Justice Denied? Supreme Court’s Judgement in Sunday Jackson’s Self-Defence Case (Part 2)
Introduction
Recently, I outlined the facts of Sunday Jackson’s case, and briefly reviewed the Apex Court’s decision-pointing out the areas that raised some disquiet, particularly the court’s misapplication of the principle of self-defence in our criminal jurisprudence. Today, we shall continue with same highlighting the perception that the decision reflects a failure of substantial judgement and miscomprehension of the facts and the court’s failure to take cognisance of the lingering herdsmen-farmers crisis. After which we shall x-ray of factors therein. Enjoy.
Overview of the Supreme Court Judgement: Points of Concern (Continues)
3. Failure of Substantial Justice and Misjudgement of Facts
The Supreme Court’s approach to Jackson’s case, represents a deeper judicial failure: the substitution of presumed scenarios for proven facts. The court’s analysis, was built on the mental construction of a disarmed aggressor lying harmlessly before a free and unthreatened Jackson. This imaginary scene contradicts Jackson’s account, which described a wrestling struggle during which he gained control of the weapon in a moment of sheer survival.
The court overlooked the critical fact that, Jackson and his attacker remained in physical contact throughout the ordeal. In such close quarters, it is unrealistic to presume Jackson had the luxury of time or physical ability to disengage, without first ensuring his own safety by incapacitating his assailant. Additionally, the court failed to reckon with the reasonable fear that, the attacker still within reach, could have reclaimed the weapon, or grabbed any other weapon within reach (for example, a piece of rock, tree branch, etc) and attacked Jackson.
Even the court’s suo motu exploration of the defence of provocation was, with respect, mishandled. Although it recognised that Jackson acted in the heat of passion and under grave provocation, it however, concluded erroneously that there was sufficient time for his passion to have cooled. This is a legal fiction unsupported by the chronology of events, as admitted in Jackson’s confessional statement.
In dismissing the defence of provocation, the court claimed Jackson’s passion had cooled. But, how could it have? The entire incident happened in a blur of chaos; in the heat of the moment when reason had vacated its seat, and when there was no time for passion to have cooled down. This was not a pre-meditated or calculated revenge; it was a reflex action for survival. And, the law is supposed to understand that.
4. Failure of the Supreme Court to take Judicial Notice of the lingering Farmer-Herder Crisis in Assessing the Defence of Self-Defence
In affirming the conviction and death sentence of Sunday Jackson, the Supreme Court appeared to have approached the case in a vacuum, as though the incident took place in a socially and historically neutral setting. It made no reference whatsoever, to the widely recognised and ongoing farmers-herders conflict that has plagued communities across Adamawa State and much of Nigeria’s Middle Belt, South-West, South-South and South-East. This oversight is striking, particularly given that Jackson’s alleged assailant, a herder, confronted him in a rural bush area, a pattern consistent with the violent clashes that have led to hundreds of deaths and displacements in the region.
Under Section 124 of the Evidence Act, Nigerian courts are permitted and indeed, expected to take judicial notice of facts that are so notorious or well-known that they are not reasonably open to question. The farmers-herders conflict, and the tension and hostility they generate in affected communities, fall squarely within this category. The Supreme Court’s failure to contextualise Jackson’s fear and response within this reality, deprived the case of necessary social, sociological and historical nuance.
The court ought to have appreciated that Jackson, being part of a vulnerable and frequently targeted farming community, would have reasonably perceived any sudden attack from a known herder as a mortal threat. By ignoring this critical background, the judgement appears detached from the lived experiences of rural Nigerians, and fails to reflect the court’s obligation to administer justice not merely according to the letter of the law, but in alignment with the broader circumstances that inform human behaviour.
The Supreme Court had a chance, a golden opportunity, to expand Nigerian jurisprudence on self-defence: To recognise that not all threats come with time to think; that a farmer attacked on his own land should not be condemned for failing to flee; that justice must take into account the real-life context in which people act, not just the sterile pages of law books.
The Defences of Self-Defence and Provocation
What is self-defence under the Nigerian Law?
Self-defence is the protection of one’s person or property (Section 289 Criminal Code (CC), against some injury attempted by another. This right is recognised on the basis that, it constitutes a lawful justification for the use of force in repelling an assault against one’s person (Section 32(3) Criminal Code). In the Penal Code, it is also referred to as private defence (Section 59 Penal Code (PC) In the usual course of law, the use of such force would constitute a criminal offence; however, it is deemed justified under the doctrine of self-defence (John v The State [2012] 7 NWLR (Pt.1299) 336 C.A).
In EKPOUDO v THE STATE (2021) LPELR-52826(CA), the Court of Appeal defined self-defence as; “the use of force to protect oneself, one’s family or one’s property from a real or threatened attack”. Typically, a person is justified in using a reasonable degree of force in self-defence, when they have a reasonable belief that imminent bodily harm is threatened, and that such force is necessary to prevent the danger.
Section 32(3) of the Criminal Code stipulates that a person shall not be held criminally liable for an act, if it is reasonably necessary to resist actual and unlawful violence directed at themselves or another individual in their presence.
To activate the above section, the Apex Court in UWAEKWEGHINYA v THE STATE (2005) 9 NWLR (PT. 930) 27, the Supreme Court held that “Where a person kills another in defence of himself, such a killing is excused, and it does not amount to manslaughter under the Criminal Code or Culpable Homicide not punishable with death under the Penal Code. The defence of self-defence is a complete defence under the Criminal Code and the Penal Code, and a successful defence of self-defence leads to the discharge and acquittal of the accused person”.
This position was also reiterated in the case of LAWALI v STATE (2021) LPELR-56431 where the Court of Appeal opined as follows:
“The Law is that, if the intention of an accused person in doing an unlawful act was not to kill or cause grievous harm, but the act resulted in the death of a person, a verdict of culpable homicide not punishable with death will be returned. This is in line with the provisions of Section 222(4) of the Penal Code which states that, culpable homicide is not punishable with death if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner”.
The consequence of this is that self-defence is constitutionally afforded to an individual who is attacked by another, serving as a necessary defence, with specific elements that must be demonstrated or proven in order to succeed in the claim.
In order for the plea of self-defence to succeed, the following must be present as outlined by the Supreme Court in RASHEED AMINU v THE STATE ((2019) 7 NWLR (pt.1672) 481). They constitute the requisite ingredients of self-defence under Section 32(3) of the Criminal Code to wit:
a. That the victim was attacking or about to attack the Defendant in a manner that grievous hurt and or death was possible, thus, he had to defend himself.
b. That the self-defence was instantaneous and contemporaneous with threatened attack.
c. That the mode of defence was not greater or disproportionate with the threatened attack.
To elaborate further on self-defence under the Penal Code, the Apex Court in MOHAMMAD v THE STATE ((2019) 4 NWLR (pt. 1661) 98 at 101) adopted the ingredients laid down in RASHEED AMINU v THE STATE ((2019) 7 NWLR (PT.1627) 481). This obviously evidenced that the ingredients of self–defence under the Criminal Code and Penal Code are the same. The Court of Appeal in MOHAMMED v STATE (2020) LPELR-50919(CA) held that:
“The defence of self-defence, is clearly a child of necessity. It is a defence that is not pleaded as a matter of course, but, one in which the Defendant is expected to establish that he was at the time of the killing, in reasonable apprehension of death to himself or grievous harm, and that it was necessary at the time to use the force which resulted in the death of the deceased in order to preserve his life. As an important aspect of the force used by the Defendant, must be shown to be proportionate to the force used or imminently threatened against him and reasonable in the circumstances in which it was used. The defence of self-defence, of course, is not available where the person attacked used a greater degree of force than was necessary in repelling the attack”.
The defence of provocation, which can reduce a murder charge to manslaughter, was also considered. The law recognises provocation where:
1. The accused was provoked by a sudden and grave act.
2. The provocation deprived the accused of self-control.
3. The act of killing occurred before time to regain composure.
The Supreme Court in the Jackson case, acknowledged that being stabbed could amount to grave provocation. But, it held that Jackson, having overpowered his attacker, had time, however brief, to calm down. Thus, the Court concluded that he acted not in the heat of passion, but in calculated retaliation.
It must be pointed out that, this standard fails to appreciate the psychological and physiological state of someone who has just survived a violent, near-death encounter. Expecting dispassionate judgement in such moments is unrealistic, especially when such expectation is judged from a removed, academic standpoint.
The Dissenting Opinion: A Voice of Moderation
Many a time, events or decisions can appear entirely reasonable when outlined on paper neatly justified by logic, data, or policy. But, the moment a human face is attached to that same event, the perspective shifts. What once seemed like a practical or even necessary action can suddenly feel personal, emotional, and far more complex. Numbers do not cry. Statistics do not have families. But, people do. And, when the abstract becomes tangible, when names replace case numbers and stories replace bullet points, we are reminded that reason alone is not always enough we need empathy, too. (To be continued)
THOUGHT FOR THE WEEK
“At his best, man is the noblest of all animals; separated from law and justice he is the worst”. (Aristotle).
