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BETWEEN FIRS AND FRANCE DGFIP
DANIEL ADAJI argues that the MoU is not evidence of surrendered sovereignty
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Nigeria’s Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) and France’s Direction Générale des Finances Publiques (DGFiP) recently, has triggered intense public debate, not because tax cooperation is unusual, but because taxation sits at the very heart of state power.
The MoU signed on December 10, 2025, is coming nearly six weeks to the formal transition into the Nigeria Revenue Service which would take off in January 2026.
The bone of contention here is whether the agreement represents a prudent effort to modernise Nigeria’s tax administration or a strategic misstep that could expose the country’s fiscal architecture to undue foreign influence.
Understanding the controversy requires dissecting the content of the pact as clarified by the federal government in a document dated December 12, 2025, from the deeper structural fears driving public resistance.
The federal government maintains that the MoU is a standard technical cooperation framework focused strictly on capacity building and institutional learning. According to FIRS, the agreement does not grant France access to Nigerian taxpayer data, digital platforms, enforcement systems, or operational infrastructure. Existing Nigerian laws on data protection, cybersecurity, and national sovereignty remain fully applicable, and the MoU does not override them in any form.
“The MoU is a standard globally recognized cooperation framework focused sole on technical assistance and capacity building. It does not grant France access to Nigeria taxpayer data, digital systems or any element of our operational infrastructure. All existing Nigerian laws on data protection, cybersecurity and sovereignty remain fully applicable and strictly enforced. The NRS like it predecessor FIRS places the highest premium on national security and maintains rigorous standard for the protection of all tax information,” the FIRS stated.
From the government’s perspective, the partnership is advisory and non-intrusive. DGFiP is positioned as a source of technical knowledge, drawing on its long institutional experience in digital tax administration, compliance management, governance, and public finance.
The arrangement, FIRS argues, mirrors similar cooperation agreements signed globally by tax authorities seeking to adopt international best practices, particularly in an era of increasingly complex cross-border financial flows.
The government also stresses that the MoU does not displace Nigerian technology providers or outsource core functions. Local institutions and fintech firms remain central to Nigeria’s tax ecosystem, while the transition from FIRS to the Nigeria Revenue Service (NRS) is being managed under Nigerian control. In this framing, the agreement is not a surrender of capacity but an attempt to strengthen it.
Despite the official clarification, public anxiety has remained intense. This is not merely the result of misunderstanding but reflects deeper concerns about sovereignty, power, and historical experience.
Nigerians home and abroad have taken to the social media to criticize this new move. On Facebook, Kholawole Prince Adebayor stated “Your FIRS dey sign MoU with France, country other African nations are sending away. Another user, Olalo Ayo Ayo Ajayi noted “Nigeria is walking into a one chance that will shock many generations. Let’s be clear, France is not an innocent country.”
Ibrahim Rufai Buhari stated “I warned about this situation nine months ago.” One post on X formerl (Twitter), a user posted “The truth is, this data can reveal key financial patterns and give France visibility into our economy. Once it leaves, we can’t get it back, putting our national economic sovereignty at risk.”
It added “This MoU could compromise our control over our revenue system, expose sensitive economic data, and weaken Nigeria’s fiscal independence. We are big enough to manage our own tax system and employ our own experts. This deal should be paused or renegotiated to protect Nigerian taxpayers and safeguard the sovereignty of our economy.”
Tax systems are strategic assets. Beyond revenue collection, they reveal the inner structure of an economy: who generates wealth, who avoids obligations, which sectors thrive, and how political and commercial networks intersect. Even limited advisory exposure, if poorly bounded, can create informational advantages over time. This reality explains why tax administration partnerships attract far more scrutiny than other forms of technical cooperation.
France’s historical role in Africa further complicates perceptions. Its deep involvement in the fiscal, monetary, and administrative systems of Francophone West Africa has left a legacy of distrust. While Nigeria is not part of the CFA zone, the fear is not about formal arrangements alone but about patterns of influence that often begin as technical assistance and evolve into structural dependence.
Much of the controversy hinges on the phrase “capacity building,” which critics interpret as coded language for foreign penetration of sensitive state functions. FIRS, however, defines capacity building narrowly and technically: training staff, sharing administrative best practices, improving taxpayer services, and learning from international experience in digital tax administration.
Crucially, the MoU does not include the provision of software, system design, data hosting, or operational management. It is not a services contract, and it does not displace Nigerian technology providers. FIRS maintains ongoing partnerships with local institutions and fintech firms, a point it raises to counter fears of foreign dominance over Nigeria’s revenue architecture.
On the most sensitive issue – data, the federal government draws a firm line. It states unequivocally that the MoU does not permit access to Nigerian taxpayer data or financial intelligence. Without data access, the government argues, claims of economic surveillance or fiscal domination collapse under scrutiny.
From FG’s perspective, sovereignty is not compromised by learning from another tax authority; it is compromised when institutions remain weak, opaque, and vulnerable to elite capture. In this framing, modernisation is a defensive strategy, not a surrender.
The choice of France’s DGFiP is presented as pragmatic rather than political. DGFiP is among the world’s most established tax administrations, with extensive experience in digital systems, governance reform, and public finance management. Similar cooperation agreements, FIRS notes, exist globally among tax authorities seeking to adapt to increasingly complex, digital, and cross-border economies.
The government rejects the notion that engagement equals subordination, arguing that Nigeria already operates within global tax cooperation frameworks without forfeiting its independence.
Where critics see a slow erosion of independence through technical agreements, the federal government advances a counterargument: that a weak tax system poses a greater threat to sovereignty than international cooperation ever could. Capital flight, tax evasion, and informal economic dominance, it argues, are the real forces hollowing out the Nigerian state.
The MoU, in this context, is framed as preparatory groundwork for the transition from FIRS to the Nigeria Revenue Service (NRS), aimed at strengthening institutional competence before that shift occurs.
Ultimately, the debate is less about the text of the MoU than about trust, trust in institutions, in governance, and in the ability of the Nigerian state to draw firm boundaries in its dealings with foreign partners.
Based strictly on the documents, the federal government’s position is clear: no data access, no system control, no foreign fingerprints on Nigeria’s tax backend. Whether that assurance holds will depend not on rhetoric, but on implementation, transparency, and sustained public scrutiny.
For now, the MoU stands not as evidence of surrendered sovereignty, but as a reminder that in Nigeria, credibility is earned not by declarations, but by conduct.
· Adaji, a tax expert, writes from Abuja







