importance of adhering to the Constitution and the law, stressing the need for fidelity to both.

The framers of the Constitution included 150-day and 30-day deadlines for these types of elections in Section 132(2) and the corresponding provisions in Sections 76(2), 116(2), and 178(2). In their wisdom, they incorporated these deadlines directly into the Constitution, underscoring that all authorities and individuals must strictly adhere to them. By embedding these provisions in the Constitution rather than the Electoral Act, the framers elevated their significance and underscored their importance.

In ANPP & Ors v Goni & Ors (2012) LPELR-7830(SC) and Marwa & Ors v Nyako & Ors (2012) LPELR-7837(SC), it was emphasised that the time fixed by the Constitution is as unchangeable as the Rock of Gibraltar or Mount Zion; that such time cannot be extended, expanded, prolonged, or in any way increased; and that if the required action is not taken within the prescribed period, it lapses.

It is evident that the Constitution is not a typical document. It surpasses mere legislation. The Constitution is the grundnorm and the fundamental law of the land. It is not simply a legal document, but an organic instrument that confers powers, establishes rights, and imposes limitations. It governs the affairs of the nation-State, defines the authorities of government bodies, and regulates the relationship between citizens and the State. Once the powers, rights, and restrictions outlined by the Constitution are recognised as valid, their existence cannot be contested in a court of law. This principle is affirmed in numerous judgements, including Marwa & Ors v Nyako & Ors (Supra).

 The Supreme Court of Nigeria has also cautioned against “an unrestrained inclination to disregard the Constitution, and treat its terms with irreverence and disrespect”. Since the Constitution is the highest law in the land, its provisions override any other Act or law, and are binding on all persons and authorities in Nigeria. Any action by a government body, individual, or institution that conflicts with the Constitution is unconstitutional, null, and void.

The implication is that, we must not, under any circumstances, and for political or personal convenience, manipulate constitutional timelines. This is evident in how the framers of the Constitution set the schedule for the constitutional duration for the President, Governors, and members of the National and State Assemblies. 

 Under Section 135(2) of the Constitution, the President shall vacate office after four years from the date on which, in the case of a person first elected as President under the Constitution, he took the Oath of Allegiance and the Oath of Office; and in any other case, from the date the person last elected to that office under the Constitution took the Oath of Allegiance and Oath of Office, or would have taken such oaths but for his death.

Accordingly, the tenure of the current President and Governors of the Federal Republic of Nigeria will conclude on 28 May, 2027, and the National and State Assemblies will be dissolved on 8 June, 2027.

According to Sections 76(2), 116(2), 132(2), and 178(2) of the Constitution, elections for these offices must be held not earlier than one hundred and fifty (150) days and not later than thirty (30) days before the current officeholders’ terms end. This suggests that the country could face a constitutional crisis if a presidential or gubernatorial election is not held on or before 27 April 2027.

 Under Section 134 of the Constitution, a candidate for the office of President shall be considered duly elected when, in an election with more than two candidates, he has the highest number of votes and has secured at least one-quarter of the votes cast in each of at least two-thirds of all the States of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.

If no candidate meets this constitutional threshold, a second election shall be held between the candidate with the most votes, and one of the remaining candidates who secured a majority of votes in the greatest number of States. Where more than one candidate satisfies this latter criterion, the candidate with the highest total number of votes among them shall become the second candidate.

The Commission must hold this second election within twenty-one (21) days of announcing the results. To be duly elected in the second election, a candidate must secure a majority of the votes cast and at least a quarter of the votes in at least two-thirds of the Federation’s States and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. If this does not happen, the Commission must organise a third election within twenty-one (21) days of the previous result, and a candidate shall be deemed duly elected if they obtain a simple majority of the votes cast.

All these constitutional processes must be completed within the 150-day and 30-day windows. To prepare for potential second and third elections, the Commission needs to count back forty-two days from the 30-day constitutional deadline. Thirty days plus forty-two days totals seventy-two days. Therefore, it would be risky to hold a presidential or gubernatorial election after 17 March 2027.

To meet the one hundred and fifty (150)-day threshold, Presidential Governorship elections may only be held between 30 December 2026 and 16 March 2027. To organise elections within this period, the electoral management body must carefully adjust all other timelines specified in the Electoral Act, including those related to submitting registers of members by political parties, conducting party primaries, nominating and withdrawing candidates, publishing the final list of candidates, campaigning, and related matters.

The Electoral Act 2026, has amended certain timelines, requiring the electoral management body to update its timetable and schedule of activities accordingly. This is because, while the constitutional deadlines for conducting elections and the final dates for the President, Governors, and National and State Assembly members to vacate office are fixed, the specific dates and times for other activities are set by the Electoral Act. 

Under the Electoral Act 2026, the Commission can give notice of elections not later than 300 days before the date appointed for the election, compared to 360 days under the Electoral Act 2022. The submission period for the list of duly nominated candidates by political parties is now 120 days, down from 180 days under the previous Act. The period for displaying the full names and addresses of all nominated candidates, has been reduced from 150 days to 60 days. Previously, the Commission had 20 days to invite political parties that nominated candidates to inspect their identity on sample materials. This has been increased to 60 days before the election. 

 Two other significant changes occurred in Sections 60(3) and 84-88 of the Act. Section 60(3) of the Electoral Act 2026 provides that “The Presiding Officer shall electronically transmit the results from each polling unit to IREV portal, and such transmission shall be done after the prescribed Form EC8A has been signed and stamped by the Presiding Officer and/or countersigned by the candidates or Polling agents where available at the Polling Unit: Provided that in all cases, the Form EC8A shall remain the primary source of collation and declaration of the result”.

 The full implication is that, the compilation and declaration of election results at all stages of the process are manual. The proviso has removed all forms of presence from the electronic transmission of results, making manual collation the primary method of result collation and declaration. 

 Furthermore, the electronic transmission of results by the Presiding Officer is sent to the IREV portal, which is not a collation system but a platform created by the Commission for uploading and publishing images of polling unit results for public viewing. IREV functions the same way as the portal for candidate nominations, observer accreditation, media accreditation, and polling agent accreditation. 

Secondly, the Electoral Act 2026, abolished Indirect Primaries, leaving only Direct Primaries and Consensus as methods for candidate nomination. All direct primaries must be carried out in accordance with each political party’s guidelines. 

 A party adopting a consensus candidate must obtain written consent from all cleared aspirants, indicating their voluntary withdrawal from the race and their endorsement of the consensus candidate. If a party cannot secure written consent from all aspirants to select a consensus candidate, it shall revert to conducting direct primaries for candidate nominations for elective positions. A special convention or nomination congress will be held to ratify consensus candidates at designated centres at the National, State, Senatorial, Federal, and State Constituencies.

The Commission, as the sole authority constitutionally empowered to set election dates and determine the timing of other electoral activities in accordance with the Electoral Act, must exercise due diligence when deciding whether it can reschedule the Presidential and National Assembly Elections, as well as the Governorship and State Houses of Assembly Elections, without causing a constitutional crisis. It must recognise that the earliest possible window is January 2027, since extending into late March would violate strict constitutional timelines. The Commission also needs to consider the two scheduled off-cycle Governorship elections — Ekiti State on 20 June, 2026 and Osun State on 8 August, 2026 — alongside the Electoral Act’s sequential timelines for other electoral activities.

Conclusion 

As a people and as a nation, we must avoid political, personal, ethnic, and religious expediency and act in the national interest. We must sidestep avoidable errors and legal complications that ultimately undermine the electoral process and our democratic practices. Fidelity to the Constitution and adherence to the rule of law and due process enable forward-looking, proactive nations to view their constitutions as living documents capable of adapting to changing realities in science, technology, the economy, social relations, and governance. This is why the Constitution provides mechanisms for its own amendment, as it cannot anticipate every circumstance.

 We often fail to foresee constitutional and electoral deadlocks, waiting until they happen before implementing ad hoc measures. When this occurs, we expend energy resolving issues that could have been avoided through foresight and careful planning.

Festus Okoye, Legal Practitioner; former INEC National Commissioner 

Electoral Amendment Bill 2026: Clarifying the Architecture of Electronic Transmission and Collation

Dr Monday Onyekachi Ubani, SAN

From the look of things, Nigeria’s National Assembly tactically harmonised both chambers on the Electoral Amendment Bill 2026, thereby eliminating the necessity for a conference committee. With identical versions passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Bill received Presidential assent timeously.

Three Major Provisions 

At the core of the amendment are three major provisions relating to electronic transmission. First, is the mandatory Electronic Transmission of Results. And, second, is the statutory Recognition of the IREV Portals. The third, is the fallback to Form EC8A in cases of Communication Failure.

 Under the proposed framework, where there is no communication failure, results recorded at each polling unit on Form EC8A, duly signed by the Presiding Officer and countersigned by party agents, must be uploaded to the IREV portal immediately after announcement. Where electronic transmission fails due to communication challenges, the duly completed and signed EC8A becomes the primary document for collation.

Our Legislators appear to justify this proviso as a pragmatic safeguard, against any anticipated  technological or network failures that may disrupt or invalidate the electoral process.

Stakeholders’ Concerns 

Stakeholders have, however, expressed concerns, despite this legislative rationale. Critics argue that the fallback clause may inadvertently create a window for a possible manipulation. Arguably, given that we have achieved improvements in Nigeria’s telecommunications infrastructure, some consider the proviso unnecessary and potentially capable of generating confusion, evidentiary disputes, and post-election litigation. Although the Bill passed both chambers, public confidence remains cautiously divided.

 Recommendations for Institutional Clarity

As the Bill has become law, certain  regulatory clarifications from INEC will be indispensable. They are that INEC Guidelines must mandate immediate electronic transmission upon completion, announcement and signing of results at the polling unit, in the presence of party agents, security personnel, and voters. The temporal element must be precise, to prevent delayed uploads that may undermine transparency. 

Secondly, there must be clear definition of what constitutes “Communication Failure”. The Guidelines must clearly define what constitutes “communication failure”, and who determines the existence of such failure at the polling unit. The objective threshold or duration before failure is declared, must also be spelt out clearly.

We must note that, where  clear parameters are absent, discretionary interpretation may fuel avoidable disputes and election petitions. 

And, finally political parties must invest in voter education and deploy competent, technologically literate agents at both polling and collation centres. The success of any electoral reform depends not merely on statutory text, but on operational vigilance. All  political parties must take note of this advice, and strategise appropriately.

Amid the intense focus on electronic transmission, a less discussed but critical development, appears to be the removal of the reform previously introduced under Section 137 of the 2022 Electoral Act, which aimed to reduce the burden of calling multiple polling unit witnesses where documentary evidence suffices.

Judicial precedents and interpretations have consistently required petitioners to call witnesses from each disputed polling unit, even where documentary irregularities are apparent on the face of the record. Reform on that section became necessary, and it was agreed that witnesses are no longer necessary in the face of overwhelming reliable  documentary evidence. That reform did not scale through, by my observation. If the reform is indeed, removed or diluted, which nobody seems to notice, litigants will continue to face the onerous obligation of producing agents as witnesses from every contested polling unit, in spite of limited time frame to prove his petition.

 This unnoticed provision in the new amendment Bill has profound implications for access to electoral justice, and will require my deeper examination in subsequent analysis.

  While the amendment may not represent the full spectrum of reforms many Nigerians desire, it nonetheless, signifies institutional movement. Electoral reform is evolutionary, and  not  necessarily revolutionary.

Nigeria remains our only country. We must not pray for its failure. Our collective vigilance, goodwill, and commitment to electoral integrity must guide the process forward. Progress may be incremental, but with sustained institutional engagement and civic responsibility, the desired destination is attainable.

Let us have faith, and  keep hope alive!

Dr Monday Onyekachi Ubani, SAN,

Legal Practitioner and Policy Analyst

2026 Electoral Act as Determinant of Nigeria’s Future Electoral Democracy

Jonathan Gunu Taidi, SAN

The Electoral Act 2026

The recently enacted Electoral Act 2026 represents an attempt to recalibrate Nigeria’s electoral architecture, following the operational controversies of the 2023 general elections conducted by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).  From the perspective of electoral jurisprudence and governance standpoint, any amendment to the electoral legislation must be evaluated across three parameters:

Electoral Transparency; Institutional Accountability; and Technological Certainty.

The Act ought to strengthen result transmission clarity, tighten timelines for dispute resolution, enhance internal party democracy, and reduce discretionary ambiguities within INEC. In accomplishing this, the Act becomes a progressive document, taking us further along our quest for a hitch- free, fair and transparent election system.

However, if the amendments introduced vague drafting around electronic transmission, weakened judicial oversight, or reduced enforceability of compliance mechanisms, then, at best, we are looking at cosmetic changes rather than the structural reform we urgently needed.

The amendment on the conduct of primary elections is a commendable one, but INEC’s oversight must be retained and effectively regulated accordingly. Similarly, the increase in punishment for electoral offences is another step in the right direction towards strengthening our democracy.

The fundamental issue is not the passage of a new Act. The real question is, implementation integrity. Nigeria’s electoral challenge has historically been less about absence of law, and more about enforcement discipline.

The test of the 2026 Act will therefore lie in: operational clarity, judicial interpretation, administrative compliance by INEC, and political party conduct.

IREV, BVAS and Technological Integrity

Two major technological instruments remain central:

BVAS (Bimodal Voter Accreditation System) and

IREV (INEC Result Viewing Portal)

BVAS substantially reduced incidents of manual accreditation fraud. Biometric verification, introduced a measurable improvement in voter authentication.

The controversy has been less about accreditation, and more about what happens after accreditation. There is a need to further strengthen post-accreditation processes and procedures, to guarantee accuracy of the accredited facts and figures.

IREV

The legal and political dispute following 2023 elections, centred on whether electronic transmission of results was mandatory or discretionary.

The Supreme Court’s position clarified that the IREV is primarily a viewing portal, and not the legally determinative collation mechanism unless expressly made so by statute. That distinction created political dissatisfaction, but legally aligned with the wording of the then Electoral Act, 2022.

The 2026 Act must therefore:

Clearly state the legal status of electronic transmission as mandatory and not merely discretionary, otherwise the risk survives the amended Act:

Remove ambiguity between “upload” and “collation”:

Define consequences for failure of technological compliance for both the staff, INEC and the election itself.

Technology in elections must be legally binding, not administratively optional, if not, confidence deficits will persist. With the increased participation of young Nigerians, both at home and in the diaspora in the 2023 electoral process and the voter turnout, it becomes imperative to address the issues raised as a result of the aftermath of the 2023 elections, otherwise, the 2027 electioneering cycle will witness an air of unprecedented voter and political apathy arising from widespread lack of confidence in the system and, consequently, in the outcome as well.

2027 Elections During Ramadan and Lent

The 2027 general elections are projected to fall within Ramadan, a sacred fasting period observed by Muslims, and also within Lent, observed by Christians.

It is necessary to approach this rationally and yet, carefully. Nigeria is constitutionally stated to be a secular State by virtue of Section 10 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) which prohibits the adoption of State religion. The Constitution does not elevate, privilege, or subordinate governance to any religion. Public institutions must operate on neutral constitutional principles, not theological considerations.

The real institutional issue, is not whether elections fall within Ramadan or Lent. The deeper governance concern, is electoral design and execution strategy. Responsibility properly lies with INEC to design a system that minimises friction, eliminates prolonged electoral windows, and reduces opportunities for manipulation. 

Nigeria’s current practice of staggered elections across different days and weeks, has several implications:

It creates extended periods of political tension.

It increases operational costs.

It widens the window for logistical breakdowns and litigation.

It fuels complaints about clashes with religious or social activities that are dynamic and calendar dependent.

When elections are compressed into a single national electoral day, many of these secondary controversies reduce significantly. Countries with significantly larger populations, have demonstrated that scale is not an excuse for fragmentation.

For example, India conducts national elections involving hundreds of millions of voters, within a defined and tightly managed electoral window. While India may phase voting across regions for security reasons, results management and institutional coherence are centralised and technologically structured to preserve integrity and transparency.

Nigeria’s voter population, is materially smaller. With robust logistics planning, security coordination, and digital integration, conducting major elections within one unified electoral day is not administratively impossible. The barrier is not capacity. It is operational will and systems optimisation.

If Nigeria is to reduce suspicion and religious tension narratives, INEC must:

Fully institutionalise real time electronic transmission of results.

Make result uploads legally binding, and not merely administrative.

Provide public viewing dashboards accessible to citizens nationwide.

Deploy redundancy systems, to eliminate excuses of server failure.

Integrate accreditation, collation, and publication into one transparent chain.

By strengthening structure, INEC can neutralise the religious debate entirely. Ultimately, the credibility of 2027 will not be determined by whether it falls in Ramadan or Lent. It will be determined by whether Nigerians believe the process was transparent, efficient, technologically verifiable, and constitutionally grounded. That is the standard a secular democracy must pursue.

Final Thoughts

The conversation around these issues, reflects three broader tensions:

Trust deficit in electoral institutions;

Ambiguity in technological enforcement; and

Politicisation of religious identity.

Nigeria must move from personality-driven politics, to system-driven credibility. If the 2026 Electoral Act cures technological ambiguity and enforces accountability, it may well restore public confidence and engender increased participation.

If not, the 2027 elections will be judged not by law, but by perception. And, perception, in electoral democracy, is everything.

Jonathan Gunu Taidi, SAN, former NBA General Secretary; Bencher

Electoral Act 2026: When Electoral Laws Undermine Electoral Integrity  

Samson Itodo

On 18 February, 2026, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu signed the Electoral Act 2026 into law, barely twenty-four hours after both chambers of the National Assembly passed the Bill in a rushed, opaque process that alarmed, civil society groups, and opposition political parties across the country. In a political context where public confidence in elections remains fragile, the passage and assent to the Electoral Act 2026 raise a disturbing question: can electoral laws themselves become instruments of electoral subversion?

 The answer, based on a careful reading of the most contested provisions in the Act, is a resounding yes. Laws that govern elections, carry special obligations. They must be clear, inclusive, participatory in their formulation, and above all, designed to strengthen, not undermine, the integrity of the electoral process. Although the Electoral Act 2026 introduces notable technological reforms, critical elements of its design risk undermining the very objectives it purports to advance.

Electoral Technology: Legal Recognition and Structural Ambiguity

The Electoral Act 2026 contains significant provisions, on the deployment of technology in Nigerian elections. First, Section 47 provides legal recognition for the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) device for electronic voter accreditation. Secondly, Sections 60 and 62, mandate electronic transmission of polling unit results to the INEC Results Portal (IReV). Third, the Electoral Act establishes the hierarchy and primacy of physical results forms, over electronically transmitted results. These new provisions respond to longstanding controversies, regarding the legal status of innovations introduced through INEC regulations and guidelines and the interpretation of the relationship between electronically transmitted results and physically collated forms which has been a subject of intense electoral disputes.

Biometric Voter Accreditation and Discretionary Thresholds

Section 47 governs the accreditation of voters at polling units. Sub-section (1) requires voters to present their Permanent Voters Card (PVC) to the Presiding Officer for accreditation. Sub-section (2) mandates that: To vote, the Presiding Officer shall use a Bimodal Voter Accreditation System or any other technological device that may be prescribed by the Commission, for the accreditation of voters, to verify, confirm or authenticate the particulars of the intending voter in the manner prescribed by the Commission.

This provision has three important implications. First, it legally mandates the use of a biometric device (specifically named as BVAS), moving accreditation beyond manual verification. Second, it allows flexibility by permitting ‘any other technological device’ that INEC may prescribe, enabling the Commission to upgrade or substitute devices without requiring legislative amendment. Third, it retains the power vested on INEC to determine the manner of voter verification.

The technology failure contingency is addressed by Section 47(3): where the BVAS or equivalent device fails in any polling unit and a replacement device is not deployed, the election in that unit shall be cancelled and rescheduled within 24 hours, but only where INEC determines that the result would “substantially affect” the overall outcome in the constituency.

Electronic Transmission and Primacy of From EC8A

Section 60 governs counting procedures at the polling unit level. Sub-section (3) introduces what is arguably the most consequential technology provision in the Act: The Presiding Officer shall electronically transmit the results from each polling unit to IREV portal and such transmission shall be done after the prescribed Form EC8A has been signed and stamped by the Presiding Officer and/or countersigned by the candidates or Polling agents where available at the Polling Unit: Provided that in all cases, the Form EC8A shall remain the primary source of collation and declaration of the result.

This provision resolves a major ambiguity from the 2022 Act, by explicitly designating Form EC8A as the ‘primary source of collation and declaration’. Electronic transmission to IReV is a mandatory, real-time verification tool, but not the instrument of legal declaration. Physical result sheets retain legal primacy.

Section 60(5) further requires the Presiding Officer to transmit results, including total accredited voter numbers to the next level of collation. Collation officers must reconcile transmitted data with physical forms before announcing results (Section 62(4)). Section 60(6) further criminalises wilful contravention of Section 60, with penalties including a fine of not less than N500,000 or imprisonment of not less than six months, or both.

Undoubtedly, electronic data of results and accredited voters provide an independent audit trail, against which manipulated physical forms can be identified. Public access to polling unit results on the IReV can deter large-scale result falsification at the collation stage. However, there are vulnerabilities that this dual verification system creates that could significantly undermine the integrity of elections. If IReV upload is delayed or incomplete, collation officers lose the verification instrument and revert to paper-only collation. The ‘primary source’ designation of Form EC8A renders electronically transmitted results on the IReV of no legal effect. It assigns superior legal authority to physical result sheets, the very instruments most historically associated with result falsification. Consequently, the verification value of electronic transmission may be rendered procedurally subordinate, and legally inconsequential.

Results Management and the Collation Vulnerability

Nigeria’s elections have historically been compromised at the collation stage, where results are aggregated and transmitted from polling units to ward, local government, and State collation centres. It is in this chain between the announcement of results at a polling unit and their final certification, that manipulation usually occurs. The introduction of the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV) under the 2022 Electoral Act was designed to close this window, by enabling real-time public verification of results.

 The original reform proposal before the National Assembly mandated that presiding officers upload results immediately after counting and signing, in real time, while polling agents and party representatives were still present to verify uploads against announced results. This was the provision, that could have transformed Nigerian elections. It was rejected. What Nigerians got instead, is a provision that recognises IReV and mandates electronic transmission of Form EC8A, but crucially, retains physical result sheets as the primary source of collation and results declaration, thereby creating a loophole for manipulation.

The Electoral Act 2026 partially adopts this reform, but ultimately retreats from its transformative potential. While electronic transmission is mandated, the retention of physical forms as the primary legal instrument creates a residual loophole. Where electronic uploads are delayed, incomplete, or contested, collation officers may revert to paper-based collation. The verification mechanism thus, becomes contingent rather than determinative.

Regulatory Responsibility and Institutional Safeguards

Given the deficiencies in the Electoral Act 2026, a significant burden now falls on INEC to fill regulatory gaps that the Legislature failed to address. INEC must urgently publish a revised electoral timetable for the 2027 elections to provide political parties, candidates, security agencies, and civil society with the certainty they need to prepare. More importantly, INEC must issue clear and detailed regulations defining the results management process, including transparent verification procedures. The Commission must also conduct nationwide simulations of electronic result transmission across all polling units. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, the Electoral Act 2026 reflects both progress and regression. It formalises the use of electoral technology, and establishes a statutory audit framework. Yet, by subordinating electronic transmission to physical result forms, it preserves a vulnerability at the very stage where electoral manipulation has historically occurred. When electoral law embeds loopholes or elevates historically vulnerable mechanisms of manipulation, legislative design places electoral integrity at risk. In this sense, the Electoral Act 2026 illustrates a deeper paradox: electoral laws, when insufficiently conceived, may inadvertently undermine the integrity they are intended to protect.

Samson Itodo, Election, Democracy, and Public Policy Enthusiast; Executive Director of Yiaga Africa 

Electoral Act 2026: Gains and Missed Opportunities

Jide Ojo

Introduction

Nigeria is earnestly preparing for her eighth general elections, in 2027. Ahead of that, machinery was set in motion by critical actors and stakeholders, to play their part in the upcoming epochal event. The country’s Judiciary had made profound statements on our last Electoral Act passed in 2022. The Supreme Court, among other things, said the INEC designed result viewing portal known as IREV is unknown to our laws, and as such, could not be the basis upon which alleged electoral fraud of 2023 general elections could be based. 

INEC in February 2024 published its 526-page official report on the 2023 General Elections. By December 2024, immediate past INEC Chairman, Prof Mahmood Yakubu, said the Commission has come up with 142 recommendations to improve the future electoral process. By February 2024, the National Assembly inaugurated House of Rep and Senate Committees on electoral reforms. On Wednesday, February 18, 2026, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu signed the electoral Bill 2026 into law. All efforts were geared towards ensuring better future elections.

National Assembly and Electoral Reforms

The Senate and House of Representatives had been playing pivotal roles, in engendering electoral reforms since 2001 when the first Electoral Act was passed. Controversies led to the annulment and replacement of the 2001 effort with another Electoral Act in 2002. Since then, we have had 2006, 2010, 2022 and now 2026 Electoral Acts, making a total of six electoral Acts since this Fourth Republic started in 1999. Since the first successful effort at amending the Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution in 2010, the grundnorm has been altered five times, with the sixth effort in the offing. The million-dollar question has been, has Nigeria’s electoral democracy improved with all these law reforms? The answer is yes.

There has been significant progress made, in our electoral process. Once upon a time, ballot box snatching and stuffing was the order of the day. Underage and multiple registration were very common. Electoral violence was also a defining factor of Nigeria’s election up till 2011. However, with the infusion of technology, gradually the electoral process is getting sanitised. With the customisation and colour-coding of ballot papers, thugs no longer see any utility value in snatching and stuffing ballot boxes. With the introduction of Permanent Voters Card ahead of 2011 general elections by Prof Attahiru Jega’s INEC, the credibility quotient of Nigeria’s National Register of Voters soared, as voters biometrics captured at registration are now embedded in microchip contained in the PVC. By 2015, when INEC introduced the Smart Card Reader (SCR), that device became another game changer especially as it eliminates impersonation, under age voting and multiple voting. In fact, ex-President Muhammadu Buhari said he would not have won the 2015 Presidential election, but for the deployment of SCR.

However, the courts, including the Supreme Court, said SCR is unknown to our election jurisprudence, even though it was not said to be illegal. That device had to be captured in the 2022 Electoral Act in Section 47(2) when it stated “To vote, the presiding officer shall use a smart card reader or any other technological device that may be prescribed by the Commission, for the accreditation of voters, to verify, confirm or authenticate the particulars of the intending voter in the manner prescribed by the Commission”.

In 2020, INEC came up with another innovation, the INEC Result Viewing Portal which it first deployed in Nasarawa State Constituency election. It was meant to enhance transparency in the result collation management value chain. Thus far, it has been used in several off-cycle Governorship elections, 2023 general elections and the by elections. IREV had enabled those who want to do parallel vote tabulation in their various situation rooms, to do so. However, it’s not a result collation device or database, because it is just a mere upload of the already published EC8A result sheet which had been given to the Polling Agents and the Police, and a copy of which is taken to the Ward Collation Centre to serve as primary ingredients of the collation process.  A copy is even pasted at the Polling Unit, for public to view.

Though there was no formal mention of transmission of result to IREV portal in the Electoral Act 2022, however, the National Assembly said in the following provisions contained in Section 60(5) that “The presiding officer shall transfer the results including total number of accredited voters and the results of the ballot in a manner as prescribed by the Commission”.  In fact, in Section 60(6) there was a penalty prescribed for non-compliance when the law said “A presiding officer who wilfully contravenes any provision of this section commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine not more than N500,000 or imprisonment for a term of at least six months”.

Incidentally, the Supreme Court allegedly said IREV is unknown to our electoral law, even though it was contained in INEC’s guidelines. This is why the 10th National Assembly decided to have it spelt out in the newly signed Electoral Act 2026.

Highwire Drama over Electronic Transmission of Results 

I followed the recent highwire drama by opposition lawmakers and a section of the civil society, who protested and wanted electronic transmission of results without any fail-safe proviso option. To me, it’s all grandstanding and showmanship. There is nowhere in the world where electronic transmission of result is relied upon 100%. There must and should be a fallback position or Plan B, if technology fails. That is already guaranteed in Section 60(3) of the newly signed Electoral Act 2026. 

The most important thing is that, the EA 2026 has now given full legal backing to the IREV portal, and makes electronic transmission of EC8A result sheet mandatory. Election tribunal and other courts will no longer say it is unknown to our electoral jurisprudence.

Salient Provisions in Electoral Act 2026

It is saddening to me that the number of days for INEC to issue Notice of Election and Timetable of Activities has been reduced from 360 days to 300 days, in order to accommodate concerns raised by a section of Nigeria’s Muslim community that the already announced date of February 20 and March 6 by INEC will coincide with Ramadan in 2027. For God’s sake, as it coincides with Ramadan, so it is with the Lenten period of Christians. Assuming the date for the general elections has been inserted in the Constitution as is the case in USA and Ghana, will those agitating for elections not to fall within Ramadan ask that the Constitution be altered to accommodate their belief? When I went to observe Ghana’s Presidential election run-off in 2008, the poll date  fell on Sunday and Ghana’s Christian community did not raise an eyebrow. They simply had their church service, on Saturday.

The removal of Indirect Primary from the tripod of Direct, Indirect and Consensus which was in the 2022 Electoral Act, is also a double-edged sword. While Indirect Primary is prone to vote trading and delegate inducement given the smaller number of electors, the Consensus option that has been retained has the capacity to engender “Baba sò pe” Politics, where a handful of elders determines who gets the party nomination tickets. Imposition of candidates will likely now be the order of the day as is currently the practice in some of the political parties, where one powerful individual or a powerful group determines the party flag-bearers under the guise of adopting the consensus mode of party primary. 

The other provision that says election funds should be released to INEC six months to the general election, is a dangerous provision. Six months may be too short, for INEC to do many of its multi-billion procurement. The one-year provision in the Electoral Act 2022 should have been retained.

Missed Opportunities 

It is unfortunate that NASS kept the sixth Constitution alteration effort in limbo while giving priority to the Electoral Act, when they know that there may be need for consequential alteration of the Electoral Act when the Constitution is eventually altered. What the 10th NASS has done, like their 9th NASS counterpart, is to put the cart before the horse. They passed the Electoral Act, before the Constitution amendment. 

Other opportunities the current reform has missed, include lack of provision for early voting, voting by proxy, Diaspora voting, and voting by prisoners. Expanding voting rights including reducing age qualification to seek election from 25 years to 21 years as is the case in Ghana, are all lost in the current round of electoral reform.

Conclusion

Now that we have a new Electoral Act 2026, it behooves INEC, National Orientation Agency, the Media and Civil Society Organisations to study this new piece of legislation and educate the masses on the key provisions. Political parties and candidates should note that, rather than putting their hopes on electronic transmission of results to the IREV portal, they should mobilise resources and ensure that they field a corps of well-trained Polling Agents, who can be their whistleblowers when electoral fraud is afoot and whose exhibits and oral testimonies in court and tribunal carry weight in determining electoral fraud cases. I do hope that INEC, political parties and other stakeholders who are duty bearers in the electoral process, will keep fidelity with the new Electoral Act 2026 in the performance of their electoral duties.

Jide Ojo, Development Consultant, Author and Public Affairs Analyst

Electronic Transmission of Results: Much Ado About Nothing 

Ferdinand Oshioke Orbih, SAN

The Electoral Act 2022

Section 60 of the Electoral Act, 2022, outlines the procedure for counting votes and handling election forms at the polling unit. Specifically, Section 60(1) mandates the Presiding Officer, after counting votes, to enter the scores for each candidate into a form prescribed by INEC. This form must be signed and stamped by the Presiding Officer and counter-signed by candidates or their polling agents, as per Section 60(2). Crucially, Section 60(3) requires the Presiding Officer to give copies of the completed forms to polling agents and the police officer present. Furthermore, Section 60 (4) states that the Presiding Officer shall “transmit the result including the total number of accredited voters and the results of the ballot in a manner prescribed by the Commission.” Section 60 (5) then provides that the Presiding Officer shall transfer the results, along with the ballot paper account and the tendered ballot paper statement, to the collation officer of the ward, in a sealed envelope.

Complementing the provisions of Section 60, Section 62(1) of the Electoral Act 2022, stipulates that after recording and announcing the result, the Presiding Officer shall deliver the same along with election materials under security to a person prescribed by the Commission. More significantly, Section 62(2) mandates the Commission to “compile, maintain and update, on a continuous basis, a register of election results to be known as the National Electronic Register of Election Results which shall be a distinct database or repository…”. This provision is the statutory basis for the IReV portal, which is designed for transparency and public access to election results.

Additionally, Section 118(1) of the State Government (Basic Constitutional and Transition Provisions) Act, 1991, designates the Chief Electoral Officer of the Federation or a delegated officer, to announce election results. Section 118(2) criminalises the unofficial announcement of results, reinforcing the official process.

Judicial Interpretation and the Role of IReV

Notwithstanding the provisions of the Electoral Act 2022, particularly Section 60(4) and Section 62(2), the Supreme Court has consistently held that the electronic transmission of results to the IReV portal is not a mandatory condition precedent for the validity of an election. The Apex Court has clarified that, while the IReV portal is a laudable technological innovation aimed at enhancing transparency, it does not supersede the manual collation process as the primary and legally recognised method for determining election results.

In Oyetola & Anor v INEC & Ors (2023) LPELR-60392(SC), the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the law requires immediate transmission of polling unit results to the INEC database during the poll. The Court emphasised that the Electoral Act 2022, while providing for electronic transmission, does not make it the sole or mandatory means of collation. The manual collation of results, evidenced by the signed and stamped forms (Form EC8A, EC8B, etc.), remains the legally recognised method.

 This position was reiterated in Atiku & Anor v INEC & ORS (2023) LPELR-61556(SC), where the Supreme Court further clarified that the failure to transmit results electronically to the IReV portal, or any glitches encountered during such transmission, does not invalidate an election result that has been properly collated manually and declared. The Court held that the IReV portal is a technological innovation for transparency, but the primary evidence of election results remains the physical forms signed at the polling units and subsequent collation centres.

More recently, in Lawal v. Maitawalle & Ors (2024) LPELR-61856(SC) and Ifeanyi & Anor v INEC & Ors (2024) LPELR-61713(SC), the Supreme Court maintained this stance. These judgements consistently affirm that the provisions of the Electoral Act 2022, regarding electronic transmission are largely discretionary or directory, rather than mandatory, in the sense that their non-compliance does not automatically nullify an election where manual collation was properly conducted. The Court of Appeal had similarly held in Aguebor & Anor v INEC & Ors (2023) LPELR-61331(CA) that the law does not require immediate electronic transmission, as a condition for result validity.

 In summary, while the Electoral Act 2022, provides for the electronic transmission of election results from polling units to the IReV portal, and INEC is statutorily mandated to maintain the National Electronic Register of Election Results, the Nigerian appellate courts have consistently interpreted these provisions to mean that electronic transmission is not a mandatory requirement for the validity of an election. The manual collation process, involving the physical forms signed by electoral officials and party agents at the polling units and subsequent collation centres, remains the legally recognised and primary method for determining election results. The IReV portal serves as an important tool for transparency and public viewing, but its non-functionality or failure to transmit results electronically does not, by itself, invalidate an election where the manual process was duly followed.

The Electoral Act 2026

The point must be made that, the National Assembly has been most proactive in the area of the reformation of our electoral laws. For this, it deserves commendation. Most of the problems bedevilling our elections have received legislative intervention as soon as they reared their ugly heads. Whether or not these interventions have achieved their desired outcomes, is another matter altogether. A look at few examples of these interventions will suffice.

The legal principle that Courts do not have the jurisdictional competence to choose candidates for political parties was virtually cast in stone, until it was watered down through series of legislative interventions. These interventions were informed by the reality that impunity reigned supreme in political parties, when it came to choosing and/or substituting candidates for election. When political parties were not substituting candidates who won their primary election without any reason, they were busy putting forward as candidates, those who did not participate in the primaries. In 2006, the National Assembly intervened by amending the Electoral Act to state that before a political party can change or substitute its candidate for an election, it must have and state a “cogent and verifiable reason” for doing so. The National Assembly further watered down the principle that, Courts do not have the jurisdiction to choose candidates  for political parties by amending the Electoral Act to state that a candidate who complains that the provisions of the Electoral Act were breached during the conduct of the primary election, may approach the court for redress.

Again, when the National Assembly observed that persons who did not participate in primaries and who did not participate in the actual election were being declared as winners by Election Tribunals as a result of the nullification of the result of some candidates who won the elections, it rose to the occasion by amending the Electoral Act to the effect that a Court can only declare as winners of an election, candidates who participated in all the stages of the election.

other example of legislative solution to an electoral problem, is the enactment of Section 34 of the Electoral Act which provides as follows:

It shall not be necessary for a party who alleges non-compliance with the provisions of this Act for the conduct of elections to call oral evidence if originals or certified true copies manifestly disclose the non-compliance alleged.

Section 34 quoted above was enacted to ease the burden of Petitioners in election Petition who were bound to call witnesses, polling unit by polling unit to prove the allegations contained in their Petition. In Rivers State for example, there are 4,442 polling units. A Petitioner who alleges over-voting in these polling units, is duty bound to call 4,442 witnesses to prove those allegations and hence, the above legislative intervention. However, it must be stated that the stand of the Court has not shifted from the need to call witnesses polling unit by polling unit, notwithstanding the enactment of Section 34 of the Electoral Act.

The Positives of the Electoral Act 2026

The protests generated by the amendment or otherwise pertaining to the transmission of election results from the polling units to the INEC Result Viewing (IreV) portal in real time, has drowned all the other positives in the amendments carried out by the National Assembly in the 2026 Electoral Act. It is perhaps, necessary to highlight some of these positively ventilating amendments.

Voter apathy has been of concern in our democracy. Since 2003, voter turn out has been in rapid decline. For instance, in 2003, 69% of the registered voters turned out to vote. This can be compared to the paltry 26% that turned out to vote, in the last general elections of 2023. One of the major causes of low voter turn out, is the millions of uncollected permanent voters cards (PVCs). The 2026 Act has tried to address this problem, by making it possible for voters to download their PVCs directly from INEC website instead of going through the tedious and cumbersome process of physically paying a visit to INEC offices to do so. This is a step in the right direction. 

Another positive step in the right direction, is the provision of the 2026 Electoral Act that reduces the time for release of funds to INEC from twelve months to six months.

The Controversies Surrounding the Amendment

We must begin by pointing out that it was the spectacular failure of the Public Affairs Department of the National Assembly (if it has any), to properly enlighten the populace about the rationale for the amendments that led to the current controversies and protests surrounding them, as we shall demonstrate anon. 

There are two major controversies currently surrounding the amendments to the Electoral Act. The first one is about Section 60 of the Electoral Act, pertaining to transmission of election results in real time from the polling units to the IreV. The second one is the Timetable that puts the holding of the elections squarely during the Ramadan (Muslim fasting period) and Lent (Christian Fasting) period.

E-Transmission of Results  

We put the blame for this controversy on the National Assembly, who failed to carry out proper public enlightenment on this amendment and mischievous politicians. A provision making e-transmission of election result compulsory and making the results in IreV superior to the Form EC8A result from the polling units in case of a conflict between the two, would have been problematic and chaotic. It is immaterial that there is internet coverage for 85% or 95% of the country. What of the areas that do not have internet coverage, do we automatically disenfranchise the electorate in those areas? What if there are transmission glitches arising from malfunctioning BVAS machines or internet coverage on election day, are we disenfranchise the voters in areas where such glitches occurred? Banks are supposed to have the most efficient internet servers. Yet we still have glitches in their system, to the extent that credited sums of money are reversed within  seconds, and one has to manually cross-check the status of such transactions. What if a presiding officer discovers that he/she made mistakes in the entry of the results after the same had been transmitted in real time whilst being at the polling unit; should such errors be left uncorrected and the result from the unit rendered useless? It is easy to ask from the comfort of our homes why there should be mistakes in the Result Form in the first place. But, anyone who has ever been to a polling unit on an election day and witnessed the pressure on presiding officers, would know that mistakes can and do occur during the filling of result forms.

Some analysts have postulated that the National Assembly should have added a clause to the effect that, in the case of a conflict the Form EC8A-result from the polling unit and the electronically transmitted result in the IReV, the IReV result shall prevail. These analyst seem to forget that the result in Form EC8A filled at the polling unit, remains the primary result. Any other result generated from it, whether in IReV or otherwise, can only be described as secondary.  The secondary should never be preferred to the original. To do that, would be akin to preferring a photocopy to the original.

It would be dangerous to put forward the compulsory e-transmission of election result as the universal talisman that would solve all our electoral problems. It has been argued, albeit erroneously, that e-transmission of election result is not subject to manipulation. Anyone familiar with computers should know that it is highly subject to manipulation. If you make IReV the beginning and the end of election results, the battle ground will shift from the present collation centres to the control of the INEC servers. In such an event, he who controls the INEC servers will win the election. It is because of this genuine fear of manipulation that we currently have very strict provisions for the use of electronically generated documents in the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court has held in a plethora of decided cases that IReV is a viewing portal, not a legal collation system. Data uploaded to it cannot override manually collated figures. The stand of the Court in this regard, cannot be faulted.

Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the National Assembly cannot validly legislate on which evidence a Court of Law should prefer, having regard to the doctrine of separation of powers under the Constitution. The Doctrine states that there are three arms of Government; the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary and no one arm should try to control another in the performance of their functions.

Elections during Muslim Ramadan or Christian Lenten Season

A serious paradox about Nigerians is that we are one of the most religious people on earth, but very ungodly and unspiritual. Despite this, we continuously try to mix State issues with religious issues; a situation akin to mixing oil and water. Let us not digress. The important thing that we often forget or choose to forget is that, Nigeria is a secular State. Very often, we politicise and weaponise religion. Nowhere is it written in the Holy Koran or Holy Bible, that we should not come out to vote on election day. There is therefore, no scriptural support in both Islam and Christianity for the view that election cannot be held during the holy month of Ramadan for Muslims and Lenten Season for Christians, respectively. What is to be said about the traditional religion adherents? Where do we place them, in this argument?

Every Christian or Muslim knows that, the Lenten Season or Holy Month of Ramadan are not static. Instead they move from one period to another every year. If we are to align our election calendar with the fasting period for Muslims and Christians, then we would have to amend the  Electoral Act on a yearly basis. That would be ridiculous, to say the least. So, let us take out religion from politics, or take politics out of religion.  

Conclusion

Very often, in Nigeria, while trying to solve one problem, we create some more serious ones. The National Assembly did their best in steering a middle course in providing for the e-transmission of election results, and at the same time, preserving the pride of place accorded to Form EC8A from polling units. In doing so, the National Assembly has saved the country from a load of potential problems, some of which we have dealt with above. 

The current controversy about e-transmission of election results and holding of elections during the Muslims and Christian fasting periods, are needless and baseless. It is what William Shakespeare would have have described as, much ado about nothing.

Ferdinand Oshioke Orbih, KSG, DSSRS, SAN

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