By Bola A. Akinterinwa
Global peace and security is gradually, but also increasingly, threatened by one major factor: quest for self-reliance. Self-reliance is one of the first cardinal objectives of several African countries which acceded to both national and international sovereignty in the 1960s. The accession to national sovereignty was first preceded by the people’s quest for self-determination. The principle of self-determination was ab initio conceived for the purposes of dependent territories, to liberate them from the clutches of colonial exploitation. Put differently, the people wanted to be independent. With much help from the government and people of United States, most dependent countries have moved from the level of struggle for self-determination to that of independence and sovereignty.
However, the independence and sovereignty of most African countries constitutes a more difficult problem than the various problems under colonial dependency. Bad governance, especially driven by institutional corruption, perversion of justice, political chicanery, ethnic chauvinism, undermining meritocracy, sit-tight presidents and intervention of foreign powers in the day-to-day management of African countries, has not only militated against development but has also prompted a loss of hope in many countries.
Many constituent parts of some countries feel that they are being marginalised, that they are not having their own fair share of government’s developmental allocations, and therefore, have engaged in renewed nationalism. Nationalism necessarily raises other issues: autonomy, which can be limited or full; separation or disintegration, type of federalism to adopt, etc.
And true enough, nationalism is also increasingly competing with multilateralism in contemporary international relations. The current general belief of integration experts is that economic growth and development can be faster with regional integration approach. This is one major rationale for the making of the European Economic Community of Six with the signing of Rome Treaty in 1957. Membership of the community has not only increased to 28 but has also led to the restructuring of the economic community into a union following the Maastritch Treaty.
For instance, British nationalism has given birth to what is now known in the political integration studies lexicon as Brexit (withdrawal of Britain from the European Union). Scotland is currently struggling to be carved out of the United Kingdom as an independent state. The people of Catalonia have the same objective in Spain. California once threatened to secede from the United States. Here in Africa, the Casamance province in Senegal remains a recidivist source of insecurity for the Dakarois authorities. The cases of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in Nigeria remind us clearly that there is now nationalism as a concentric circle within other outer concentric circles of nationalism in Nigeria. The IPOB circle is within a larger outer circle, even though the long term objective of the two is the same. The IPOB and the MASSOB circles are located within the Nigerian circle of nationalism that has been generating much of division in the polity, particularly in the area of its management for the purposes of national unity.
In this column, it is observed that there has been an evolution from the conception of the principle of self-determination as a dynamic of and guide to decolonisation, and to self-determination as an instrument for secession from existing states. In this regard, secession can be synonymous with rearrangement, and therefore, not necessarily implying withdrawal from being a constitutive part of an existing state. This rearrangement is called ‘restructuring’ in Nigeria. The proponents of restructuring want a review of the derivation formula, power structure in which more powers will be given to the constitutive states of Nigeria. More importantly, they want some other critical issues promptly addressed. They include the questions of land tenure system; form of government, especially in terms of whether it would be better to return to regionalism and parliamentarianism as it was in the 1960s with possible adaptations to respond to contemporary challenges or to evolve a true federal system; the problems of states creation, particularly in light of the insolvency of many of the existing states and quests for six geo-political zones; fiscal federalism and revenue allocation.
Basically, the apostles of restructuring posit that the federal government, or what is also called the centre, is too strong to the detriment of the survival of the member states of Nigeria. They simply want the federal government to be responsible for national currency, national defence and security, with particular emphasis on the need for state police and community police, as well as foreign policy.
Again, secession can imply limited or full autonomy, and outright total separation. The Eritrean war with Ethiopia led to the carving out of Eritrea from Ethiopia. The same is true of South Sudan from Sudan. What is particularly noteworthy about the foregoing is that it is increasingly becoming clearer that, for a longer time to come, the state cannot but continue to remain the first and most important unit and stakeholder in international relations. Secondly, the partitioning of Africa by fiat à la 1885 Berlin Conference has the great potential of seriously generating violence in the future if we reckon with the reasons often given for the renewed and growing nationalism in Africa.
And perhaps most disturbingly, future threats to Nigeria’s national security have a critical character. The threats are more likely to be sub-regionally and regionally driven, with the potential of also being aided and abetted by powerful countries that are friendly with Nigeria. Consequently, Nigeria cannot but need to learn from the experiences of others in the management of quests for autonomy, restructuring and secession. An explication of the cases of Catalonia in Spain, Casamance in Senegal, and Anglophone Cameroon is good enough to draw lessons for Nigeria in the handling of the IPOB and MASSOB saga.
Self-determination Driven Nationalism
The cases of nationalism in Catalonia, Casamance and Anglophone Cameroon are recidivist in character. They do not respond to any legal logic or law. The main point of interest for the nationalists is simply their recognition of the need to chart a new future for themselves in a particular manner and in the strong belief that sovereignty is theirs.
In Spain, for example, Catalonia has been part of Spain for almost 300 years, and yet, the Catalans are still insisting on independence. It should be recalled that the quest for Catalonia’s independence dates back to more than 200 years. There was a time in the 17th Century when Catalonia, was not only an autonomous community, occupying a triangular area in the north eastern corner of Spain, but also the centre of a separatist movement that dominated Spanish affairs at times,
There was also the time in 1137 when Catalonia and Aragon were united under the same ruler and Catalonia had to monopolise trade in the Western Mediterranean in the 13th and 14th Centuries, as well as “dominated the Union with Aragon until 1410, when the male line of the Courts of Barcelona became extinct. More importantly, dissatisfaction in Catalonia developed into a full-scale but unsuccessful rebellion that lasted from 1462 to 1472
As pointed out by Vicente Rodriguez in Encyclopaedia Britannica, “after the marriage of John II’s son, Ferdinand, with Isabella of Castilla (1469) had brought about the unification of Spain, Catalonia became of secondary importance in Spanish affairs. Though it retained its autonomy and Generalitat (Assembly) by the 17th Century, its conflict of interest with Castilla, along with the decline of the Spanish Monarchy’s prestige, ‘led to the first of a series of Catalan separatist movements.’ In fact, Rodriguez further noted, ‘in 1640, Catalonia revolted against Spain and placed itself under the protection of Louis XIII of France, but the revolt was quelled in the 1650s’.
Quelling the revolt did not prevent the resurgence of Catalan separatism in the 1850s, especially with the establishment of Renaixenca (Rebirth). Again, by 1913, Catalonia was given a limited autonomy but the legislation that conferred it was repealed in 1925 by Miguel Primo de Riviera who also fought Catalonia nationalism.
The hostility of Primo de Riviera prompted the establishment of Esquerra, a left wing coalition party, which not only won the 1931 municipal elections but whose leader had to proclaim a Catalan Republic. This proclamation promptly warranted negotiations by the central government and the adoption in 1932 of a Statute of autonomy. However, the legal autonomy would not last with the coming to power of General Francisco Franco who related repressively with Catalan.
From the foregoing, there is no disputing the fact that the use of force has not in any way suppressed the quest for self-determination, nor prevented the resurgence of Catalan nationalism, even after General Francisco Franco’s death. Limited autonomy was given to Catalonia in September 1977. Two years after, full autonomy was granted with the establishment of the Autonomous Community of Catalonia.
In fact, in 2006, Catalonia was not only granted a ‘Nation status’ but was also given the same level of taxation responsibility as the Spanish Central government. Even though the Spanish Constitutional Court ‘struck down portions of this autonomy statute in 2010′ on the premise that the Catalans constituted a “nationality,†but Catalonia was not, itself, a ‘nation’, the Catalonian regional parliament still passed a bill in 2013 calling for a referendum. Artur Mas, the Convergence and Union leader, proposed to hold the referendum on November 9, 2014.
The call for a referendum was largely influenced by the Euro-zone crisis and also by the September 2014 Scotland’s referendum on independence from the United Kingdom. The Spanish Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, challenged the move and the independence campaign was suspended for the umpteenth time to allow for consideration of the legality of the vote. In spite of this, Artus Mas held the referendum as an informal poll of Catalan opinion.
One third of the registered voters participated in it and over 80% of them voted in favour of independence but the Madrid authorities frustrated the outcome. Again in September 2015, Arthur Mas held regional parliamentary elections as a plebiscite on independence, He led the Jungs Pel Si (Together for Yes) Alliance which won 62 of the 135 Seats. He entered into alliance with the Popular Unity candidacy which won 10 Seats in order to have majority.
As usual, Madrid vehemently opposed it for various reasons ranging from the conviction by a Spanish Court in March 2017, of Arthur Mas as Catalan President by the Popular Unity Candidacy, Carles Puigdemont, the Mayor of Giroma, was settled for. Most unfortunately for Madrid, Puigdemont again began to work for independence of Catalonia. He announced in June 2017 that Catalonia would surely hold a binding referendum on October 1, 2017. And true enough, it took place. Prime Minister Rajoy, who described the referendum as a mockery of democracy, responded repressively, but, unfortunately, severely damaging the international image of Spain. And most unfortunately too, the repression involved police assaults on Catalans. The assaults were reported worldwide and are currently attracting much sympathy from the international community.
This is an interesting case from which many lessons could be learnt. Use of force or violence can kill people, destroy property but cannot neutralize any will of the people. The people’s will is indestructible. Consequently, it is a matter of when will the rejection of the people’s will degenerate into guerrilla terrorism over which no individual state has monopoly control or effective defence mechanism. President Muhammadu Buhari must never allow himself or the Armed Forces to be wrapped in the glory of military strength. There is the need for change in the attitudinal disposition of Government to the calls for restructuring and agitations for secession.
A cursory look at the case of nationalism in Cameroon reveals the same recidivist will of the people to be independent. Two dates are important in explicating nationalism in Cameroon: March 10 and October 1 of every year. Every March 10, the Yaoundé authorities always mark the day in remembrance of the day of loss of part of their territory, Northern British Cameroon, to Nigeria. October 1 is the national day of independence which has two dimensions: celebration of independence from the colonial master, France, on the one hand, and celebration of unity of the British Southern Cameroon to form the Federal Republic, on the other.
In this former British Southern Cameroon, there have always been people agitating for autonomy right from the time of independence. They have been complaining of marginalisation and repression. Anglophone Cameroon accounts for only 20% of the total population of the country.
One important dynamic of the agitation for independence by Anglophone Cameroonians is the porous foundation of the making of a united Cameroon at the time of independence. The observation of Cardinal Christian Tumi is quite relevant here. As he put it on August 21, 2017, ‘il n’y a jamais eu de mariage entre le Cameroun anglophone et le Cameroun francophone. Ils vivent en concubinage’ (vide lavoixdukoat.com). This simply means that there has never been any marriage between Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon. What exists between them was a relationship of concubinage. This point of view is largely based on the fact that there was no official act agreed upon in July 1961 at Foumban.
As he further explained it, ‘ils n’ont rien signé à Foumban. Le premier ministre, John Ngu Foncha… n’avait pas le pouvoir de négocier parce que le Cameroun était sous tutelle de la France et de l’Angleterre. Comme les français soutenaient Ahidjo, ils étaient à la conférence. C’est l’Angleterre et les Nations Unies qui devaient valider l’acte. Mais ces deux n’étaient pas présents. Il n’ya jamais eu de document sur ce qui s’est passé à Foumban. Les gens sont allés boire du vin.’
Explained differently ‘they signed nothing in Foumban. The Prime Minister, John Ngu Foncha… did not have the power to negotiate because Cameroon was under the authority of France and England. As the French supported Ahidjo, they were at the conference. It is England and the United Nations that were to validate the act. But the two of them were not present. Never was there any document on what happened. The men went to drink wine.’
In Senegal, an already small country, the Casamance province is still struggling to be carved out of Senegal, again for the same allegations of marginalisation, unfairness and injustice. But, whatever is the case, the people’s will is always at the epicentral foundation. The implication of this is clear: likely protracted period of national insecurity in the foreseeable future, especially with the manu militari style of ministers in communicating with the aggrieved in Nigeria. Government should not toe the Von Clausewitz theory of seeking peace by engaging in war. Integration, be it regional or sub-regional, is good but the promotion of nationalism for whatever reasons is necessarily detrimental to the cause of integration. In both cases, the right to self-determination, self-reliance and self-identity cannot be compromised on any altar of sacrifice.
