Introduction
Today, we shall conclude our discourse on the above vexed issue having started with some of the ways to reduce the causes of insecurity.
Restoration/Reintegration Challenges
4. Adopting a Gender-Sensitive Lens
Historically, DDDR programs failed to integrate gender into their program design and implementation, thereby reinforcing women’s marginalisation from post conflict development processes. Over the past several years, donors and policymakers have realised the need for a more gender-sensitive approach, although implementation often lags behind. In Northeast Nigeria, the gender dimensions of the conflict – particularly Boko Haram’s reliance on female suicide bombers and the group’s targeting of women and girls, has received significant attention. Both international donors and local actors, emphasise the specific vulnerabilities and needs of women and girls in the crisis. Yet studies of other conflict contexts caution against depicting women only as victims to be protected, and neglecting the ways in which gender norms also affect men’s wartime experiences and likelihood of reintegration.
Such an approach carries several risks. First, framing women only as victims of Boko Haram risks denying their political agency and erasing the complexity of their experiences. Although Boko Haram did indeed abduct many women and girls, others joined voluntarily or followed their husbands and family members. Interviews with female Boko Haram members suggest that some viewed the group as an opportunity to escape hard agricultural labour and receive a religious education, which was inaccessible to girls in many rural parts of Northeast Nigeria. These experiences of structural marginalisation have to be understood, in order to address the reasons why women joined or supported Boko Haram in the first place, and to ensure specialised reintegration support.
Second, marginalising women’s wartime roles and experiences, can also perpetuate their exclusion from key decisions around the broader peace-building process. For example, restricting transitional justice processes only to civil and political rights violations, may mean that the “forms and places of violation that may be of particular significance to women” are left unrecognized, such as violations that occur in private spaces. This risk is particularly acute in northeastern Nigeria, where women are largely absent from both government and traditional decision-making structures. For example, a recent study conducted in Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa States, suggests that women may be more reluctant than men to embrace community-level reconciliation and reintegration, and more likely to stress the need for legal accountability for sexual violence.
Rather than treating women only as subjects of DDR efforts, local gender expertise through existing women’s movements and organisations should therefore be integrated into all aspects of the design and implementation process, including in the community dialogues organised to prepare for the return of rehabilitated Boko Haram associates. Under the military’s purview, the DDR process to date, has lacked even the most basic elements of gender sensitivity. For instance, international aid officials report that women and men have been detained together in overcrowded facilities, with inadequate protection and provisions for privacy. In remote camps for internally displaced persons, women alleged to be sympathetic to Boko Haram have faced severe movement restrictions, and have been specifically targeted for sexual violence by security forces.
Finally, it is crucial to expand the gender lens to include boys and men, and to pay attention to the role that masculinity norms play in the conflict. Despite increased attention to gender in post-conflict peace-building, men and boys still are rarely considered as gendered subjects.
Yet, in the case of Boko Haram, some young men may have joined the movement because poverty excluded them from the “marriage market”, and Boko Haram filled a crucial gap by arranging marriages for loyal supporters. Similarly, changes in women’s roles and livelihoods during and after conflict can threaten the traditional gender norms that require men to be the providers for their household, which can complicate men’s social reintegration and exacerbate gender-based violence. As the Scholars, Dyan Mazurana, Roxanne Krystalli, and Anton Baaré note, “a gender-aware approach to DDR transcends getting women into DDR programs and requires examining how these programs imagine, address, and reconstruct masculinity, femininity, and relationships in the aftermath of conflict”.
1. Demobilising and Reintegrating Civilian Militias
Lastly, a broader question surrounds the future of the civilian militia groups, most commonly known as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), that emerged during the conflict. Although their exact numbers are uncertain, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that around 25,000 to 27,000 such fighters currently are active in northeastern Nigeria. Formed at the height of the insurgency to protect local communities, they assist the Nigerian security forces with intelligence collection and military operations, particularly in more remote areas. Given the lack of official Nigerian policing capacity, CJTF members also have taken over policing functions in some parts of Borno, often exerting significant control over IDPs.
Members of these community militia in some ways fall between categories: they do not qualify for existing reintegration programs, nor are they considered victims of the conflict. They also are not a homogenous group: although a small number of fighters have been trained, armed, and placed on the military payroll, others are armed but unpaid, and the overwhelming majority neither carry arms nor receive direct financial support for their services. Many of the latter are dissatisfied with their current status, and seek to be formally integrated into State security forces.
To date, these fighters have not been formally discharged or demobilised. Yet the status quo poses several challenges. The first is, the lack of framework for civilian protection and accountability. As noted above, most of the CJTF never received formal training; they often have little knowledge of existing legal frameworks and civilian protection norms. Given their lack of integration into formal chains of command, civilians have few effective channels to appeal the decisions of vigilante fighters, or demand justice for their abuses – including sexual exploitation, intimidation, aid diversion, and assaults on those suspected of being part of armed groups.
At the same time, CJTF fighters are mostly young men with few alternative livelihood options. Many have little or no formal education, and do not fulfil the minimum requirements that would enable them to be integrated into the formal security forces. Drug addiction and abuse problems are widespread, and likely growing. Without a comprehensive reintegration plan, the Nigerian Government risks sustaining a pool of young men with few opportunities yet significant experience, wielding violence and authority. Ahead of Nigeria’s scheduled 2023 elections, reports suggest that politicians are already forging ties to CJTF leaders for electoral purposes, potentially to pay local militia to intimidate political opponents and mobilise votes.
Going forward, one option is to integrate the civilian militia groups into a broader community policing framework. This would allow security forces to continue tapping into their local expertise, while also ensuring that the militias receive adequate training and are linked to community justice mechanisms. Yet, the precise structure of such a program remains hotly contested: the Nigerian Federal Government has long resisted calls by State Governments, to establish security structures that challenge the centre’s monopoly over the security sector. In the absence of an agreement on such a framework, current nongovernmental organisation efforts centre on connecting CJTF fighters to livelihood and educational opportunities, as well as psychosocial support and drug addiction treatment. Yet more systematic and longer-term support, is urgently needed.
Having painstakingly read through this article, it is imperative to however, make some necessary suggestions or recommendations in order to achieve a level of peace, oneness, security, unity, and overall good governance.
Suggestions or Recommendations for a Peaceful, Progressive and United Nation
The civil society in Nigeria played a key role in the struggle for Nigeria’s independence, and in the return of the country back to democracy and disengagement from military rule. Important civil societies during these periods, Campaign for Democracy (CD), National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), etc. played a significant role in this process. This can be replicated in Nigeria today, to arrest the ugly trend of conflict and violence in the polity. However, some far reaching steps need to be taken to position the civil society as the effective ‘third sector’ in Nigeria, and to strategically galvanise them to make more effective contributions to peace building in Nigeria.
1. First, the leadership in Nigeria must ensure good governance, respect for rule of law and equality before the law. Poverty, injustice and discrimination are some of the causes of conflict in Nigeria. Civil society organisations and philanthropists are better organised under a peaceful, just and equitable atmosphere. Threat to security, is a threat to the workings and functioning of civil society organisations.
2. Secondly, an association of civil society organisations whose major mandates are in peace building, conflict management and advocacy, can be formed wholly and principally to deal with issues of violent extremism and conflictual situations in the society. They can pool resources and manpower together to make them more effective. For instance, the West Africa Civil Society Forum was formed to bring all civil society organisations under one umbrella; this can be done in Nigeria, but only for organisations and philanthropists interested in peace building.
3. In the same vein, the diaspora (and Nigeria has a lot of citizens outside her shores) should be mobilised through effective data capturing through Nigerian embassies worldwide, for philanthropic gestures. This is a strategy the Government should seriously consider, to shore up funds that can be used to rebuild the Northeast in particular, and other parts of the country destroyed by insurgents and militants. Giving in the society, especially for peace building purposes, should be encouraged more by the Government and other sectors of the society through recognition of donors, and having a sort of ‘bonus’ such as tax holiday for donors properly catered for in the corporate social responsibility law.
4. Discard antiquated ideas of asking citizens to fill forms with stereotypes such as religion, tribe, LGA, town of birth, etc.
5. Enthrone good leadership in all strata.
6. Kill corruption before corruption kills us.
Conclusion
Over the past five years, Nigerian authorities have increasingly acknowledged that ending the conflict in Northeast Nigeria, will require more than a military response. Yet, in practice, efforts to establish a transparent framework for rehabilitating and reintegrating low-risk Boko Haram affiliates while ensuring meaningful accountability for victims, have been slow to progress.
However, in many ways, Nigeria epitomises the challenges of implementing a DDDR program in a context of violent extremism and ongoing conflict. Problems that plague all DDDR efforts – such as how to determine and implement fair and consistent eligibility criteria, ensure equal access, prevent re-mobilisation, and ensure community involvement – are exacerbated by access and safety constraints, a highly fluid operational environment, and a lack of alignment between civilian and military actors. Such a context also poses unique challenges for international actors
seeking to support the process, as they have less control over who enters rehabilitation programs, who is released, and based on what criteria.
Yet, implementing a broader demobilisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration strategy also represents an opportunity to begin addressing the social cleavages that emerged over the course of the conflict. In practice, this means formally recognising the diversity of victims in the conflict, which include individuals who lived in Boko Haram–controlled areas or were associated with Boko Haram in some capacity, and systematising screening and evidence collection standards to adhere to human rights norms. It also means planning for sustainable reintegration, by consistently involving communities in the process, closely tracking returnee trajectories, prioritising accountability and protection for those most affected by violence, and providing assistance both to receiving communities and those who fall through the cracks of formal rehabilitation programs. Any breakdown in this complex system – whether in screening and categorising detainees, in preparing for their return, or in ensuring post-release support – risks causing further cleavages and resentment.
The security crises seizing Nigeria in the present times range from kidnapping of citizens for ransom, to the abduction of school children and setting ablaze of Police stations. These crises seem to tail one another, and has left the average Nigerian dis-sensitised from the happenings in Nigeria.
Security, generally is the duty of the Government. Section 14(2)(b) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) points to this and provides that:
“(b) the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government”
There is need for active and systematic peace building needs to be effected, for growth and development to occur in Nigeria; this has however been hampered by the current state of insecurity which once solved will bring about a better country.
In all, to fully reap the benefit of civil society and good governance in Nigeria, it requires the Government, citizens – young and old, especially youths and women, to be alive to their responsibilities and ensure that Nigeria moves from being a ‘pariah’ in Global Peace Index, to a safe, strong and united nation. Success requires the full participation of every section of the Nigerian State, and active inclusiveness of the people. (The End).
