Nigeria and the New Cold War Order in the Making: The Challenges of Relevance and Survival

 

Nigeria’s foreign policy has generally followed two directions: programmatic and reactive. Professors Bolaji Akinwande Akinyemi and Ibrahim Agboola Gambari are on record to have favoured programmatic foreign policy. Professor Akinyemi organized the 1986 Kuru Conference and also came up with the Akinyemi Consultation Doctrine which were geared towards taking initiatives and providing leadership in the conduct and management of various international questions. The establishment of the Technical Aid Corps Scheme is one good illustration. The Suggestion of the Concert of Medium that was changed to the Lagos Forum is another. In fact, his quest for a black power status for Nigeria is self-explanatory.

Professor Gambari’s suggestion of the need to adopt the principle of concentricism in the application of Nigeria’s foreign policy is noteworthy. He divided the whole world into four areas of priority to guide every foreign policy endeavour: Nigeria and the immediate neighbours to constitute the first and innermost, as well as the most important circle. The inclusion of the neighbours as part of the innermost circle is explained by the fact of Nigeria’s security linkages that are intertwined with those of the neighbours. The next outer circle is the ECOWAS region. The third circle is the rest of Africa. When scholars talk about Africa being the cornerstone and centerpiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy, they easily wrongly ignore the fact that Africa is under prioritization of importance. Professor Gambari’s prioritization necessarily makes Nigeria and her immediate neighbourhood the centerpiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy and not Africa as generally referred to.

The point being made by the two diplomatic scholars is that they preach the sermon of anticipatory foreign policy and not reactive foreign policy. Anticipatory foreign policy does not talk about achievements ab initio. It deals with anticipated challenges, giant strides, intellectual finesse in addressing attitudinal dispositions of various countries in such a way that Nigeria is not allowed to be cut unawares.

Unfortunately, foreign policy under President Muhammadu Buhari, has been, at best, very reactive. It lacks lustre and articulation. The implication is to ask which way Nigeria in light of the New Cold War Order that is in the making? Should Nigeria begin to plan based on a programmatic foreign policy or should simply wait to react to the new order? What really is the likely format of the new order? What are the processes of its emergence? Will Nigeria or Africa be relevant in its making? In discussing the roles for Nigeria, an exegesis of the likely scenarios of the New Cold War Order is necessary at this juncture.

New Cold War Order Scenarios

The old Cold War Order was defined by bipolarity, East-West superpower rivalry, which prompted the adoption of policies of glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union, and eventually the dismantlement of the Soviet Union. Soviet Union’s self-destruction put an end to politics of bipolarity and re-energised the United States and its allies to seek greater democratization of the whole world, in the belief that the West has the best form of government.

In the making of the new Cold War Order, the likelihood of its being guided by principles of bipolarity is very remote. What is foreseeable is either tripolarity or quadripolarity. In this regard, the European Union, right from the time of its being an EEC of Six as established by the 25 March 1957 Rome Treaty, has generally sought to be a centre of power on its own right. Even though the two Franco-German Foreign Ministers that sponsored the Rome Treaty, Robert Schumann of Germany and Jean Monnet of France, had the basis objective of preventing any new misunderstanding between their two countries in order to avoid a new war in Europe, the objective later shifted from conflict prevention though economic cooperation to political and defence interests. The 1993 Maastricht treaty is clear on this point The European Union of today is that of peoples and no more simply about governments.

More important, the EEC and the EU as models for regional economic integration for others, especially for the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, may not have the type of importance and values they used to have in the near future. It is relevant to recall that the United Kingdom has Brexited from the European Union. The initial pointers to the Brexiting date back to 1975, in other words, only two years when the United Kingdom joined the EEC. By very narrow margins, proponents of membership of the EEC won but anti-Europeanism began to grow from within.

After Brexit, there may be Polandexit, that is, the withdrawal of Poland’s membership from the European Union, and the implications of such a withdrawal cannot but be strategically injurious to Western calculations in their relationship with Eastern Europe. On Thursday, 7 October 2021 the Polish Constitutional Tribunal ruled in a case, brought before it by the Polish Prime Minister, Mateusc Morawiecki, in 2016, that there are four core articles of the European Union’s founding treaties that are incompatible with the Polish Constitution, and by implication such incompatible articles cannot be enforced in Poland.

Unlike in a similar case of Ireland whose Supreme Court had raised a clash between its Constitution and the EU treaties and which was resolved, it is expected that the case of Poland may be completely different this time and that Poland may be compelled to withdraw its membership of the European Union. In the thinking of the European union, and particularly, the French and the Germans, it is the common values and rules of the Union that are under attack in Poland.

As explained by the Polish Court, the four core articles considered incompatible with the Polish Constitution are Article 1 ‘’where EU countries agree to set up the Union, which they call a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’’; Article which ‘contains the Union’s main values of ‘’respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’ in a society in which ‘’pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’; Article 4.3 which ‘establishes a principle of ‘’sincere cooperation’’ for EU countries and the Union to ‘’assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the treaties’; and Article 19 which ‘introduces the Court of Justice of the European Union, saying it ‘’shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed.’ In the understanding of the Polish Court, Articles 1 and 4’allowed the Union to act ‘’beyond the limits of competences transferred by the Republic of Poland in the treaties.’ The Polish Court also noted that, thanks to Articles 19 and 2, the European courts illegally override the Polish constitution, including by checking the legality of the appointment of judges.’

Two points are noteworthy in this case. First, the Polish are not openly contesting the supranational character of the European courts but that the surrendered part of the Polish sovereignty to the European Union does not include the powers being self-ascribed by the European authorities. Even though the French are talking about possible ‘de facto exit’ or withdrawal of membership and the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, is pledging to ‘use all the powers’ at her disposal to enforce EU laws, the bitter truth remains that it is only Poland’s membership that can be suspended, as the general support of other members is required to send Poland packing. Besides, countries like Germany and Hungary have complained in the past about the European institutions going beyond their approved mandate. And perhaps more significantly, even the French presidential hopeful, Michel Barnier, is on record to have said that France must regain its ‘legal sovereignty in order to no longer be subject to the judgments of the CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights.’

The second point is that there are millions of people in the European Union who are not prepared to surrender their sovereignty to any supranational organization, although political governance is still largely governed by the rule of the majority. Even though Poland may not be on record to be contributing much to the European Union, the beauty of Poland moving away from the Warsaw Pact mentality to joining the European Union world of democratization and human rights values explains the failure of communism which the Western world is seriously preaching against. What is most likely in the context of a new Cold War order is that Russia cannot but be particularly interested in a Poland that will no longer be interested in the European Union. Russia wants to be at the epicentre of a new power alliance., that is a polarity of its own. Can there be a renewal of the old Eastern European alliance?

The European Union, currently a natural ally of the United States, is existing as a centre of power on its own merit. In the event of a new Cold War order, will the European Union be freely aligned with the United States or will prefer to be independent? Without any jots of doubt, several EU countries supported France in the AUKUS dispute in which the United Kingdom and the United States sought a common understanding with Australia to undermine the French agreement with Australia on the production of some classical nuclear submarines, as distinct from the digitized submarines newly proposed by the Americans. In other words, it is likely that there will be much animosity vis-à-vis future American leadership at the level of Western alliance. What is likely is that the European Union and the United States are most likely to reconcile their differences in facing Russia and China as other centres of power. Thus, we can consider the US and the EU as one polarity.

Without doubt, Russia as epicentre of one alliance cannot be ruled out. Russia’s possible quest for a rapprochement with the Chinese who are a superpower in waiting, cannot also be ruled out. The United States has grouses with both China and Russia. In the absence of any rapprochement between China and Russia and with the European joining the United States, we are likely to have tripolarity. If the EU seeks independence, then quadripolarity cannot be ruled out. In this regard, how does Nigeria respond to these scenarios?

Nigeria and New Cold War Tripolarity

France and Germany have condemned the Polish Court’s ruling, arguing that ‘membership of the European Union goes hand-in-hand with full and unconditional adherence to common values and rules. Compliance with these is the responsibility of each Member State and therefore, of course, also of Poland, which occupies a key position in the European Union. This is not only a moral commitment. It is also a legal commitment.’ Without doubt, the Polish Court’s ruling has its proponents and opponents in Europe. Hungary, for example, supports the court ruling.

In relating to the European Union, Nigeria’s foreign policy of non-alignment will be difficult to apply, even though the policy is not that Nigerian government is prevented from aligning but that the act of alignment is that it must be a resultant from a sovereign decision. This is consistent with that of Poland, which is arguing that the European Union cannot legislate on matters over which there is no delegated competency.

Secondly, the extent to which the Western world would be able to assist Nigeria in addressing the issue of national unity cannot but remain a moot question. What is the position of the European Union and the United States on the issues of secession and self-determination in Nigeria, and particularly on whether there should be a UN referendum in Yoruba Southwest?

The Yoruba have not only registered with the UNPO but has taken their matter beyond to the level of the United Nations. Plebiscite is what is being considered at the level of the international community? Will the United Kingdom and the United States refuse to support national unity the way they did in 1967 before they were compelled to review their policy when the Soviet Union quickly accepted national unity and supply weapons to Nigeria? Without any whiff of doubt, many EU countries have the potential to support the self-determination quest of the Yoruba southwest based on human rights, strong belief in the principle of self-determination and democracy. The struggle for secession is not different. No one can be forced into an unwanted union. The first challenge for the Government of Nigeria is how to manage the likely duplicity that will characterize the attitudinal disposition of many countries of the world.

Thirdly, hostility towards France and the United States in Africa is on the increase. Several questions are being raised about the dishonesty that has come to characterize their engagements in Africa. For instance, specifically on the Republic of Niger, it is said that Niger has one of the biggest uranium deposits in the world and for strategic reasons that are not far-fetched, the United States has the biggest network of foreign drones covering the areas of the deposit.

In the same vein, it is complained that France also has military presence in that same location. And perhaps more interestingly, it is argued that one of every three lighting bulbs in France gets its energy from the uranium deposit. Whereas, in the Republic of Niger itself, people’s access to the electricity grid is not more than 15% while there is regularity of electricity 24/7 in France. Many Nigeriens are getting irritated on this matter. By implication, the extent to which support from former colonies for whatever French agenda in the future may no longer be taken for granted as it used to be. What is manifestly also clear is that both France and the United States are protecting their strategic interests in the Republic of Niger. But has Nigeria any strategic interests in the Republic of Niger? Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji’s beneficial and constructive concentricism requires the articulation of Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives in every foreign policy prioritized concentric circle. What really is Nigeria’s foreign policy objective in the Republic of Niger?

Fourthly, at the domestic level, to what extent can PMB expect the support of the people of Nigeria in the event of a new Cold War order? There is already a Cold War relationship between the Chinese and the Americans. Have the Nigerian citizen diplomats any position on the Sino-American relationship? What is Nigeria’s reactive policy on the relationship?

What is noteworthy is that PMB does not have the political clout to generate domestic support for Nigeria’s foreign policy basically because his policies of nepotism. The Sino-US Cold War goes beyond bilateral questions to include the international controversy over who has sovereignty over the South China Sea and the international status of Taiwan: independent Taiwan or Taiwan as part of Mainland China? If there is a fresh war in Nigeria, the Chinese are likely to support the Government of Nigeria because of Chinese investments in Nigeria, and particularly because of Nigeria’s heavy debts owed China.

Fifthly, and true enough, the Americans are much concerned about the increasing inroads of the Chinese in Africa. They are particularly concerned that US influence is declining to the advantage of the Chinese. Can Nigeria have a programmatic foreign policy attitude on US-China relationship? Can the Government be able to enlist domestic support while openly engaging in reckless nepotism, on the one hand, and pleading for national understanding and unity, on the other? Nigeria is already divided against herself as Nigeria is governed largely by political chicanery. Consequently, in preparing for a programmatic foreign policy that will be able to respond to the emerging new Cold War order, the intra-Nigerian contradictions must be first addressed.

Sixthly, at the African level, will Nigeria be related with as leader of Africa? Will Nigeria also be free from the new wave of coups d’état that have come to characterize African political governance in recent times? Even though the African Union has vehemently prohibited every unconstitutional change of government in Africa and has always sanctioned such unconstitutional changes by suspending the membership of such countries, from the look of things, Africa may be witnessing the return of the era of coups-making. What the international community has always succeeded in doing is to simply condemn terrorist attacks and unconstitutional changes of government. Beyond that, fresh coups have not in any way been prevented. By coincidence or otherwise, the recent coups d’état in Africa have a Francophone character. They all took place in former French colonies: double coup within one year in Mali, controversial coup in Chad, failed coup in Niger, Guinea Conakry, etc.

What currently obtains in Nigeria goes beyond coup-making. Nigeria is currently challenged by crises of legitimacy and survival which can be addressed by laying a foundation for an enabling environment for a long-term nation-building. In this regard, Nigeria must prepare to be relevant in the conduct and management of international questions, and this requires addressing domestic questions.

Ambassador Princeton N. Lyman, former US plenipotentiary to Nigeria, said at the Achebe Colloquium at the Brown University, United States, that Nigeria is no more of any relevant, strategic importance to the United States: Brazil now has a 10-year program that will make it one of the major oil producers in the world; many African countries, particularly Angola, are now oil producers; the United States has also discovered a large gas reserve; and alternative sources of energy are currently being developed worldwide. For Ambassador Lyman, ‘Nigeria is becoming a kind of society that imports and exports and lives off in oil, which does not make it a significant economic entity.’ If Nigeria cannot be relevant and its survival as a sovereign nation-state is being threatened, there is the need for a re-strategy beyond show of ethnic chauvinism and nepotistic policies. Condemning verbally institutional corruption while actually aiding and abetting it, is a critical challenge that must first be addressed in nation-building and relevance-seeking.