INTERNATIoNAL
Bola A. Akinterinwa
Vie Internationale strongly believes that President Emmanuel Macron will be re-elected on April 24, 2022, because of the mounting diffidence, induced by high costs of living in France and Francophone Africa’s rising self-confidence to resist perceived French neo-colonisation. This is an unfinished task for him. Ms Marine Le Pen, like her father, Jean Louis Marie Le Pen, a far-right politician who led the National Front party from 1972 through 2011, holds foreigners largely responsible for France’s socio-economic problems. She initially wanted France to be out of the European Union. She wants to stop uncontrolled immigration and Islamic ideologies. This policy partly explains why she and her father have lost elections in the past.
True, Jean-Marie Le Pen contested in the presidential elections of 1974, 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2007 but failed. He could not contest in the 1981 election because he did not have the 500 signatures of elected officials required to qualify. When Marine Le Pen entered the shoes of her father, she reorganised the National Front and changed its name in 2018 to Rassemblement Nationale (RN: National Rally). Some old policies were reviewed. In fact, she contested in the 2012 presidential elections and came third in the first round. She contested in round two with Emmanuel Macron in 2017 and scored 33.90% (10,638.475) of the votes, while Emmanuel Macron, who campaigned on the platform of his La République En Marche (LREM: The Republic in Action), which was created in 2016, accounted for 66.10% (20, 743,123) of the votes. Surely, next Sunday’s election cannot but be a replay of the 2017 experience.
One certain factor for the re-election of Macron is that Mélenchon is more critical of immigrants than Marine Le Pen and he has 22% of the votes which he has directed to be given to Macron. Recall here that in last week’s election, Macron (LREM) scored 9,783,058 votes, 27.8% of total votes cast. Marine le Pen (RN) got 8,133,828 votes, that is, 23.1% while Jean-Luc Mélenchon (La France Insoumise, LFI) scored 7,712,520 or 22% of the votes.
In the spirit of the rule of désistement, Mélenchon has indirectly asked all his followers to support Macron by saying that ‘we must not give a single vote to Ms Le Pen.’ Thus, if all his followers joined their votes with those of Macron, Macron will not only have initially 49.8% before sharing with Marine Le Pen the votes of other political contenders who are not all anti-immigrant hardliners. Éric Zemmour (7.1%) supports Le Pen. Virtually, all others – Valérie Pécresse (4.8%), Yannick Jadot (4.6%), Jean Lassale (3.1%), Fabien Roussel (2.3%), Nicholas Dupont-A (2.1%), Anne Hidalgo (1.7%), Phillipe Poutou (0.8%), and Nathalie Arthaud (0.6%), support Macron to sail to victory. But what happens following his re-election? True, a returning Macron must face the challenge of France’s diffidence versus Africa’s self-confidence.
Electing Emmanuel Macron
Without doubt, French presidential electoral system is quite interesting because it is semi-presidential, not fully presidential, and not fully parliamentarian. It is a combination of both. It is particularly interesting because it allows for the election of the truly most popular candidate by providing for two rounds of election when an absolute majority of at least 50 plus one vote % cannot be achieved in the first round of election. It is the candidate with the highest number of votes based on simple majority that is elected in the second round.
Presidential election is particularly important in France, because an elected president is the ‘guarantor of national independence, territorial integrity and respect for treaties,’ as provided for in Article 5 of the French Constitution. Besides, the French electoral law under the Fourth Republic provided for proportional representation at the end of World War II but the French Fifth Republic Constitution put in place on October 4, 1958, put an end to it.
More interestingly, the 2022 presidential election is of much concern to the French as much as it is for the entire world. The French are particularly interested in who will be able relate with Russia’s Putin in the post-Russo-Ukrainian war. France is not interested in any extension of the war near her borders. Additionally, in the last twenty years, France has not played host to the re-election of any president. However, many factors are pointing to the re-election of Macron, initially considered as a political neophyte, who established his party, LREM, in 2016, contested in 2017 and won.
As noted by many French observers, the French electorate generally vote with their heart in the first round of elections and then vote with their head in round two of the elections. Explained differently, they choose their ideal or preferential candidate in the first round, and then opt for the lesser of two evils in the second round. Thus, an ideal candidate is an expression of love and admiration while voting with one’s head is another way of saying think twice before voting, ensure that you vote for who is most likely to protect your interests beyond campaign promises. Article 7 of the Fifth Republic’s Constitution enables the protection of such interests through very strict regulation of presidential elections.
For instance, a second ballot must be held within fourteen days if an absolute majority constitutionally provided for is not obtained; only the two candidates polling the greatest number of votes in the first ballot may stand in the second ballot; election must be held not earlier than 20 days and not more than 35 days before the expiry of the term of the incumbent President; if before the first round of voting, any of the candidates dies or becomes incapacitated, the Constitutional Council is required to declare the election to be postponed, but election must hold within 35 days after the decision to postpone; etc.
Thus, the mentality of sit tight syndrome in the mania of African politics is not condoned. In fact, the conditions further attached to the holding of the second ballot are more interesting: there must be a public presidential debate which was introduced in 1974 to enable the electorate to see for themselves how good, how prepared and determine their future leader would be. Since the introduction of this public debate in 1974, it was only in 2002 that there was not one: the then outgoing President, Jacques Chirac refused to engage in any public debate with the far-right politician, Jean-Marie Le Pen because of what he stood for: excessive nationalism.
Expectedly, and more importantly, Macron and Le Pen are required to hold their own debate in the evening of April 20, 2022, at 9pm. The debate is to be covered electronically by Radio France 2 and TF1 and simultaneously relayed by BFM, CNews, LCI, and Franceinfo. More notably, presidential candidates are disallowed from campaigning the day before the vote, April 24, and cannot campaign on the very day of election. And true enough too, the media are subject to reporting restrictions from the eve of election until polls close at 8pm on Sunday in France. Giving money to voters at the polling stations at the time of voting the way Nigerians cannot but look very barbaric to French observers. It is promotion of corruption in the market space. But most importantly, how will Africa be impacted upon by the election or how will the winner of the April 24 election relate with Africa after the election? In responding to these questions, it is useful to first investigate the new African environment before examining the challenges of diffidence and confidence before President Macron.
Franco-African relations in an emerging new Cold War and New World Order cannot but require an attitudinal policy disposition that goes beyond diffidence and self-confidence. The relationship between France and Africa is increasingly fraught with unprecedented irritants. In this regard, the notion and spirit of a French Community in which France’s former colonies were given preferential treatment over non-Francophones, does not exist anymore. Franco-African relationships, especially with the Francophone African countries, is currently witnessing a wave of misunderstandings.
Consequently, with the re-election of President Macron, the relationship cannot but become toughened as France is increasingly being seen as a country non grata in Africa. Put differently, the situational reality on the ground is very disorderly because of the conflict between France’s order and the counter order of some of Francophone countries. The coups d’état in Mali, Guinea Conakry, Chad, and Burkina Faso are cases in point. The disagreement between Mali and France particularly reflects the crescendo of the misunderstanding. It is against the new hostile environment that the challenges before Macron should be addressed.
Challenges Beyond Diffidence and Confidence
First, President Macron will face two different challenges: bilateral misunderstanding with the Francophones, on the one hand, and how to deal with Francophone and non-Francophone divide in Africa, especially at the level of the regional organisations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), on the other. Francophone Africa is always seen as an obstacle to African solidarity because of France’s influence.
For instance, Francophone-Lusophone-Anglophone divide dates to pre-ECOWAS years. In 1974, Prime Minister John Vorster visited the Côte d’Ivoire. The visit prompted general opposition of other African leaders but Ivoirian leader, President Félix Houphouet-Boigny responded that ‘as the father of dialogue, I could not refuse to meet Mr. Vorster.’ In fact, Mr. Doria-Falego, the Ivoirian Minister of Information, visited South Africa for ten days and noted in his press conference there that ‘the Côte d’Ivoire had chosen the path of dialogue and negotiation instead of war and violence.’
Thus, in the eyes of the Côte d’Ivoire, any war on apartheid in South Africa was not acceptable. There was no need for violent reactions against racial discrimination in Southern Africa. For many Anglophones, the Côte d’Ivoire was only acting under the influence of France which was accused at the United Nations of nuclear collaboration with South Africa. Though
France responded to the allegation that she was only implementing, based on pacta sunt servanda, an agreement done before the adoption of the UN resolution prohibiting such collaboration, Africans did not feel comfortable with the answer. And true, the Ivoirian policy contradicted Nigeria’s policy of ‘no compromise with apartheid.’ This difference in policy attitude is still much a dynamic of the relationships between the Anglophones and the Francophones in Africa as at today.
Secondly, there is the issue of the ECOWAS monetary integration process and Ecu Currency. On March 14, 1975, the ECOWAS reached an agreement to establish a West African Clearing House which was established. For the purpose of monetary integration, in its decision A/SDec.4/7/92, the ECOWAS Authority not only transformed the Clearing House into an autonomous specialised agency of the ECOWAS within the rationalisation framework of the ECOWAS, but also changed the name to West African Monetary Agency (WAMA). The expectation was that the transformation and change of name of the Clearing House would strengthen WAMA and enable it to play a more effective role in the regional monetary integration process.’
Additionally for this same purpose, Article 3(a) of the Protocol A/P.1/7/93 Relating to the West African Monetary Agency, done on 24th July 1993 in Cotonou, requires the Agency ‘to promote the use of national currencies of Member States for regional trade and other transactions,’ while Article 3(i) obligates the WAMA to ‘ensure the establishment of a single Monetary Zone.’ It is on this basis that the quest for a single regional currency began and that an ‘eco currency’ was not only suggested, but also that the year 2027 was fixed on 19 June 2021 for its launching after four postponements. The Eco is expected to remove trade and monetary barriers, as well as boost better living standards.
However, the eight Francophone Members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) have adopted the same name, Eco, as their new currency to replace the old CFA franc, which has been in use since 1945. The Eco, which is to be pegged to the Euro (655.957 to the euro), necessarily replaces France with the European Union as depository for foreign reserves of the UEMOA countries. For about 75 years, the French order was that UEMOA countries must deposit their foreign exchange reserves with the Banque de France, also referred to as the French Treasury. On July 1, 2021, the UEMOA countries decided to put an end to the 75 years of French rule on the matter. The development requires the withdrawal of France from the governing bodies of the UEMOA, but France will still stand as guarantor of the pegging of the Eco to the Euro.
Many problems are raised here. First, the French government has made it clear that ‘this new position enables us to support the UEMOA in its commitment to pursuing the single currency project of the ECOWAS.’ The ECOWAS, unlike the defunct CEAO (Communauté Économique de L’Afrique de L’Ouest, that is, West African Economic Community which comprised Francophone States only), consists of Anglophones, Francophones, and the Lusophones in the West African region of Africa. If the Francophone eco will be pegged to the euro, have the Francophones acted well in advance, before 2027, on behalf of the ECOWAS? If not, will there be another ECOWAS eco? If not, if the whole ECOWAS region accept to have their regional currency pegged to the euro, especially with the backing of the French Treasury, will the Francophones have acted on behalf of the ECOWAS? Is the adoption of Eco currency an attempt to return to the making of another CEAO in another form?
More disturbingly, why did the Francophone West Africa opt out of the ECOWAS collective monetary programme? Will the non-Francophone countries have their own single currency? Whatever is the case, these are some of the challenges that Macron’s France will have to contend with in Africa after his re-election.
Thirdly, there is the issue of unconstitutional changes of government in Francophone countries. Notable amongst them are those of Mali, Chad, and Burkina Faso. The problem here is that France actively supports the policy attitude of the ECOWAS on non-acceptance of forceful change of government. Article 45(1) of Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, provides that ‘in the event that democracy is abruptly brought to an end by any means or where there is massive violation of Human Rights in a Member State, ECOWAS may impose sanctions on the State concerned.
Paragraph 2 of the same Article 45 stipulates the possible sanctions for infractions, which include the refusal to support the candidates of States concerned for elective posts in international organisations, refusal to hold ECOWAS meetings in such countries, and suspension of membership of the State concerned. Consistent with the rule of subsidiarity, the ECOWAS appointed Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, former President of Nigeria, as its special envoy to seek mediation of the forceful change of government in the ECOWAS countries affected. In fact, not only were Mali and Burkina Faso suspended based on Dr Jonathan’s report, but sanctions were also taken against them. Mali has called the bluff of the ECOWAS and, in fact, has contemplated probable withdrawal of membership from the ECOWAS. Mali has also accused the ECOWAS of supporting French multinational interests against Mali.
What is perhaps more disturbing is the fact that France which supports ECOWAS policy of non-acceptance of unconstitutional change of government in Africa conveniently adopted a double standard in the case of Chad, following the killing on 18 April 2021 of President Idris Déby at the battlefield when he went to visit troops battling the troops of the Front for Change and Concord in Chad. Before his death, President Déby had been accused of changing the presidential term from five to six years, of re-introducing the two-term limit for presidents, of abolishing the post of the Prime Minister, and for creating a full presidential system in the country.
France did not show much concern about these allegations but apparently gave active support to President Déby and the reason cannot be far-fetched: like his father, Idris Déby is a very strong and reliable ally of France and the West in the war against the jihadist terrorists in the Sahelian region. Under normal circumstance, France, which led the campaigns of democratic constitutionalism as conditionality for development assistance at the Franco-African Summit held in La Baule in August 1990, supported unconstitutional change of government in Chad by encouraging the appointment of the son of President Idris Déby as successor.
His son, Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, a four-star army general and aged 37, took over power by fiat, but with the support of the military, which is a manifestation of a palace coup. Mahamat Déby told all Chadians that he would lead a transition government for eighteen months at the end of which there would be free and fair credible elections. To show unflinching support for the new president, President Macron sat side-by-side at the state funeral with Mahamat Déby. President Macron was the only Western president at the state funeral. And in the words of President Macron, ‘France will never let anyone, either today or tomorrow, challenge Chad’s stability and integrity.’ He said Mahamat Déby is a ‘friend and courageous leader.’
Regardless of the friendship and courage of Mahamat Déby, what the Chadian Constitution stipulates is that the Senate President should occupy the presidential seat for about three months during which time the necessary must be done to pave the way for election and democratic succession. The President or Speaker, as reported by France, did not want to fill the vacuum created by death of Idriss Déby, implying that he did not want to fulfil his constitutional obligations. This was why France reportedly supported the appointment of Mahamat Déby by the military as president. This also means that the rule of unconstitutional change of government is subject to political whims and caprices.
Fourthly, and perhaps worse still, is the perception of France in Nigeria. France is currently being seen as an agent of disintegration of Nigeria in the mania of Michel Debré during the 1967-1970 Nigerian civil war. Nigerians are accusing France of aiding and abetting terrorist insurrection in Nigeria, particularly the Boko Haram. Based on this belief, some Nigerians under the aegis of the Movement Against Slavery and Terrorism (MAST) went to demonstrate against France, in front of her embassy in Abuja, Nigeria in December 2019. The leader of the MAST, Princess Ajibola, said that the protest is ‘for the rescue of the soul of our dear country, Nigeria, from the forces of evil that have attempted to cause disharmony and disintegration by covertly sponsoring the activities in Nigeria.’ Will this perception of France augur well in maintaining the cordiality in Franco-Nigerian relations? How will President Macron manage the growing hostility vis-à-vis France in Africa?
Fifthly, and perhaps more importantly, Mali has asked French troops helping in containing the jihadist terror in the Sahel to leave Mali. Russian mercenaries have been engaged to replace the French. One major reason for France to begin to comply with the Malian directive is the factor of this Russian mercenaries who the French are vehemently opposed to. Russia is currently engaged in a special military intervention in Ukraine and Russian mercenaries are having a strengthened influence in France’s privileged zone, what will President Macron do to stop the expanding Russian influence in Africa, which is becoming detrimental to her interests, and by extension, to the NATO countries?
