Collins Ihekire: With Political Will, Nigerian Army Can Tackle Insecurity

Major General Collins R.U. Ihekire (retd) brings to the national conversation on security a rare blend of battlefield experience, strategic thinking, and civic responsibility. A highly decorated former officer who served Nigeria with distinction at home and abroad, Ihekire argues that the country’s insecurity is less a failure of capacity than of political will. Beyond his military career, he has emerged as a community leader and statesman, investing in youth development, moral reorientation and cultural preservation through various initiatives and foundations. In a chat with Amby Uneze, he reflects candidly on insecurity, leadership, the choices Nigeria must make to secure its future and on where the next governor of Imo State should come from…excerpts

You have held several positions in the Nigerian Army and rose to the rank of Major General. Can you tell us about your background?

Firstly, I want to establish that my father was a soldier and I grew up in the military barracks. It was exciting as a child watching soldiers do their marching and, in those days, there was what they called the Signal Corps. They used to show films in the barracks, and these included war films. As children during holidays, we found ourselves fighting wars in the barracks’ field, practicing what we saw in the war films. When I finished my primary school at the Army Children’s School, I found myself in the military school in Zaria in 1965. I had a long stay in the army, covering a total of about 42 years. During the crisis of 1966, we returned to Biafra, the Eastern Region. The then military administrator of the Eastern Region, Col. Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, refused to allow us go back after our holidays because of the massacre of Igbos in the North, and we thought it was the end. We were 79 that came back from the Military School in Zaria and, according to proximity, we were split into two: half went to Government College Afikpo and the other half went to Government College Umuahia. I was in Government College Umuahia. That was where we were when Biafra was declared and hostilities started. Naturally, I was absorbed, like others, into the Biafran army as a lieutenant of the 11th Division. By the way, the war took a big toll on us in the military school. We were 79, but at the end of the war, we were only 21 alive. Of the 21, not up to six of us were without injury. At the end of the war, we went back to the military school, completed our education, and because of what I saw during the war and my experiences, I wanted to be a medical doctor. In fact, I passed exams to study Medicine at Ahmadu Bello University, but again, due to circumstances, most of us were sent to units, and I was in the Medical Corps. The circumstances, forced by the Interim Civil Service Commission, which was like a quota system applied by the North in those days, did not allow us to proceed. At the same time, I passed the Military Academy (12th Regular Course) exam, but because I wanted to study medicine, I abandoned that academy, only to get to the unit and be informed that the arrangement had been cancelled and a new arrangement had come up. I was shattered and didn’t know what to do. One of my colleagues (Lt. Col. P.C. Izuogu), one of the returnees from the war who was selected to go and complete his training at Sandhurst, told me I could still study medicine at the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA), that they had introduced biology there. After all these, I joined the academy (14th Regular Course), trained, and with biology, physics, and chemistry at A-level, I was posted as an infantry officer and started my career in 1 Division at the Lagos Battalion. The civil war brought development in the Nigerian Army. From about 7,000, the Army grew to about 200,000 after the war. In the Army, we have a scale of structure. For instance, you need a squadron of engineers to establish a brigade, and you may need about 150 engineers for a brigade at that time. So when they got to my battalion, they discovered I had Physics, Chemistry, and Biology at A-level from the University of Ibadan, and they wondered what I was doing in the infantry. I was transferred to the Corps of Engineers, and from there I was sent to India, where I did my first degree in Civil Engineering. This did not stop me from being a combatant officer. The Army will train you to acquire the same level of knowledge in their own thematic way. I came back and joined the mainstream army. I think it was a very good career. I got appointments from company command, battalion command, and brigade command, and then I taught at the Staff College as directing staff—that’s where I had the Dagger. I also taught at the Defence College (I also have a Dagger in Defence College). I was an external examiner to NIPSS (Nigerian Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies). I took part in many internal security operations—in Kaduna and Jos. During the Zangon Kataf crisis, I was a commander in Zaria. I was also in Sudan (Force Commander), Rwanda (Contingent Commander and Chief of Operations), and as a junior officer, I was in Lebanon too.

What were you doing with the Niger Basin Authority (NBA), because you were the Executive Secretary of the authority at the time?

I went there after retirement from the Army. I didn’t know that the experiences I had while in the Army exposed me to a lot of people without my awareness. Even before I left service, I worked with General Williams as Coordinator of the International Secretariat at the Pan-African Strategic and Policy Research Group (PANAFSTRAG), advising governments and institutions on policy and strategy reforms, among other tasks. While there, I was the Coordinator at the National Secretariat, and I was appointed Chairman of the Task Force to Combat Illegal Importation of Light Weapons and Small Firearms. I was on that job when the nine Heads of State of the Niger Basin Authority appointed me as the Executive Secretary—an international development organisation made up of nine countries, with headquarters in Niamey, Niger Republic. The organisation is in charge of the entire catchment area of the River Niger, starting from the source in Fouta Djallon (Guinea) to its end in Port Harcourt. So all the countries along the route—rivers, tributaries, and sub-tributaries—make up the catchment area of the NBA. The Benue is a tributary of the River Niger; that is why we have Cameroon and Chad as part of it, because the Benue drains Cameroon and Chad. The Basin is a sub-continental development organisation, and our mandate is to ensure that there is no conflict among the countries that make up the Basin. Basically, no country can touch or encroach on the River Niger without my approval. For example, when Côte d’Ivoire wanted to change from rice cultivation to sugarcane on about 140 square hectares of land, the president told me his plan. I carried out what is called a hydraulic model and advised him that if he did so, the downstream countries would not get water, and that he could only do about 80,000 square hectares. Similarly, Niger Republic had a dam called Kandadji Dam. Their first priority was electricity, and it was supposed to take 6.2 billion cubic litres of water. When we did the study, we found out that water would not reach Kainji Dam, meaning our own dam would be stifled. We then reached an agreement: it was reduced to 1.7 billion cubic litres, and their priority changed to agriculture, while Nigeria agreed to supply them electricity. Remember the conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia—Egypt did not want Ethiopia to collect water from the Nile because the Nile was the lifeline of Egypt. Before any country does anything with the Niger, our authority advises them to avoid conflict. The nine countries include two from Central Africa (Cameroon and Chad) and seven from West Africa (Benin Republic, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Niger). The ministers of these countries were responsible to me because they carried my programmes within their countries and reported back to me. Every country designated a ministry as a focal ministry, and the minister was my focal person. There was success. The programmes I designed are still running. I planned a programme to dredge the Niger and enable navigation from Kainji down to Port Harcourt. I instituted a common communication platform. We recovered thousands of kilometres of land in Burkina Faso. We reclaimed degraded lands and waterways between the fringes of the lower part of the desert and the Sahel. There was a programme where we planted millions of trees. Within those countries where lands were degraded, we reclaimed them, and people who owned them and had run away returned to reclaim their lands. That is why the problem of farmers-herders clashes here is unnecessary. Agricultural tertiary institutions have many programmes on how cattle can be grazed without disturbing other people. The clashes are unnecessary.

The insecurity caused by farmers-herders clashes in Nigeria has sent many people to early graves. As you described it as unnecessary, why is the government still finding it difficult to stop it, and what do you expect government to do?

For me, I don’t see farmers-herders’ clashes. What I see is not about religion or cattle; it is a disguise to acquire territory in the 21st century by conquest. It doesn’t make sense. Before 1986, there were no cattle in the South-East for grazing. Any cattle in the South-East were for eating because tsetse fly did not allow them to survive. In 1986, there was a Professor in Vom, Jos, who discovered a vaccine against tsetse fly. The narratives are wrong; they are geared towards changing history.

I asked that question because a lot of concerns have been raised about the grazing issue. I ask again, what is government expected to do in this regard?

First of all, ranching is a private business. Granted that it can have national significance, just like transportation, government only provides roads and infrastructure. What these people need is grazing land, and the North has a lot of space and empty lands, even the Sambisa area, where ranches can be established. The North has much more land than here. Government knows what to do, I believe, but maybe the political will is not there because everything is politicised. That is why people like us, from the angle of statesmen, are looking for the common good. The government has a duty, and they know what to do.

Talking about insecurity in the country, especially in the area of seeking foreign assistance, as President Trump has come in to render assistance to Nigeria, is that necessary?

For me, foreign assistance is neither here nor there; the Nigerian Army is capable of tackling insecurity in the country. The Nigerian Army has not failed anywhere; perhaps there is no political will. So President Trump coming in, in my thinking, has other connotations and undertones. When Boko Haram started at a particular time, they offered us technical assistance; we didn’t see enough there. There was an American general in 2014 during the American Independence celebration; I was in the Diplomatic Corps. Normally, we go to the embassies of countries celebrating their national day, and when I was announced as a Major General in the Nigerian Army to have come to felicitate with the ambassador, somebody followed me to my seat and introduced himself as a Major General in the US Army. He was patronising and served me drinks, etc., and he asked me, “General, we know your exploits; how come you people are there and Boko Haram is surviving?” I told him it was the same problem you people had in Iran and Iraq. I told him that it is something we all have to come together and deliberate on. It was beyond combat and defence.

The concern for Owerri zone as the 2028 governorship race approaches, and considering the fact that the Orlu zone has had it severally for many years and the Okigwe zone had it once or so, as the 1st Vice Chairman of Imo Harmony Project, an umbrella championing the Owerri zone governorship, what is really the strategy to actualise this?

Like you asked, what is the cause? In 2018, I was part of this arrangement that worked for the Owerri zone to emerge as governor in 2019 under the auspices of the Owerri Zone Elders Forum. At the same time, in 2017, I was the spokesperson for the Southern and Middle Belt Forum with the aim of getting a credible person as president of the country, with restructuring as our agenda. We believed that if this country does not restructure, the country will die; there is a limit to the coercion that can be applied. If we don’t restructure, the conflict will consume all of us, no matter how we deceive ourselves. Back to the Owerri zone issue, I urge all those in different organs to come together for our common good. There is no sense in division if what we are really pursuing is the common good. I think the problem is that many people have personal motives rather than the common good. Some people are jostling for what they would get rather than working as a group. Our aim now should be for everybody to ensure that every political party picks its governorship candidate from the Owerri zone. But some people are canvassing for themselves, as you could see at the Mbaise rally. When you canvass for yourself, in the end what you get is chaos, and in the midst of chaos, where do you go from there? The second thing is that when the position is zoned to the Owerri zone, you have about 22 candidates, and you get one or two from Orlu. For instance, if you have one cow and 22 people to share it, and two people to share a chicken, who gets the biggest share? That is why what we are doing is important: to remind everybody that, in the spirit of the Egbu Declaration, our people should eschew personal ambition. That is why I tell you that I am a statesman, and they wonder what the difference is between a statesman and a politician. A politician looks for the next election, while a statesman looks at the next generation. That is why I celebrate Governor Hope Uzodimma when, in 2023, he championed the Imo Charter of Equity. Hope Uzodimma is an astute politician because, by putting the Charter of Equity in place, it means he is thinking of peace and the future progress of the state. That, for me, makes him a statesman of high repute. It takes goodwill to try and break a cycle of disharmony and do something that can help us in the future. I commend him very much for that Charter of Equity. It is our prayer that it goes the way he has planned it.

You were reported to have stormed out of the convention of the Imo Harmony Project in Mbaise because you felt you were ignored on the protocol list the organisers put up. How can such an incident be resolved?

Resolving it means that everybody should show restraint. Imo Harmony Project has a hierarchy. They approached me to be the 1st Vice Chairman, and I willingly agreed. I didn’t bother about which position I occupy; my interest is to get anybody from the Owerri zone so that this road (his village road) would be looked into because I live in the village. This is Douglas Road; it goes to Douglas Road in Owerri, about 12 miles. When we were small, we used to go by foot. Maybe that is the only thing they can do for me. I am not looking for any appointment or any other favour. In IHP, the hierarchy is always violated for whatever reason. For me, it is to see that every political party chooses its governorship candidate from Owerri. If they do that, I must have achieved my aim and I will withdraw. So people should respect themselves. I was called that I would speak, and I spent the whole night preparing my paper till 4 a.m., and when I got there, they brought lists of speakers; it had no bearing as far as I am concerned. I am a structured, institutional person. I have traversed every part of the country, and I learnt that people drop their titles at home when going for “Umunna” meetings; everybody is the same. I have never introduced myself at an IHP gathering as a former general in the army. I don’t come there with any escort because this is an “Umunna” meeting. The same thing applies in Yoruba land; your status is immaterial to them. You come in as a son of “Oduduwa.” We should have a think-tank in the Igbo socio-cultural setting, and whatever is agreed in the think-tank should then be brought before our politicians and we ask them to go for it as our collective bargain.