Terrorism, Armed Banditry, and Coups d’État in West Africa: Recidivist Dynamics and Quo Vadis

INTERNATIoNAL Bola A. Akinterinwa

Terrorism, armed banditry, and coups d’état have five common factors: use of force to compel the admission of a request; the force is driven by cruelty in most cases; the cruelty is indiscriminate in terms of its impact; the indiscrimination is explained using small arms and light weapons in most cases. And more importantly, they are nationally and internationally illegal and therefore prohibited.

Terrorism, armed banditry, and coups d’état are manifestations of aggression on individuals and sovereign states which every Member State of the international community is required to prevent. The ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression, done on 22nd of April , 1978 in Lagos, provides that Member States shall not only ‘refrain from threat or use of force or aggression or from employing any other means inconsistent with the Charters of the United Nations and the OAU against the territorial integrity or political independence of Member States’ (Article 1) but to also ‘refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other Member States’ (Article 2). And perhaps most importantly, Article 3 requires a Member State to ‘prevent foreigners resident on its territory from committing the acts referred to in Article 2’ and to ‘undertake to prevent non-foreigners from using its territory as a base for committing the acts referred to in Article 2.

The implication of the foregoing protocolar provisions is not simply that Signatory States should refrain but should prevent their nationals and foreigners residing in their countries from engaging in the use of force and aggression. Thus, terrorism, armed banditry, and coups d’état or subversion are unlawful and should not be condoned. The ultimate objective of the protocol is to promote good neighbourliness among West African States and ensure mutual assistance in the event of threats and actual cases of aggression.

Use of Force and Dynamics

At the international multilateral level, there are the Inter-American Convention Against terrorism adopted on 9 December 1999 by the UN General Assembly to suppress the financing of terrorism; international instruments related to the 1996 measures to eliminate international terrorism and the 1997 Prevention and Suppression of terrorist bombings. In fact, there are more than 15 universal anti-terrorism instruments.

For example, an International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings was done in New York on 15 December 1997. Benin Republic acceded to the convention on 31 July 2003 and Burkina Faso on 1 October 2003. Cape Verde acceded to it on 10 May 2002, Ghana on 6 September 2002, Guinea on 7 September 2000, Guinea Bissau on 6 August 2008, Liberia on 5 March 2003, Mali on 28 March 2002, Mauritania on 30 April 2003, Niger on 26 October 2004, Nigeria on 24 September 2013, Senegal on 27 October 2003, and Sierra Leone on 26 September 2003. Togo signed it on 21 August 1998 and ratified it on 10 March 2003.

What is noteworthy here is that all the West African States acceded to the Convention save Togo which signed and ratified it. More importantly, Nigeria was the last to accede to it, which raises the extent to which a terrorist bombing is taken as a priority is limited. It is against this background that the problems of force in the form of terrorism, armed banditry and coups d’état are explicated and that the quo vadis should be understood.

Use of force varies according to the type of violence and force should not be confused with violence, even though they are interchangeably used to mean the same thing. Force is a vis, a Latin word meaning power which, lato sensu, is ambiguous. Vis can be of any type. It is defined as any force, any violence or any disturbance relating to a person or property. As explained by Bryan A. Garner, ‘vis, as a legal term, was understood to denote the organizing and arming of tumultuous bodies of men for the purpose of obstructing the constituted authorities in the performance of their duty, and thus interrupting the ordinary administration of the laws.’ More importantly, violence is described as ‘the use of physical force usually accompanied by fury, vehemence, or outrage’ It is the ‘physical force unlawfully exercised with the intent to harm’ (vide the Black’s Law Dictionary, Thomson Reuters, Tenth’s Edition, 2014).

Explained differently, violence exists when force is physically used unlawfully to harm, while force is synonymous with a vis. Force is the use of power to compel a change lawfully or unlawfully. In all cases, terrorism, armed banditry, and coups d’état have always been manifested in the form of force and violence in Africa in general, and West Africa, in particular. Voluntarily or otherwise, they harm they obstruct and militate against the constituted authorities in the performance of their duty, and they also interrupt the ordinary administration of the laws. And true enough, the various coups d’états in Francophone West and Central Arica, the armed banditry and insurrectional terrorism in Nigeria are clear illustrations of a vis, violence and force, the dynamics of which vary from one country and sub-region to another.

In general, there are three main dynamics of the recidivist character of terrorism, armed banditry and coups d’état that have now become the most critical challenge facing African leaders. The first dynamic is the declining influence of France and French speakingness in Africa. The decline is largely a resultant from the promotion of French multinational interests to the detriment of the general interest of the local people. The people have been complaining quietly in the past but have now changed their complaints into an open confrontation. Rather than seeking to address the complaints, France, the ECOWAS, and the international community took side with the elected governments.

In Mali, France supported the ousted IBK (Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta) who was Malian president from September 2013 to August 2020 but forced to resign with his Prime Minister, Boubou Cissé. The ECOWAS and the African Union suspended Mali’s membership and prevented it from participating in their activities. The ECOWAS also closed the land and air borders with Mali. And true again, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie suspended Mali’s membership. The United States cut off military aid to Mali on 21 August 2021. All these sanctions were in vain in outcome.

On 24 May 2021 a second coup, again led by Assimi Goïta and Vice President took place. President Bah N’daw, Prime Minister Moctar Ouane and Minister of Defence Souleymane, Doucouré were captured. In this regard, the coupists, have invited Russian mercenaries with the intention of replacing the French troops that have been helping to contain jihadist terrorism since 2013 in the country. The French did not like this development and prefer to withdraw their troops that be in the same boat together with the Russians. When the first coup took place, there were no display of Russian flags during public demonstrations in support of the coup. When Assimi Goita, who did not accept to be the president but the position of Second-in-Command and accepted this time to be the president.

The bilateral misunderstanding got to its crescendo on Monday, 31 January 2022 when the Goïta junta blocked and prevented the European troops from seeking to fight the jihadist terrorists. Goïta did not only expel the French ambassador to Mali, His Excellency, Mr. Joel Meyer, giving him an ultimatum of 72 hours to leave the country, but also called for a review of Franco-Malian defence agreement. In response, the French Foreign Minister, Jean Yves Le Drian described the Goïta junta as ‘irresponsible’ and ‘illegitimate.’ He also accused the Russian mercenaries of ‘helping themselves to the country’s resources in exchange for protecting the junta.’

At the level of the European allies, sanctions were taken against five members of the Goïta regime mainly because the Francophone CFA franc used in 14 countries is tied to the European Union Euro. Untying the politico-economic cord between Francophone Africa and the EU has serious negative implications. The EU sanctions taken on 4 February 2022 include travel ban and attachment of their assets.

One of the five members, Mr. Adama Ben Diarra explained that the EU sanction ‘is an important step in the fight, but the victory must go all the way, the next step must be the departure of French forces and then we will start the move towards economic and monetary sovereignty.’ On the critical issue of insecurity, Mr. Diarra said ‘for the security of my people, I am ready to make a pact with Satan (Russia) to drive out France and its terrorist allies’ (vide Al Jazeera reports).

In this regard, many points are noteworthy: consideration of French and European troops fighting the jihadist terrorists as terrorists, implying that Malians have been pushed to the wall; The junta has some thought-provoking reasons for the coup: France has been engaged in the anti-jihad terrorism since 2013 but the situation of insecurity has not improved; elected governments have been helpless and do not have any foreseeable solution to the problem of jihadist terrorism; Malians do not have access to social justice and their natural resources. They believe that their resources are under foreign control, particularly the big French multinational companies.

Another point that is noteworthy is that all the coups are taking place mainly in the French-speaking countries, apart from Guinea Bissau, a Lusophone country, where the latest coup took place on February 1, 2022, but failed. The Bissau president, Sissoco Embaló, said many security forces were killed and that the coup attempt was a ‘failed attack against democracy.’ From the perspective polemology, why is it that it is the Francophones that are playing host to the coups? Why the calls for economic and monetary sovereignty at this time?

The second dynamic, apart from the French factor, is the role of the ECOWAS in the promotion of democracy and good governance in the ECOWAS region. The role has been identified as a reflection of double standard that assists bad governance and oppresses the people. The role of the ECOWAS is particularly raised in the context of the Côte d’Ivoire which has not been openly seen to have played host to a military coup, but which, following the acquittance of former President Laurent Gbagbo by the International Criminal Court, has shown that President Alassane Ouattara organized a civilian coup by initiative and a military coup by execution.

Problematique and Quo Vadis

The problematique and major dynamic from the foregoing is external in character. It is a combination of the quest to impose Islam and Fulanisation by force, on the one hand, and the quest to make very secure all countries where strategic mineral resources are found in Africa. In this regard, France and her allies are bent that whoever comes to power in such countries where resources are located are not hostile to the protection of Euro-American strategic interests. There is nothing that they do not do to ensure their security survival.

When hostile leaders emerge, they are quickly removed By France and her allies. When such leaders have popular support and the people organize public demonstrations in support of coupists as it is the case in Mali and Burkina Faso, a problematic is necessarily raised: how to reconcile people’s interest and support for coups, on the one hand, and unconstitutional change of government as prohibited by the AU and the ECOWAS.

Coups in the Francophone countries are of two types: people and military-driven coups. People-driven coups are permissible while military-driven coups are non-permissible. The coups in Mali, Guinea Conakry and Burkina Faso are military but enjoy popular support. Those in Chad and Guinea Bissau are military but without popular support. In fact, there is a civilian-initiated coup in the Côte d’Ivoire, which is different from all others and are hardly talked about. Let us begin with the attempted coup in Niger Republic and the Ivoirian case as a problematique.

Olayinka Ajala of the Leeds Beckett University identified three dynamic of the failed coup in Niger: World Bank’s 2019 report that over 40% of Nigeriens were living in extreme poverty; ethnic tension in which the largest ethnic group is the Hausa (56%), Zarma-Songhai (22%0 and Tuareg (8%). The problem is that successive military governments took various measures to stifle conversations on the need to prevent an ethnicity-driven and dominated polity. As a result of the issue of ethnicity, the Tuaregs threatened to secede at a point in time. The third dynamic is the division in the army which is similarly informed by politics of ethnicity. As noted by Ajala, ‘the most common criticism is that the army is negatively affected by appointments that are made along ethnic lines rather than for professional reasons.’

Based on these dynamics, a coup attempt took place at about 3 a.m., two days before the inauguration of the president-elect, Mohammed Bazoum. It was led by Captain Sani Saley Gourouza and came on the heels of the 2010 coup that overthrew the government of Mamadou Tandja and the 1996 coup that ousted Mahamane Ousmane. The immediate dynamic of the failed coup was the rejection of the results of the run-off presidential elections by the defeated candidate following announcement on February 23, 2021. Mohammed Bazoum, former Minister of Interior, polled 55.75% while Mahamane Ousmane, the opposition candidate, reportedly got 44.25% but argued that he did poll 50.3%. In this case, why is it that there is never any election in Africa that the opposition never accepts that elections could be free and fair? When will there not be another coup when some coupists were arrested and some escaped and can still come back? Niger had four coups already: in 1974, 1996, 1999 and 2010. Can there be an antidot to coup making in Niger?

The Ivoirian coup is more interesting but disturbing. It happened in 2010 during the political struggle for presidential power between Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara.

The coup in Guinea Conakry took place on 5 September 2021 and removed President Alpha Condé. The coupists, led by Mamady Doumbouya, suspended the Constitution. Even though President Condé reportedly tried his best to improve the economy, there was little impact of his efforts on the people’s life. This situation prompted the organisation of public protests in 2020 against President Condé who organized a referendum to change the Constitution that enabled him to have a third term in office.

President Condé responded to the protests with acts of brutality which only strengthened the resolve of the protesters, especially following the announcement of increases in tax payments. It was against this background that the coup took place and that Mamady Doumbouya was sworn in as interim President on October 1, 2021. The problem here is that Guinea Conakry was under dictatorial and corrupt rules from 1958 to 2010 and yet, the ECOWAS is preaching the sermon of non-forceful change of government without seeking to address the question of bad governance and oppression