Invasion 2026: Venezuela Today; Tomorrow, Who’s Next?

To many, it came as no surprise when President Donald Trump of the United States of America ordered the invasion of the sovereign State of Venezuela, and forcefully abducted its President Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, who appeared in a U.S. Court with a black eye, raising questions of possible violation of her human rights. Nicholas Maduro and his wife were forcibly brought to face trial, before a US court. What were the immediate and remote causes of such daring move by the USA, infringing on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of another nation? While jubilations erupted in Caracas, the Venezuelan Capital, not a few have expressed their worries over Trump’s actions and the real reasons he invaded Venezuela. Could it be the exportation of narcotic drugs into the US, allegedly masterminded by Maduro? Could it be an eye on Venezuela’s rich oil reserves?  Kunle Edun, SAN;  Kingsley Jesuorobo and Chukwuemeka Eze visit the issue, offering insightful perspectives

Venezuela Attack: Lessons for the International Community

Kunle Edun, SAN

The abduction of President Nicolás Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela, is a violent reminder that the big and powerful nations actually rule the world. They determine what is right and what is wrong. The Rules-based International order, does not apply to them. Russia’s unprovoked war against Ukraine, is a good example. Once the interest of any of the powerful nations is threatened, they do not wait for the UN to decide for them. UN is just there to whip the smaller nations into line, and give them a false hope of an international order based on laws. U.S has just pulled out, from more than 60 International organisations. 

Trump was elected to ‘Make America Great Again’. In as much as his invading Venezuela may be seen as a breach of International law, I dare say that it was what the American people voted for. The hypocrisy of International law and the UN, has been revealed. The only way out for the smaller or less powerful nations, is to also make their countries great by respecting the democratic rights of their citizens, stop looting the resources of their countries, and make sure that the welfare and security of their citizens are their primary considerations. 

If Venezuela had a responsible leadership and there is no suppression of the citizens, I do not think that Trump would have been able to find any good reason to invade the country. When African leaders make their countries great, they will earn respect in the International community. Sadly, many of them are errors in the various Presidential Palaces, that are mostly interested in the mad acquisition of wealth while their people suffer.

Kunle Edun, SAN, former NBA National Publicity Secretary 

When Power Writes the Law: Trump, Maduro, and the New Geopolitics of Intervention

Kingsley Jesuorobo

Background 

On 3 January, 2026, a dramatic military operation ordered by U.S. President Donald J. Trump culminated in the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by U.S. forces in Caracas, followed by his transportation to New York to face criminal charges. The strikes involved air and naval assets, combat engagements in Venezuelan territory, and resulted in Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, being held in U.S. custody. Trump publicly declared that Washington would “run” Venezuela until a “safe and judicious transition” could be implemented, and immediately began an outreach to major oil companies and foreign governments, regarding Venezuela’s energy sector and reconstruction.  

Intense Debate 

The stunning operation has triggered intense debate, over the legality of the act under international law. Many commentators at the United Nations and in international legal scholarship, swiftly labelled the strikes and capture as a violation of the United Nations Charter, particularly Article 2(4), which prohibits the use of force against another State’s territorial integrity and political independence, except in self-defence or with Security Council authorisation.  

Yet, a contrasting line of argument – one increasingly embraced in realist and power-political circles – challenges the assumption that international law has ever genuinely constrained the conduct of powerful States. The capture of President Maduro, from this vantage point, is less a rupture of international law than an illustration of how the international system actually works: where law bends to the capacities of those with the power to enforce or evade it.

The Myth of Absolute Non-Interference

 Traditional interpretations of the United Nations Charter treat State sovereignty – and the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs – as sacrosanct. But, a closer look at the UN’s history reveals structural exceptions for the permanent members of the Security Council (P5), particularly the United States. The veto power, enshrined in Article 27 of the UN Charter, enables the U.S., United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China, to block any Security Council action that might impede their strategic interests. This effectively immunises them, from collective action being used to check their unilateral uses of force. In practice, powerful States have often acted with impunity when confronting weaker States – whether through covert operations, economic coercion, or outright military force.

Even during the heyday of the Cold War, great powers regularly intervened in the internal affairs of other States under the guise of ideological conflict, counterinsurgency support, and covert action, without meaningful restraint from the UN. The same pattern persisted in the post-Cold War era, from NATO’s interventions in the Balkans to the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Each of these operations prompted legal debate, yet none resulted in decisive international enforcement actions against the intervening powers. The common denominator was not legal clarity, but military dominance and political leverage.

Thus, to argue that Trump’s operation represents a sudden collapse of international law, misunderstands the underlying dynamics: international law has long coexisted with – and been subordinated to – the strategic interests of the most powerful States. The stronger a State’s military and economic capacity, the more latitude it enjoys, to interpret or evade legal norms.

Sovereignty in Practice: Unequal and Selective

The international legal order was never underpinned by a strict, universal commitment to non-interference. The UN Charter itself balances principles of sovereignty with exceptions for collective security – but in practice, decisions under Chapter VII have been heavily influenced by geopolitical interests and the Security Council’s power dynamics. When a non-P5 State’s conduct is deemed threatening, intervention can be legitimised (as in Kuwait, 1990-91) — but, when a P5 member engages in force without Security Council authorisation, veto power effectively shields it from accountability.

In the case of Venezuela, critics argue that the U.S. operation lacked both Security Council approval and a valid self-defence justification. Indeed, Secretary-General António Guterres and representatives of Russia and China, have condemned the operation as illegal under international law’s letter and spirit. But, such formal denunciations are distinct from any practical constraint on the United States’ actions. Historically, major powers have disregarded international objections when strategic interests are at stake, secure in the knowledge that enforcement mechanisms are impotent without cooperation from those same powers.

The Reality of International Law: Force Over Forum

It is increasingly evident that the world’s political order is tilting toward a hierarchy of power, rather than a genuinely multilateral legal order. For weaker States, international legal protections often exist more in rhetoric than reality; for powerful States, international law functions as an instrument to be wielded selectively.

Trump’s public embrace of unilateral military action – framed domestically as law enforcement or regional security – underscores a broader shift: the normative force of international law weakens when military supremacy is conflated with legitimacy. The capacity to strike another sovereign capital and abduct its Head of State is, in itself, a demonstration of who shapes the rules on the ground.

Implications for Middle Powers: Canada and Nigeria in an Age of Assertive Power

 The implications of this evolving international order, are not confined to States in direct confrontation with great powers. Middle powers and regional anchors such as Canada and Nigeria are increasingly compelled to recalibrate their strategic assumptions, not because they are equal adversaries of dominant States, but precisely because their room for autonomous decision-making is narrowing.

 For Canada, geographical proximity to the United States has always been a defining – and constraining – feature of its foreign policy. While it is implausible to imagine dramatic, overt intervention of the kind witnessed elsewhere, the more subtle reality is arguably more consequential. Canada’s strategic alliances, defence posture, intelligence cooperation, energy policy, and even diplomatic positioning are increasingly shaped within parameters implicitly set by Washington. As U.S. foreign policy becomes more openly unilateral and interventionist, Canada’s margin for divergence correspondingly shrinks. The pressure is not exercised through tanks or airstrikes, but through alignment expectations, economic leverage, security integration, and shared threat narratives. In such an environment, sovereignty is not extinguished, but it is conditioned – exercised within boundaries drawn by the gravitational pull of American power.

 Nigeria’s position is starker, and more instructive. As Africa’s most populous nation and a regional military heavyweight, Nigeria has traditionally viewed itself as insulated from direct great-power coercion. That assumption is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. The recent U.S. military actions described as strikes deep within Nigerian territory – following sustained warnings and escalating rhetoric from President Trump, serve as a sobering marker of a broader truth: no State, regardless of size or regional influence, is categorically beyond the reach of interventionist impulses when it is deemed strategically relevant or insufficiently compliant. Whether framed as counterterrorism, protection of global interests, or enforcement of international norms, such actions underscore that Nigeria, like many States in the Global South, operates within an international system where sovereignty is contingent, not absolute.

 Taken together, Canada and Nigeria illustrate two faces of the same global reality. One experiences intervention primarily through structural alignment and strategic constraint; the other encounters it through coercive signalling and direct force. Both reveal a world drifting further from the ideals of multilateralism, and toward a hierarchy defined by military reach and political dominance.

In this emerging order, international law does not disappear, but, it increasingly follows power rather than restrains it. For States outside the inner circle of global dominance, the lesson is unmistakable: the question is no longer whether intervention is lawful in the abstract, but whether resistance is feasible in practice.

Conclusion: Law, Power, and the International Order

The capture of Nicolás Maduro by U.S. forces is likely to be memorialised – in legal textbooks and political analyses alike, as a watershed moment in international relations. Critics assert that it violates core norms, setting a dangerous precedent. Supporters of realist frameworks argue that it merely reveals what the international system has always been: a domain where military capacity, not legal principle, ultimately dictates outcomes.

 International law, in its idealised form, aspires to restrain the powerful and protect the weak. In practice, history suggests that it often does the opposite. The intervention in Venezuela – controversial, complex, and fraught with geopolitical implications, highlights not the failure of international law, but its subordination to the realities of power politics in a world where the permanent members of the Security Council retain privileged positions not because of legal merit, but because of their unmatched coercive capabilities.

Kingsley Jesuorobo, Law Commission Governor, Ontario, Canada; Board Chair, Canadian Association of Nigerian Lawyers

Trump’s  Abduction of Maduro, Implications for Venezuelan Sovereignty, It’s Neighbours, and the International Community

Chukwuemeka Eze

Introduction

The world woke up on 3 January, 2026, to the chilling news of a sting military operation in Venezuela by the United States, which resulted in the abduction of President Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Celia Flores, in the dead of the night. The duo were immediately flown to the United States and arraigned in court on various charges, including narco-terrorism. The action of the USA has been condemned by many countries as being a violation of international law, especially the United Nations’ Charter. 

Operation Absolute Resolve and its fallouts

On January 3, 2026, the United States launched “Operation Absolute Resolve”, a massive military and law enforcement incursion into Venezuela that resulted in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores.

 To accomplish the task, the US amassed over 150 U.S. aircrafts launched from 20 bases, and conducted aerial strikes across Caracas and northern Venezuela to suppress air defences. 

Using its crack Delta Force, the US raided Maduro’s residence at Fort Tiuna, capturing him and his wife. They were transported to the USS Iwo Jima and then flown to New York, where they were arraigned in a Manhattan Federal court on January 5, 2026. They pleaded not guilty to charges of narcoterrorism conspiracy, cocaine importation, and weapons offences. The raid resulted in the deaths of 100 persons, including 32 members of the Cuban military and security agencies.

The US action has implications for the world order, sovereignty, maritime freedom, economic exploitation, and governance generally.

President Trump initially stated the U.S. would “run the country” until a “safe, proper and judicious transition”. He explicitly linked the intervention to securing Venezuela’s oil reserves, stating U.S. companies would “rebuild” the sector. 

 Despite U.S. claims, the existing Venezuelan government remained largely intact. Vice President Delcy Rodríguez was sworn in as Acting President by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice on January 5, 2026.

 Trump characterised the action as the “Donroe Doctrine”, asserting that American dominance in the Western Hemisphere would never again be questioned. The U.S. announced plans to indefinitely control the sale of Venezuelan oil, to “reimburse” the U.S. for the operation. 

How Latin American Neighbours Responded 

There were mixed reactions among neighbours of Venezuela, over the US strikes.

 Colombian President and the most virulent critic of Trump, Gustavo Petro, ordered the mobilisation of security forces along the Colombia-Venezuela border in anticipation of a mass influx of Venezuelan refugees.

On 5 January, 2026, Petro warned that he would “take up arms” for his country if necessary, after the US threatened him and his Government, stating that any similar interventions in Colombia would have a response. Nonetheless, the Colombian President  commenced dialogue on January 7 with Trump to diffuse tension. According to President Petro, “Instead of a United States dominating the world – an imperial dream – it is a United States isolated from the world. An empire was not built, by being isolated from the world”.

Police in Trinidad and Tobago, which hosts the largest per-capita population of Venezuelan refugees and migrants, cordoned off key areas of the capital, Port of Spain. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago, which has hosted US military personnel and vessels amid its recent buildup in the Caribbean Sea, stated that it did not participate in the attack.

 The Government of Guyana, whose ongoing border dispute with Venezuela heated up in 2023-2024, had a muted response, but, was broadly supportive of the removal of Maduro. Guyanese President, Irfaan Ali,announced that the country’s security forces were “fully mobilised” to deal with potential refugees, and an increase in instability along the border.

 The Cuban Government declared two days of national mourning on 5 and 6 January, 2026, for its soldiers killed in the attacks.

World Reaction

UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, stated that US actions had  “worrying implications for the region”, “constitute[d] a dangerous precedent”, and worried “that the rules of international law have not been respected”.

At the request of China, Colombia, and Russia, the UNSC convened on 5 January, 2026, to discuss the situation. Representatives of Russia and China called for the immediate release of President Maduro, while the US representative rejected characterisations of US actions as military aggression, describing the operation as a targeted law enforcement measure to arrest an indicted fugitive.

 The attack was condemned by other countries, including Brazil, Chile, China, France, Iran, Mexico, North Korea, Russia, South Africa, and Spain. U. K., Argentina, Chile, France, Germany, Israel, Peru, and Ukraine applauded the developments.

 Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez urged de-escalation, stating that “international law and the principles of the U.N. Charter must be respected”; this was echoed by European Union (EU) foreign policy Chief and European Commission Vice-President, Kaja Kallas.

 The Governments of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Spain, Uruguay, and the outgoing administration in Chile, issued a joint statement rejecting the US action and expressed their concern, saying that it could “constitute an extremely dangerous precedent for peace and regional security and endanger”.

With respect to internal governance in Venezuela, opposition Nobel Peace Prize laureate, María Corina Machado expressed frustration, after Trump suggested he would work with Delcy Rodríguez instead of the established opposition.

Many analysts have wondered, how the impasse escalated to the point of abduction of Maduro. The factors are both internal and external. Let us start with the internal factor. 

Governance Issues: Hugo Chavez, Chavismo, and Maduro

 After leading a failed coup attempt in 1992, Hugo Chavez eventually rode to power in 1998. Chávez established himself as a charismatic and populist leader, gaining a devoted following and reshaping the country’s political landscape. He justified many of his policies as part of a “Bolivarian Revolution”, aimed at empowering the Venezuelan people, especially the poor, who make up the grand majority of the population. However, critics contend that Chávez concentrated power within his administration, undermining democratic institutions. In 1999, shortly after being elected, Chávez pushed for a new Constitution that expanded presidential powers through Judiciary and governmental control, lengthened the presidential term indefinitely, and abolished the Senate. The Supreme Court came under heavy influence from Chávez, and the judicial system effectively became a tool for repressing opposition and dissent. 

By 2009, the Judiciary was described as effectively subservient to Chávez, with Judges who opposed the administration being dismissed, imprisoned, or harassed. He remained in power, until he died in 2013. 

His protégé and Vice President, Nicholas Maduro, replaced him as the country’s leader until his date of capture. Despite having the largest oil reserves in the world, Venezuela’s political and economic turbulence over the years has been traced to this resource.

Venezuela’s dependence on oil revenues, has been cited as a major factor in the country’s economic instability. Reliance on oil revenues, left Venezuela especially vulnerable to the volatility of global oil markets. While high oil prices in the early 2000s allowed for substantial social spending, the State-run oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A (PDVSA) became increasingly politicised, with appointments and agendas often based on loyalty rather than expertise. By 2013, inefficiency and mismanagement by the Government had contributed to declining production oil levels. The dependence on oil revenue, coupled with insufficient investment in other sectors, prevented the creation of a stable economy.

It was alleged that Maduro’s power tactics enabled systemic cronyism and repression, stifling opposition through media censorship, judicial control, and the persecution of dissenters.

Amidst widespread economic hardship, Maduro cracked down on opposition groups, media, and protests, creating a political environment described as one-party rule. During the mass protests in 2014 and again in 2017, government forces responded with significant violence, resulting in hundreds of deaths and thousands of arrests.

 In addition to political repression, critics argue that Chavismo’s economic policies and the resulting crises, have precipitated one of the worst humanitarian emergencies in Latin American history. This has led to severe food and medicine shortages, hyperinflation, and skyrocketing poverty for Venezuelans.  A mass migration crisis has seen over six million people leave the country, just over a fourth of the total population, seeking stability and opportunity elsewhere, such as Colombia or the United States.

 The external factor to the crisis, revolves around what the US regards as alleged interference of its adversaries within the Western Hemisphere. It was widely reported by the American media on 7 January, that the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, said that the Trump administration told Venezuela’s interim President Delcy Rodriguez, that the country must cut ties with China, Iran, Russia and Cuba, and agree to partner exclusively with the US on oil production. Further reports indicate that, Venezuela has begun to respond favourably to the US request.

The Monroe Doctrine versus a New World Order

According to Wikipedia, the Monroe Doctrine is a United States foreign policy position, that opposes any foreign interference in the Western Hemisphere. Originally concerning European colonialism, it holds that any intervention in the political affairs of the Americas by foreign powers, is a potentially hostile act against the United States. The doctrine was central to American grand strategy, in the 20th century.

 President James Monroe first articulated the doctrine on December 2, 1823, although it was not named after him until 1850). At the time, nearly all Spanish colonies in the Americas had either achieved, or were close to independence. Monroe asserted that the New World and the Old World were to remain distinctly separate spheres of influence, and thus, further efforts by European powers to control or influence sovereign States in the region would be viewed as a threat to U.S. security. In turn, the United States would recognise and not interfere with existing European colonies, nor meddle in the internal affairs of European countries. The meaning of the Doctrine has been extrapolated, from time to time. 

 In his message to Congress of December 2, 1845, President Polk reinterpreted the Monroe Doctrine, in terms of the prevailing spirit of Manifest Destiny. Whereas, Monroe had said only that the Western Hemisphere was no longer open to European colonialism, Polk now stated that European nations had better not interfere with projected territorial expansion by the U.S.

 In 1954, Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, invoked the Monroe Doctrine at the 10th Pan-American Conference in Caracas, denouncing the intervention of Soviet communism in Guatemala.

 President John F. Kennedy said at an August 29, 1962, news conference: “The Monroe Doctrine means what it has meant since President Monroe and John Quincy Adams enunciated it, and that is that we would oppose a foreign power extending its power to the Western Hemisphere, and that is why we oppose what is happening in Cuba today. That is why we have cut off our trade. That is why we worked in the OAS and in other ways, to isolate the Communist menace in Cuba. That is why we will continue to give a good deal of our effort and attention to it”.

America First Policy and Trump’s Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine

President Donald Trump implied potential use of the doctrine in August 2017, when he mentioned the possibility of military intervention in Venezuela, after CIA Director, Mike Pompeo, declared that the nation’s deterioration was the result of interference from Iranian and Russian-backed groups. In February 2018, Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, praised the Monroe Doctrine as “clearly… a success”, warning of “imperial” Chinese trade ambitions and touting the United States as the region’s preferred trade partner.

Trump reiterated his commitment to the implementation of the Monroe Doctrine at the 73rd UN General Assembly in 2018. Russian permanent representative to the United Nations, Vasily Nebenzya, criticised the U.S. for what Russia perceived as an implementation of the Monroe Doctrine at an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council on January 26, 2019. Venezuela’s representative listed 27 interventions in Latin America that Venezuela considers to be implementations of the Monroe Doctrine and stated that, in the context of the statements, they considered it “a direct military threat to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”. Cuba’s representative formulated a similar opinion, to that of Venezuela.

 On March 3, 2019, National Security Advisor, John Bolton, invoked the Monroe Doctrine in describing the Trump administration’s policy in the Americas, saying “In this administration, we’re not afraid to use the word Monroe Doctrine…It’s been the objective of US Presidents going back to President Ronald Reagan, to have a completely democratic hemisphere”.

 Trump’s determination to treat the Western Hemisphere as a U.S. sphere of influence, has been characterised as a revival of the Monroe Doctrine.

The final draft of the 2025 National Security Strategy, called upon the United States to “reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore the U.S. pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere”. The document announced the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. Foreign policy experts described the move as a desire to divide the world into “spheres of influence” between the United States, Russia, and China, and American officials later explained the strategy in those terms.

Trump’s large-scale naval deployment and military strikes against alleged drug boats in the Caribbean, were described by experts as examples of gunboat diplomacy.

The designation of drug cartels as terrorist organisations, and Trump’s promise of land-based military strikes were described as providing a legal rationale for possible military action and regime change in Venezuela. In 2025, The New York Times noted that “top  administration officials have been explicit that their overarching goal is to assert American dominance over its half of the planet”.

Following the capture of Venezuelan President, Nicolás Maduro on 3rd January, 2026 raid, Trump claimed that the action was an application of the Monroe Doctrine, stylising it as the “Donroe Doctrine” and telling reporters that  “American dominance in the Western Hemisphere will never be questioned again”.

On 7 January, German President, Frank-Walter Steinmeier said, the United States is actively dismantling the post-World War II international order it once helped build.

 He said that recent US actions amounted to a profound breach, comparable to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which he called a historic rupture. The German leader did not specify any particular US action, but his remarks followed global shock over the recent US military operations in Venezuela, that led to the capture of President Nicolás Maduro.

Use of Force Under International Law

 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided in Nicaragua v United States (1986), that the U.S. violated international law by supporting Contra rebels, mining ports, and attacking Nicaraguan infrastructure, thereby breaching sovereignty and non-intervention principles, despite the U.S. claim of self-defence against the Nicaragua Sandinista aggression. The ruling affirmed customary international law, established criteria for “armed attacks”, and held the U.S. accountable for funding, training, and directing paramilitary actions, marking a significant legal precedent against State intervention.

 The ICJ held that these actions interfered with Nicaragua’s right to self-determination and non-intervention, violating international law. The U.S. argument that it was acting in collective self-defence against Nicaragua’s support for rebels in El Salvador, was rejected. The US was also found liable, for interrupting peaceful maritime commerce.

The prohibition of the use of force is not, however, absolute, because self-defence is an exception. However, whether the use of force will be considered legitimate and without adverse consequences, is dependent on whether the use of force is necessary and proportional to the purpose. The customary international law position has been codified in Article 2 of the UN Charter. 

 A State may be able to use force outside its territory, in situations that do not violate the territorial integrity of other States. However, a State might use  force for humanitarian purposes, or to protect citizens of the intervening State who are living abroad. The UN Charter does not acknowledge these situations as exceptions to the prohibition against the use of force. Many members of the international community, feel that States cite these justifications to hide improper motives.

 When a State faces an imminent attack, it may have a right to act in anticipatory self-defence. Article 51 and other provisions of the UN Charter, do not address this situation. However, customary international law recognises the right of anticipatory self-defence, when an armed attack is imminent and inevitable. If an attack is possible but not imminent, a State probably cannot launch a pre-emptive strike.

The UN Security Council pursuant to Articles 24 and 25 of the UN Charter, may permit the UN to use collective force against a threat to international peace and security. The Security Council triggered this power in the early stages of the Korean War, and during the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The Security Council rarely invokes this power, though, and prefers to exert its authority through economic sanctions or other non-military measures. 

 Under customary international law, the Caroline Case laid down conditions that will be present, before a State can resort to use of force in anticipatory self-defence. The Caroline incident was used to establish the principle of “anticipatory self-defence” in international relations, which holds that it may be justified only in cases in which the  “necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation”.

In Nicaragua v United States, the ICJ stated that “self-defence warrant(s) only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary international law”.  

 From the whole circumstances of the Venezuelan case, the writer finds no support for the action of the US from the UN Charter.

Lessons for Nigeria

Nigeria should ensure internal cohesion, through the avoidance of repression or suppression of its citizens and high-handed governance. The Chavismo political philosophy, could not sustain the economy of Venezuela. All the arms of government were controlled by the executive, while opposition figures were sent to prison. Trump would have found it difficult to strike Venezuela with the ferocity he did, if Venezuela was functional democratically and economically. 

Nigeria should manage its resources in such a way, so as to prevent the Venezuelan experience. 

Nigeria should avoid high-stakes superpower politics. Venezuela played political chess with Russia, Iran, China, the US, and Cuba. At the end of the day, it burnt its hands.

When a situation becomes very difficult, Nigeria may sue the offending country to the ICJ. Venezuela did not exploit this option, despite decades of adversarial action by Washington.

Chukwuemeka Eze, former Postgraduate Lecturer on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, Nasarawa State University, Keffi