THE UNDERCURRENT AT NDC

LEONARD ONOTAKEVWE urges the party to put its house in order

There is something increasingly difficult to ignore in the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC). On the surface, the party has what appears to be a formidable presidential ticket in Peter Obi and Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso. It has the Obidient movement, the Kwankwasiyya movement and the institutional structure of the NDC. It has, at least in theory, the ingredients of a powerful opposition coalition.

Yet beneath that surface, a palpable uncomfortable undercurrent appears to be unraveling, making the NDC a party of particular concern. It is the question of who truly controls the political machinery of the NDC — the party itself or the movements and political structures that Obi and Kwankwaso brought into it?

That question may sound organizational. In an election as consequential as the 2027 presidential contest, however, organizational questions can quickly become political questions. And increasingly, the disagreement is no longer entirely underground. People have now taken note of it.

National Leader of the NDC, Senator Seriake Dickson, has publicly insisted that the party should not be portrayed as the beneficiary of a favour from Peter Obi or any other politician. In June, responding to criticism from some Obi supporters, Dickson declared that nobody was doing the NDC a favour by joining it; rather, he said, the NDC was doing politicians a favour by providing its platform. He also reminded his audience that he could have been the party’s presidential candidate himself.

Dickson subsequently made his position on political identity even clearer. He has said, in substance, that he is NDC and not an Obidient or a Kwankwasiyya. There is nothing inherently contradictory about that position. A political party is entitled to assert its institutional authority, just as a support movement is entitled to maintain its identity.

The problem begins when the two positions appear to collide. That collision became particularly evident in the controversy over the 59-member presidential campaign council unveiled by the Obi-Kwankwaso Movement.

The movement presented the council as a mobilisation structure for the Obi-Kwankwaso ticket. The NDC leadership rejected it, saying it had not emanated from the party and should therefore be disregarded. The party further warned that only its leadership could constitute and announce its presidential campaign council and cautioned support groups against creating structures that could be interpreted as parallel party organs. The Obi-Kwankwaso Movement, however, did not accept that interpretation. It insisted that it was an independent political organisation with its own leadership, structure and internal processes, while acknowledging the supremacy of the party within its constitutional sphere. Thankfully, Peter Obi has clarified the position, that the movement is subordinate to the party.

 It is instructive to note that campaigns for the January 16, 2026 presidential election formally began on August 16. The quarrel was not necessarily between Obi and Dickson or between Kwankwaso and Dickson. It is fundamentally a dispute over political architecture. Who commands the grassroots structures? Who appoints campaign officials? Who mobilises the voters? Who determines the campaign message? Who speaks for the presidential ticket? And, perhaps most importantly, will the Obidient and Kwankwasiyya constituencies see themselves as supporters of an NDC presidential candidate or as members of a broader political movement that happens to be contesting through the NDC?

Politics is not only about what is happening. It is also about what people think is happening. In politics, perception matters a lot. That is where the present situation could become problematic for the NDC.

A political party entering a presidential election is expected to project unity, clarity of command and strategic coherence. When the public instead sees senior party figures publicly clarifying who is doing whom a favour, support groups being warned about party authority and a presidential campaign council being publicly disowned, the immediate perception can be one of internal uncertainty. Whether that perception is completely accurate is another matter. But perception has consequences.

What is apparent is that the NDC appears as though its major political forces are still negotiating the terms of their marriage and finding integration difficult while the electoral contest is already fully underway. The party has good reasons to insist on institutional discipline. But Obi’s supporters also have a legitimate political history of their own. The Obidient movement was not created by the NDC and so was Kwankwasiyya. Both existed before the present political arrangement and developed their own networks, identities and loyal supporters. The challenge is to create a situation in which party structure and movement energy reinforce rather than compete with one another.

 The timing makes the matter even more disturbing. The presidential election is scheduled for 16 January 2027, while the official campaign period has already commenced. Obi has already flagged off his presidential campaign and presented his broad political message to Nigerians in a manner that has drawn some criticisms. The question is no longer whether the NDC has a candidate and a running mate, it does.

The question is with the current rumbling. Can the NDC rapidly transform the considerable political enthusiasm around Obi and Kwankwaso into one disciplined, coordinated and recognizable national campaign machine ahead of the 2027 election? This is where comparisons with other political parties inevitably arise.

The APC has been methodically proceeding through its electoral preparations, while the ADC has also formally submitted its presidential and vice-presidential candidates to INEC and continued its organizational preparations. The NDC, meanwhile, has spent considerable public energy dealing with questions of internal structure and authority.

That does not mean the party is inactive. Indeed, there have been consultations among Obi, Kwankwaso, Dickson and other senior figures aimed at producing a coordinated campaign structure in an endless manner. But the very fact that such consultations remain necessary illustrates the unfinished nature of their political integration.

And for Obi, this is where the issue becomes particularly important. Peter Obi’s political strength is inseparable from the enthusiasm of the movement around him. Now that Obi is contesting under the NDC, the challenge is: will the rigid system in the party be able to convert that movement energy into the formal structures of a political party without extinguishing the very enthusiasm that made the movement significant?

If Obidients perceive the NDC as attempting to subordinate their movement completely, some may feel alienated. If the NDC perceives the Obidient and Kwankwasiyya structures as attempting to operate above the party, the leadership may resist them. If both perceptions harden, the result could be duplication, competing chains of command and conflicting public messages.

And when two structures are sending different signals, voters can become confused about which one represents the actual campaign. The same applies to Kwankwasiyya. Kwankwaso brings his own political history, geographical base and organizational identity. The value of his presence on the ticket partly lies in the additional constituency he represents.

The rejection of the 59-member council should consequently not be treated merely as another political disagreement. It is a stark warning sign that the NDC is still work in progress.

The OK Movement clearly believes it has the organisational capacity to mobilise for the presidential ticket. The NDC leadership believes that a formal presidential campaign structure must come from the party. Both positions can coexist only if there is an agreed framework. Without such an agreement, every appointment, rally, statement or mobilisation exercise could become another potential flashpoint.

That would be damaging not because disagreement is inherently bad, but because an election campaign requires the ability to translate decisions quickly into coordinated action. The electorate is unlikely to be interested in the internal constitutional arguments of the NDC. Voters will be looking for answers. Who is leading?

What is the message? What does the ticket stand for? What is the plan for the economy? What is the plan for insecurity? How will jobs be created? How will the cost of living be addressed? How will the different regions of Nigeria benefit? And, above all, can the people behind the ticket demonstrate that they can work together?

Without being told, the NDC’s fault lines are too glaring for all to see. But if the disagreements continue to spill into public view, they could create an impression of a coalition that has not yet fully become a party.

 Onotakevwe Jnr, a political and current affairs analyst, writes from Abuja, FCT