Why do Movements/Groups Turn Rebellious: A Dissection of the Trajectory of Rebel Groups in Post-Colonial Nigeria Says Olusegun Somide
Over the years, global peace has been punctured many times by the menace of rebel groups’ rampage violence, often manifesting in its most brutal and vicious forms. Subjecting many nations to spells of gloom and bloodletting, these armed militia groups, with the tacit and unintended complicity of successive governments, have contributed greatly to the derailment of many promising nations. But the focus of this treatise is Nigeria, the largest conglomeration of black people and its African counterparts.
Oftentimes, when discussions, be it formal or informal, emerge about rebel groups, scholars and individuals alike often think of groups like Hamas, Al-Shabbab, Boko Haram, ISWAP, the Niger Delta militants, the IPOB-ESN network, or the countless armed militias pervasive in every nook and cranny of the world within the context of ideology, poverty, and failed governance. Some, in their explanation of the causes, often emphasize marginalization, bad leadership, or the manipulation of religion and ethnicity as fundamental incubators. While all these are empirical evidence that are directly and pointedly attributable to these problems, they essentially represent a surface-level dissection of a phenomenon that requires a much deeper exploration.
Interestingly, there is one important area that has often been overlooked or probably underemphasized: where these groups come from. The genealogy of an armed movement and the character and education of its leader or leaders often shape its character more than its slogans ever will. Whether a group is born from military defectors or from nowhere at all, its founding roots determine how it learns to use power and justify violence. A clinical understanding of this dynamic is vitally important for Nigeria, the African continent, and, more so, for global powers like the United States. For the U.S case, understanding this pattern offers a strategic opportunity for early warnings and preventing mass atrocities.
Rebel organizations do not exist in a vacuum. Every rebel organization begins somewhere. Some are offshoots of religious associations, and some are products of terrorist organizations. Others emerge from within the security forces, militias, or criminal networks, yet with a deep logic of coercion. Meanwhile, there are others that emerge with no institutional background or traceability, who believe that being armed can command attention that comes with huge material benefits in a failing state.
Nigeria represents a classic example of this dynamic. The early phases of Niger Delta mobilization in the 1990s began with civic advocacy. Organizations like the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the Ijaw Youth Council started as social movements rooted in environmental justice. They had manifestos, congresses, and community legitimacy. Yet, as state repression intensified and civic leaders were killed or exiled, the movement’s offshoots, MEND and later splinter groups, drifted toward militancy. The civic culture eroded, replaced by a logic of sabotage and ransom. Still, even at their most violent, many Niger Delta leaders continued to justify their struggle in political, and not apocalyptic, terms.
Meanwhile, the same cannot be said of Boko Haram. Beginning as a religious study group in the early 2000s in Maiduguri, led by a young cleric, Mohammed Yusuf, who preached against corruption, inequality, and what he viewed as the moral decay of Western education and governance. When the state’s brutal crackdown radicalized the movement in 2009, its leadership transferred directly into a military command structure. By the time Abubakar Shekau took over, Boko Haram had internalized the logic of coercion, complete obedience, public executions, and total separation from civilian life. Its later offshoot, ISWAP, learned those same habits from its ISIS mentors. From the foregoing, we can see a radical metamorphosis of a group that started as a religious study.
The rise of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) is also another distinct but deeply related example. Emerging in the early 2010s with the wounds of the Biafran Civil War debacle still resonating, together with enduring vociferations of marginalization in Nigeria’s political and economic order, the group had initially projected itself as a peaceful, civil-society movement advocating for self-determination. However, the lines between civic agitation and armed resistance would eventually be cleared following the creation of the Eastern Security Network (ESN), a paramilitary wing supposedly designed for self-defense. In subsequent years, the movement’s offshoots and armed enforcers adopted coercive tactics, including sporadic attacks and the violent enforcement of the so-called “sit-at-home” order, transforming what began as a symbolic protest into a source of fear and disruption across southeastern Nigeria.
Unlike Boko Haram, IPOB’s ideology is not religious, nor does it share the civic reformist roots of Niger Delta movements. Instead, it sits at the intersection of ethno-national identity, political exclusion, and securitized repression. Its evolution underscores how groups born from legitimate grievance can radicalize.
The point here is not just to compare and contrast the characteristics of these groups, but to shed light on how understanding these patterns could help policymakers design early-warning indicators for when movements are about to turn brutal. Understanding such transformations is vital for designing early-warning systems that distinguish between groups with the potential for constructive engagement and those likely to embrace militancy.
Nigeria has spent billions of dollars on counterinsurgency and disarmament programs, without a conscious attempt at analyzing and controlling the nature of all groups, right from inception to maturity. But the organizational DNA of each group differs. Without recognizing that difference, interventions miss their mark. The regional spread of violent groups from northern Nigeria to the Sahel shows how state fragility interacts with organizational inheritance. Without proper attention to these aforementioned dynamics, interventions, financial or operational, will definitely miss their mark. Countries with poor governance and rudderless security policy unintentionally reproduce the same violent organizational DNA they are trying to defeat.
However, all hope is not lost, and the opportunities for redemption are still very active. In other words, in all possibilities, the Nigerian government can still effectively subdue this ravaging menace of insurgency to the barest minimum. It’s just high time governments became remarkably strategic with their interactions and dealings with insurgents, and one fundamental starting point lies in the recognition of early indicators that portend potential devastating radicalization.
This, thus, requires a deeper exploration and understanding of the formative and historical trajectories of insurgents. In a remarkably secular state like Nigeria, a great step to effective management of insurgency should begin with the official registration of groups, no matter how local or small the group may be. This official accommodation gives opportunities for constant communication and monitoring, providing an opportunity for spotting grievances or rebellion that may metastasize into militancy. Through this initiative, the government could significantly invest in civic infrastructure such as education, civic orientation, associations, community radios, and youth cooperatives, all of which are fundamental and proactive, preventive counter-insurgency tools.
In the long run, Nigeria’s accelerated journey to nationhood and lasting peace will largely be a function of the extent to which terrorism and existing militia groups are curbed and subdued, much as the subjugation of intending and prospective pressure groups or movements with the tendency to metamorphose into terrorist groups. The question is not just about what breeds insurgency; it is about understanding how they emerge and what the consequences portend when they emerge under different conditions and circumstances.
Ultimately, to prevent another devastating manifestation of the next Boko Haram and other terrorist groups, governments should interpret the behavior of emerging groups through the lens of how previous groups started. This, thus, depends technically on the sensitivity and the strategic accommodation of the government to these groups. To build peace, governments must not just rebuild the moral and organizational roots of societies but also become more mindful and informed about the genealogy of groups and their associated shenanigans, as this can proactively address the root causes of rebellion rather than wait to respond. However, should the Nigerian government fail to do the needful and take the bull by the horns, it will not be surprising to see a global power like the United States become much more interested. It may actually be the moment for global powers.
