The present security architecture is not best suited to secure the country, argues Abdullahi Hussaini MaiBasira
State Security is significant and best understood in the context of the evolution of a country’s history, politics and ideologies. Every nation reforms or restructures its security formations, institutions and strategies in response to established attacks or as a consequence of informed analysis of an anticipated threat to national security or both.
Two examples. One, in response to the September 11th 2001 attacks, the United States established a Cabinet-level position known as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The singular decision to incorporate 22 federal security agencies into a single cabinet department became the most significant government reorganization of US National Security since the cold war era and the most substantial reorganization of federal agencies since the US National Security Act of 1947. Still in the US, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created the office of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to replace the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from acting in pole position in the US intelligence community. The DNI was created against the backdrop of intelligence failures that called into question how well the intelligence services are situated to protect US interests against foreign attacks. The DNI now coordinates intelligence gathered from 16 federal intelligence offices. Two, as a fall – out of 7th July bombings in the United Kingdom, several reforms were instituted in the security architecture, part of it was the creation of the UK National Crime Agency (NCA) as the leading national law enforcement agency to tackle any type of crime in any part of the UK. The UK – NCA consumed preceding agencies such as the Serious Organized Crime Agency, Police Central e – Crime Unit and the National Policing Improvement Agency. Also in the UK, the National Security and Investment Act 2021, which would come into effect on 4th January, 2022 introduces new powers for the UK government to investigate, and if necessary intervene in investments and other acquisitions of entities and assets in, or linked to the UK where they could harm UK’s national security. The act has been adjudged as the biggest shake up of the UK’s national security investment powers for 20 years.
Back home, in the aftermath of the military change of government in August 1985, the new military regime ordered a comprehensive review of the nation’s intelligence and security architecture. Decree 27 of 1976 which created the National Security Organization (NSO) was repealed and replaced with Decree 19 of 1986 which dissolved the NSO and created three major successor intelligence outfits; State Security Services (also known as the Department of State Services), National Intelligence Agency and the Defence Intelligence Agency. The dismantling of the NSO has been described by security analysts in Nigeria as the singular most important reform and overhaul of the nation’s security architecture in the last 40 years. Over the years, there has been; no doubt, some administrative upgrades and small scale reforms in the various formations that make up the nation’s security agencies, but these steps are piecemeals and handouts in the face of the herculean security challenges terribly piled up over the years which are now troubling the corporate sustenance of the Nigerian State.
In the years since that glorious reform, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC); first introduced as a Lagos Civil Defence Committee in 1967 has been fully transformed into a National Security agency with commands throughout the nation and a law giving it statutory backing as a law enforcement agency. The Nigerian Armed Forces, principally the Army, on its part, has had to respond to Niger Delta Militancy and the Boko Haram Insurgency by incorporating the 6th Amphibious Division in Port Harcourt, 7th Infantry Division in Maiduguri and the 8th Task Force Division in Sokoto. The Nigeria Police Force (NPF), the body primarily responsible for internal security operations, investigation and homeland law enforcement has over the years created 17 new zonal offices and eight administrative organs. Its major operational units; the Special Anti – Robbery Squad (SARS) and the Intelligence Response Team (IRT) came under very heavy public scrutiny and civil protests in 2020 thereby dragging further down the credibility of the force and ultimately affecting the force’s tactical and operational effectiveness. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and the Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit; all off – shoots of the NPF were established to add potency to economic and financial elements of national security.
The total number of armed security personnel in relation to security threats, size and population of Nigeria is equally another subject worthy of scrutiny. According to global firepower 2018, Nigeria is ranked the fourth most powerful country in Africa, with an estimated defence budget of about $2.3 billion, and 181,000 total military personnel and another 57,000 reserve personnel. As of 2016, the total number of police staff strength was 371,800 with plans to add 280,000 new recruits to reach a set target of 650,000. Giving that all the other security formations such the DSS and other paramilitary agencies are no-where in size to the Army and police, it is safe to conclude that their staff strength would be weaker. Nigeria is therefore under-policed and of course, under-armed.
Population growth also has security implications. The population of Nigeria in 1967 when the NSO was first formed was around 53.5 million, in 1986 when the NSO was dissolved, it was 85 million. In 1993, when the Coordinator of National Security was first appointed to newly created role of National Security Adviser, the population was 100 million. The United Nation’s worldometer, which tracks real-time population data estimates the population of Nigeria to be around 213,649,175 million people as of 23rd of December, 2021. Since the security reforms of 1986, the population has increased by 120 million people placing Nigeria with 2.64% of total world population and 7th among countries. It is clear that the dimension, nature and intensity of crime, criminality, terrorism, acts of subversion and undermining the authority of state increases as the population of the country increases. The response mechanisms and capacity of the State to legally use coercive measures and enforce its legitimate responsibility to guarantee security should also have increased.
Nigeria operates a federal system of government with States and local governments as quasi – independent federating units. However, the security structure is unitary with all agencies of state responsible for community, local, state, and national security controlled by the federal government. Strategically, it is incomprehensible that a unitary policing and security architecture would function effectively and proactively in a Federation the size, model and complexity of Nigeria. In other words, Nigeria cannot operate as a federation and still retain a unitary security arrangement. The nation’s present security architecture is not best suited to secure the whole country; its remote villages and small towns, its borders, its citizens and still provide sufficient capacity to advance the nation’s national security interests and objectives.
It is clear that Nigeria is facing a very precarious security situation and formidable threats to national security of varying degrees in its six geo – political regions. The North – west is enmeshed in a clear case of home – grown banditry, kidnapping, and terrorism. In addition to the aforementioned, the North East is also dealing with insurgency from mutated elements of Boko – Haram, ISIS and ISWAP. The cases of insecurity in North – Central is very similar to those of the North West but added to this, are constant communal clashes between herdsmen and farmers. In the South East, IPOB and the Eastern Security Network (ESN) are posing threats with regional agitations that is threatening daily livelihoods of ordinary citizens and businesses who comply with sit-at-home orders issued and enforced by non – state actors. In the South – South, a new wave of militancy has increased the spate of piracy, attacks on oil – facilities and increased illegal oil trade at the high sea. In the South West, there are equally agitations for self – determination, banditry and kidnappings.
At present, the Northern region of the country is worst hit. It is no mistake that this is happening, it is also no mistake that this would continue to happen unless concrete internal and external comprehensive security reforms are carried out at all levels of Statecraft. The Northern region is bordered largely by the Republic of Niger with its mountainous regions, sparsely populated areas, vast desert fields, uninhabited villages and extremely porous borders infamous for illegal cross border trades. The rise of ungoverned lands in most West African States, diversion of attention to regimes survival as against regional security objectives, small and large arms infiltration, fundamentalism, the fall of Muamar Ghaddafi in Libya, the quest for natural resources, the failing nature of Nations, weak formal education system, and the decline of the capacity of most West African nations to enforce legitimate will are some of the reasons why northern Nigeria is most adversely affected by insecurity today. Historically, Northern Nigerian tribes have traditional trade, lingual and bilateral routes beyond its present day formal borders to places as far as Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Senegal, the Guineas, Mali, Niger, Cameroun, Chad and the Sudan.
The statistics on Nigeria’s state of insecurity is alarmingly very worrisome but the pattern and mode of the challenges are clearly known – banditry, terrorism, subversion, internal rebellion, economic sabotage, cyber – crimes, and prevailing kidnappings aided by mass abductions. Armed robbery now appears to have taken the very back seat.
In the first half of 2021 alone, an average of 13 persons were kidnapped daily bringing a record estimate of 2,944 persons kidnapped. The data is a negative increment of insecurity. More Nigerians were kidnapped in the first six months of 2021 than the whole of 2020 which saw 2,860 kidnappings in all. 618 schools have been closed in the whole of the Northern region as cases of mass abductions continued unabated and increased from 25 in the whole of 2020 to 31 in the first half of 2021. In July 2021, a project of the Council of Foreign Relations Africa Program; the Nigeria Security Tracker (NST), revealed that 5,800 innocent Nigerians were killed by kidnappers. If we add the number of deaths from our heroes and men in uniform and those at the front lines at the South East and North East, the figures of Nigerian deaths would certainly be much higher.
Mid – day on 7th December, 2021, armed bandits ambushed and watched over the burning to death of over 30 people commuting in a highway bus in Sokoto State. Travelling by road in nearly all parts of the North has become a kidnap risk as cases of mass kidnappings and killings along highways have become daily occurrences. Security agencies have become helpless. After the recent killing of over 40 people, the Governor of Kaduna State – the state that is home to the highest number of military and security formations anywhere in Northern Nigeria, noted on December 21st 2021 that “the security agencies have been overstretched despite the many security institutions in the (Kaduna) State as they are involved in operations in all parts of the country.
If in the past, you had travelled by road to these areas now facing daily security incursions by armed criminal elements or terrorists in parts of the North; you would observe that they have been without any presence of government and are largely ungoverned spaces. You would travel long distances without security offices, schools, hospitals or any noticeable government activity or development. Institutional neglect and absence of state apparatus created a huge vacuum for growing disenchantment and disconnect that criminals and terrorists now seized these ungoverned spaces, infiltrated vulnerable minds of uneducated people and end up carving out areas for spheres of control.
It is either a failure of national security threat assessment or a timely refusal to respond to that assessment or a combination of both that has brought Nigeria to this unfortunate, very dire situation.
Things are definitely getting worse and there appears no end in sight. The Tony Blair Institute stated that the “scale of the insecurity threatens the very fabric of the Nigerian society and faith in democracy and the country is diminishing”.
No doubt, Nigeria possesses an inherent capacity to overcome these threats to its national security but the country has to summon the national will – power to do so.
To assume that the present security challenges would somehow end in the near future without any concrete security reforms and restructuring is to live in unprecedented fallacy. In other words, the present security architecture, cannot win the war against kidnapping, against terrorism, against banditry, against internal rebellion and against subversion. It is equally incapable of guaranteeing the present and future security and safety of the Nigerian people on a sustainable basis. Governance must confront this challenge with courage. Reform is now indispensable.
Nigeria, Way forward: In May, 2021, John Campbell and Robert Rotberg asserted that the first step to restoring stability and security (in Nigeria) is recognizing that the government has lost control. The failure of Nigeria (as a state) matters because peace and prosperity of Africa, and preventing the spread of disorder and militancy around the globe depend on a stronger Nigeria because the country still retains some attributes of viability, especially with respect to international affairs.
I wouldn’t totally agree that the government has lost control. I would rather author that the government has mismanaged its capacity for control.
Security in Nigeria is of global concern and of global implications. The national security of Nigeria should consist of the effective coordination of a variety of agencies including law enforcement, military, paramilitary, governmental and intelligence organizations. The unity, sovereignty, security and strategic interests of the country should be the sole aim.
To address these problems, and its attendant consequences on peace and stability in the country, I make the following recommendations that could sustain security in the long term.
First, we must decentralize Nigeria’s policing architecture. In addition to the urgent creation of State Police, every Local Government should be able and allowed to establish its own Local Police system and structure to operate within its own jurisdiction in line with its resource availability. The nation must go a step further to allow for the establishment of sectoral policing. This means that we should create educational Police to secure educational institutions, health police to secure federal and state health institutions, transport police to secure transport facilities and so on. The NPF, as presently constituted could remain a Federal Police Force with concurrent jurisdiction over the country’s national security threats to laws, order and public safety.
Second, we should break away VIP protection from the Police and DSS and create separate federal and even states agencies for such functions. We should ensure that the DSS remains focused on gathering and responding to internal intelligence, and domestic counter terrorism relating to public safety and not meddlesome or prioritize protection for VIP and Politically Exposed Persons. The United States Secret Service and the Russian Federal Protective Service (FSO) are clear examples of State agencies solely created for VIP protection. The precursor to the Russian FSO itself was the Presidential Security Service (SBP) of the Soviet era.
Third, the Local Government administration should and must be allowed to work to its fullest constitutional enshrined capability. Local Government councils must function, council chairmen and executives should reside in their domain, be held responsible for social order, peace and security in their local councils and should have full autonomy and control of their financial revenues.
Fourthly, now is time for the nation to establish a full – fledged Nigeria Border Security Force to secure our very porous land and sea borders. The Nigeria Customs Service had long been supervised by the Federal Ministry of Finance, it is likely far more concerned with revenue generation than border security. The Nigeria Immigration Service should concern itself more with Passport Issuance, tracking smuggling of goods, and jointly restrict movement of undocumented persons across our borders and repatriation of same.
Fifthly, security analysts are of the general opinion that the prevailing insecurity and the illegal operations of criminals, bandits, and fundamentalist elements in weak West African countries would continue as long as the present day fundamentals remain the same especially ungoverned territories and infiltration of small and large arms. Therefore, the non – expansionist element of Nigeria’s foreign policy is now out – dated. Nigeria must consider the execution of an aggressive foreign policy backed by the objective possibility of permanent Military Basis in the Sahel, Sahara or on any West African nation. This would enhance the country’s capacity to undertake tactical security operations at closer proximity to address threats before they come close to our borders.
Sixth, Nigeria must invest heavily in cyber security. That kidnappers could make phone contacts with family victims for ransom and the security system cannot track same is an embarrassment and is simply unacceptable. The country must possess an inherent capability to respond to threats using cyber technology anywhere within the country and outside the country especially within the sub region and Africa at large.
Seventh, with 11.3 million children out of school in the Northern part of Nigeria, investment and accelerated educational development is now a matter of national security. There should be a concerted, coordinated and comprehensive educational policy to increase literacy, integrate formal education and ensure these children are not on the streets.
Eighth, because the Armed forces is inherently overstretched, both on land and at sea, the Nigerian armed forces coordination, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms requires shake – up. A Joint Services Operations Command, as cited by various military analysts, with real time intelligence and formidable response capability is urgently required.
Ninth, with obvious intelligence failures and gaps in recent history, Nigeria needs to reform its State apparatus for gathering, interpreting and coordinating actionable intelligence to wage a successful war against counter terrorism.
I am of the firm opinion that should Nigeria refuse or fail to act, and act in a very comprehensive manner; the threat to our national sovereignty is real and formidable. Nigeria must simply respond and respond very fast. The capacity of the State to overcome the tide of insecurity is getting weaker by each passing day.
MaiBasira is an alumnus of the Nigeria Defence Academy, Kaduna and a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, UK
