Great Power Rivalry in 2022 and Global Insecurity: Foreign Policy Implications for Nigeria in 2023

Great Power Rivalry in 2022 and Global Insecurity: Foreign Policy Implications for Nigeria in 2023

Bola A. Akinterinwa 

Global security was threatened seriously in an unprecedented manner by the great powers in 2022. Particularly noteworthy was Russia’s Special Military Intervention in Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The Western world, led by the United States, complicated the special military intervention with coordinated sanctions against Russia and active military support for Ukraine. The United States and allies did not see the intervention simply as a special military intervention, but as an invasion of Ukraine. Similarly, many scholars described Russia’s intervention as an aggression. Be it an intervention, invasion, or aggression, all of them are internationally illegal and therefore prohibited. 

For example, Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter prohibits any intervention, as distinct from interference which is generally condoned, in the domestic affairs that fall under the jurisdictional competence of other sovereign States. An Act of aggression was listed in 1998 in the Rome Statute as a crime and defined in 2017 as ‘the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action which, in its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter…’ Put grosso modo, in international law, aggression is considered as ‘the use, intentionally and knowingly, of armed force or any other hostile act by a State, a group of States, an organisation of States or non-state actor(s) or by any foreign or external entity, against the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and human security of the population.’ Again, invasion is essentially about breaking into another person’s residence or about a state doing same in another country in order to commit a crime there especially in cases of legitimate invasion in self-defence.

In essence, the implication of any invasion of, aggression against, or any special intervention in, another sovereign State is that international peace and security is unnecessarily threatened to the extent that a possible World War III is no longer ruled out. Although there has not been any global war since 1945, in spite of the inter-state wars and intra-State conflicts that have not been a rarity, the possible use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine is a major threat.

Apart from the Russia-Ukraine war, there was also the collapse in March 2022 of the 450-square mile stretch of Conger ice shelf in the eastern part of Antarctica. Satellites started to record activity there in 1979. The concern is that the collapse of the ice shelf occurred sooner than expected in a part of the continent that is considered less vulnerable to the effects of climate change (Tricia Tisak, Dec 6, 2022 Turning Points: Guest Essay, The New York Times nytimes.com). Thus, global security is under threat in a multidimensional fashion. It is against this background that great power rivalry took place in 2022.

Great Power Rivalry: The Issues

Russia, China, France, United Kingdom and the United States are acknowledged great powers in international relations. United States was specifically identified as a superpower before the demise of the Soviet Union, thus remaining the only superpower thereafter. Great power rivalry raises different issues that threaten regional and international peace and security. For analytical purposes, it is useful to note that the current great power rivalry is not bipolar in character. It is not simply about East-West divide as there are other centres of power also taking active interest in the redefinition of the current World Order. China, as a new critical centre, is noteworthy. Thus, our emphasis is on Sino-American and Russo-American rivalry, as the Euro-Russian rivalry is a subset of the rivalry between the United States and Russia. It merits special expatiation because the European Union countries carry heavier burden than the United States because of their nearness to the Russo-Ukrainian theatre of war and because of the severe impact of the war on them. Thus, what are the issues in the rivalries that have the potential to destabilise global peace and security?

At the level of China-United States, the rivalry is largely driven by conflicting politico-economic interests. Three cases are noteworthy here: South China Sea, Trade War, and Taiwanese autonomy. As regards South China Sea, the People’s Republic of China is claiming sovereignty over the entire South China Sea, but which the United States is contesting. The United States argues that the same South China Sea falls under international waters, that is, under the High Seas and therefore no country can appropriate it. The United States also says that its warships and military aircraft have the legitimate right to operate in the area.      

Without jot of doubt, the South China Sea is of special geo-political and strategic importance not only to the United States and China, but particularly to humanity. It covers 3,500,000 sq. miles and has over 250 small islands. Its proven oil reserves is about 1.2 km3, that is, about 7.7 billion barrels. It has a total estimate of 4.5 km3 (28 barrels). More importantly. One-third of the world’s maritime shipping not only passes through the South China Sea, trade worth over 3 trillion US dollars is also carried through the route. And perhaps most interestingly, the South China Sea has a natural gas reserves of about 7,500 km3 (266 trillion cubic feet) and remains the second most used sea lane in the world, coming after the Dover Strait through which more than 500 vessels pass on daily basis.

It is therefore not surprising that many countries are much interested in the South China Sea for the foregoing considerations and for other reasons. Indonesia, Vietnam, People’s Republic of China (Beijing), Republic of China (Taiwan) are all claiming sovereignty over the waters. The Beijing authorities are claiming almost the entire area within the ‘nine-dash line,’ In fact, the United States and the Chinese are particularly more interested geo-politically in the South China Sea. In 1899 and 1900, the United States adopted the ‘Open Door Policy’ which ‘called for the protection of equal privileges for all countries trading with China and for the support of Chinese territorial and administrative integrity.’ With this policy, the United States has always been opposed to spheres of influence by outside powers.

Second is the trade dispute, which is another important element in the global power struggle between the Chinese and the Americans. The United States has always accused the Chinese of technology theft and unfairness in their policy attitude. The United States has also realised that the Chinese had outsmarted them and therefore now want to reverse the situation. In the spirit of Sun Tsu, who noted in his ‘The Art of War,’ that when one shapes the battle, the enemy will have to play along, the United States similarly wants to define the framework for international trade. This is one rationale for the adoption of The Chips Act, The Chips 4 Alliance, and the patent infringement accusations.

In this regard, for instance, several US technology companies were denied in China strategic advantages and even a level playing field. China is believed in the US to have taken away strategic technologies, a development that had prompted Google, Meta and Amazon to leave the Chinese market. This is what has been referred to as the ‘data war.’ This is also one rationale for President Joe Biden’s consideration that the United States must regain control of the supply chain with the Chips Act and promoting the Chip 4 Alliance.

It is important to note here that there is nothing wrong in competing, the only issue of concern is how to ensure that the competition is healthy. The immediate predecessor of Joe Biden, President Donald Trump came up with a new foreign policy attitude: ‘America First,’ and ‘Make America Great Again.’ These policies have policy consequences at both the domestic and external levels. At the domestic level, the obligation is to ensure that American companies are able to produce more, export more and compete well internationally. At the external level, the policies of making the ‘United States Great Again’ and ‘America First’, necessarily imply the recognition that the United States had been overtaken by other countries, hence the need to make the United States great again. In other words, the position of the United States as primus inter pares has been lost and should be restored. And perhaps most disturbingly, an ‘American First’ policy simply means that, under no circumstance would the US foreign policy attitudinal disposition be allowed to succumb to any whims and caprices of other countries. This also means no compromise.

One good illustration of this point is the caution given by President Joe Biden to African leaders following the United Nations vote on the Russian-Ukrainian war. Most African countries attempted to vote sovereignly by refusing to vote against the 

UN resolution seeking to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine either by abstaining from voting or voting against the resolution to condemn Russia. In reaction to the African position, President Biden made it clear that any country that votes henceforth against any US interest would be punished. The modality for the punishment has not been publicly specified.

Regarding Taiwan, China’s policy attitude is ‘One China, Two Systems’ meaning that China does not recognise the political sovereignty of Taiwan, in which the United States strongly believes. Taiwan operates a Western capitalist system, while the People’s Republic of China operates a socialo-communist system. In this regard, China accepts that the two systems can co-exist, but under one Chinese or Beijing authority, which the United States does not subscribe to. The reasons for Sino-American positions are not far-fetched.

Indeed, Taiwan is a terra cognita for the ICT industry which supports the whole semiconductor industry. The semiconductor industry largely depends on the Taiwanese ecosystem: more than 80% of the world’s notebooks are made in Taiwan and 92% servers are also from the Taiwanese manufacturers. As noted by Colley Hwang, ‘without chips and servers from Taiwan, data centres will not be able to operate’ (vide his “Leaders in Semiconductors in 2030 (3): Who Makes the Rules?” Thus, China and the US have conflicting interests on South China Sea, their bilateral trade, and on Taiwanese sovereignty. These are the elements of Sino-US rivalry in a world of deepening insecurity and changing environmental conditionings.

Foreign Policy Implications for Nigeria

The foreign policy implications of the great power rivalry must be understood within the context of global environmental conditionings and rivalries at other levels. For instance,                

In 2022, the world played host to the first men’s World Cup to have an all-woman referee team: Ms. Frappart’s assistants were Neuza Back of Brazil and Karen Diaz Medina of Mexico. More precisely, Stéphanie of France became the first woman lead referee at a men’s World Cup match when she officiated a game between Costa Rica and Germany in Qatar.’ In terms of foreign policy focus, when will there be Nigerian female referees to serve at the World Cup level? Sports Ambassador Segun Odegbami is collaborating with the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs to make Nigeria play host to the World Cup 2034. What will Nigeria’s foreign policy agenda in the period from now until 2034 look like? Many scholars have argued that in the absence of anti-Apartheid struggle, Nigeria does not have any foreign policy again. Hosting the World Cup 2034 can be a good foreign policy objective to which efforts can be diverted. The Qatari World Cup provides this lesson.

Another important development is the Russian-Ukrainian war which raises some critical questions to which Nigeria must also respond. First is the extent of sovereignty that any nation-state can enjoy when the national security of a neighbouring country is threatened. Russia and Ukraine are neighbours by territorial contiguity and propinquity. However, Ukraine is hob-knobbing with the NATO countries within the limits of its statehood and sovereignty. 

The exercise of the sovereignty has enabled anti-Russian activities on Ukrainian territory, a consideration that largely informed Russia’s special military intervention in Ukraine.  

Besides, Russia has, on a number of times, expressed hostility to the expansion of the NATO membership and influence to its neighbourhood. Specifically, Russia is against Ukrainian membership of the NATO. The United States never reckoned with Russia’s concerns. This angered Russia and served as a catalyst for Russian invasion and the reactive intervention of international actors in the conflict. The European Union and the NATO countries have been providing logistics, arms and ammunitions with the aim of strengthening Ukrainian resistance. They have taken critical sanctions against Russia, even though the sanctions have turned out to be counter-productive. In essence, the war is being prolonged and the number of casualties and death continues to gallop.

In terms of foreign policy implications, to what extent can President Muhammadu Buhari go in finally completing the Ajaokuta steel project? He said he would complete the project before leaving office, but Nigeria is already in the bad book of Russia for taking side with Ukraine? Nigeria told Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukraine. Additionally, Nigeria stands between Russian and US sanctions: US policy is to sanction whoever opposes US interest. Russia pledged in 2019 to help complete the Ajaokuta project. So Nigeria cannot always afford the luxury of opposing Russia. In this regard, to what extent can the foreign policy of non-alignment go? Nigeria’s foreign policy foci needs re-articulation, especially in the event of any forceful disintegration effort, foreign interventions cannot but be difficult to prevent. Foreign policy focus must therefore begin to address these issues come 2023.

Thirdly, there are basically three layers of great power politics and rivalry in contemporary times: Russia-US, China-US, and EU-Russia. As noted above, the EU case is a subset of the US-Russian rivalry. The notable point within the EU is just that some Member States of the EU do not necessarily agree with the United States and France is a case in point. Besides, to what extent can Nigeria be very critical of China or support the United States against the Chinese in light of the deepening of development ties between China and Nigeria, particularly at the level of infrastructural development? If following the second US-Africa summit held in Washington, the United States now offers increased support for Nigeria, which country should take priority: China or the US? Nigeria should begin to evolve a policy of not being a friend of one country and the enemy of another. In the same vein, the EU-Nigeria ties are warm and has its own problems. Economic Partnership Agreements is one of them. What is the choice between Russia and the EU? Should Nigeria join the BRICS in checkmating great power politics or renew the idea of Concert of Medium Powers? Without any whiff of doubt, great power rivalry has the potential to deepen and rise in medium power politics is expected. The Russo-Ukrainian war will continue to compel the making of a New World Order. Nigeria’s foreign policy must therefore anticipate the challenges and shift from the current reactive, to a more programmatic, approach. Happy New Year 2023.

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