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Buratai and the Terrorism Financing Conundrum
By Louis Achi
The puzzling or even dodgy pussyfooting by the federal government in naming and prosecuting terrorism financiers in Nigeria came to the front-burner last week when the former Chief of Army Staff, retired Lt-General Tukur Buratai, again addressed the troubling issue within the context of the intractable insecurity blighting President Biola Ahmed Tinubu’s first tenure.
Significantly, in dissecting Nigeria’s unsettling insecurity conundrum, General Buratai dispensed with diplomatese. Despite being the nation’s former Ambassador to the Republic of Benin, he chose candour over foggy rhetoric. In a period of significant uncertainty, the hard truth, as well as clarity, are imperatives.
In a television interview last week, General Buratai told Nigerians that individuals and entities financing terrorism in Nigeria are known to authorities but have not been publicly named for undisclosed reasons.
He also held that the mere identification of those financing terrorism would be insufficient to address Nigeria’s security challenges, urging the federal government to act specifically against terror financiers, explaining that the military alone cannot rout insurgents.
His words: “You cannot say I should be responsible for naming the financiers of terror…It’s not just about mentioning names; those agencies know why the names are not released. Action should be taken; these individuals are still within society today, and they are known. I take responsibility for certain things that are strictly the Nigerian Army’s responsibility.”
Buratai correctly stressed that while he accepts responsibility for matters strictly within the purview of the Nigerian Army, decisions regarding the exposure of terrorism financiers lie with appropriate authorities. He also clarified that the policy of rehabilitating repentant members of Boko Haram was initiated by the government rather than the military – another important issue but not the focus of this analysis.
It’s worth noting that the clamour for disclosure of individuals and entities allegedly funding insurgency in Nigeria have persisted over the years, particularly following assurances by the federal government in 2021 that identified sponsors would be exposed and prosecuted.
Agencies such as the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit have previously indicated that suspicious financial flows linked to terrorism were being tracked, while investigations into funding networks have continued. Alas, the identities of the alleged financiers remain largely undisclosed, drawing criticism from civil society organisations and security analysts who argue that transparency is critical to ending impunity.
Nigeria has grappled with a prolonged insurgency in the North-East, which has unfortunately morphed into other contiguous zones where Boko Haram and its splinter factions have been responsible for thousands of deaths and widespread displacement over more than a decade.
Tracking back, the kernel of General Burrata’s submission is that it is outside the constitutional purview of the Nigeria Army to name or prosecute terrorism financiers. That crucial responsibility actually lies elsewhere.
The Federal Government of Nigeria has the legal authority to identify, name, and sanction individuals and entities financing terrorism within the country. The Nigeria Army provides intelligence, but the official designation is conducted through established legal and security committees, often approved by the president.
The primary legal framework here is the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022, which empowers the federal government to identify, designate, and freeze assets of terrorism financiers. Within this legal space, the Nigeria Sanctions Committee, NSC, operating under the Office of the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF) and the National Security Adviser (NSA), is responsible for reviewing intelligence and officially adding names to the Nigeria Sanctions List.
The role of the military, including the Army is to provide intelligence and surveillance data to the NSC. As General Buratai correctly noted, the relevant security agencies including the military know terrorism financiers, but the formal naming and legal action rests with the federal government.
According to the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022, the AGF, NSA, or Inspector General of Police can apply to the president to designate individuals or entities. Once approved, the Nigeria Sanctions Committee publishes the list, and financial institutions are mandated to freeze their assets.
It could be recalled that in early 2024, the FG named 15 entities – including nine individuals and six Bureau De Change (BDC) operators – as alleged terrorism financiers, with Tukur Mamu listed as a key suspect. The Chief of Defence Staff has reportedly stated that the process of identifying and prosecuting more financiers is ongoing, involving collaboration with international partners. Nigerians wait.
In conclusion, while the Army tracks the financiers, the legal power to publicly designate them lies with the Federal Government of Nigeria through the Nigeria Sanctions Committee.
But as the cancer of terrorism continues to gnaw at the innards of Nigeria’s sovereignty and statehood, how much longer can the nation hang on before it is irreversibly compromised, ultimately leading to a horrendous state failure.
It bears repeating, why has stern action not been taken against these individuals, and entities. It could be recalled that in April 2019, Dubai (UAE) convicted six Nigerian nationals for financing Boko Haram. The Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Appeal found them guilty of setting up a Boko Haram cell in the UAE to raise funds and provide material assistance to the terrorist group in Nigeria.
Specifically, in April 17, 2019, two individuals – Surajo Abubakar Muhammad and Salihu Yusuf Adamu – were sentenced to life imprisonment. The other four – Ibrahim Ali Alhassan, AbdurRahman Ado Musa, Bashir Ali Yusuf, and Muhammad Ibrahim Isa – were sentenced to 10 years in prison. In December 2019, a UAE federal supreme court upheld the convictions, confirming the sentences.
These fellows were accused of transferring funds for Boko Haram between 2015 and 2016. Reports indicate that some of these funds were transferred via Bureau De Change (BDC) operators in Nigeria.
The UAE official designation of these individuals as terror sponsors followed their conviction. Their conviction triggered international action. Following the UAE conviction, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned these six individuals in March 2022.
If Dubai, an entity of the UAE, could recognize the danger of terrorism enablers or financiers operating within their realm and subsequently moving swiftly and decisively against them, why can’t Nigeria directly taking the damage do the same.
The former COAS and ex-ambassador is certainly not a greenhorn when it comes to matters of national security. In his interventions in arenas of national concern, he has always brought clarity and candour in dissecting troubling issues. He had previously canvassed strategic autonomy and security sovereignty for Nigeria.
This footing is also reflected in his current call on the federal government to act against terror financiers, clarifying that the military alone cannot rout out insurgents. He has correctly described Nigeria’s insurgency as a complex and deeply rooted challenge that cannot be resolved quickly or through military force alone.
His words: “Our focus has often been on the army, that the army must do everything: clear, dismantle, and wipe out all insurgents, but it is not like that. It is more or less an embedded problem within society, and it requires everyone’s effort.
“It would be wishful thinking for anyone to say that this type of insurgency can be cleared overnight. These are people with ideology and beliefs who think they have a mission. Once they establish it, they imagine a perfect society, which is not realistic in the Nigerian context.”
Tracking back, General Buratai recalled: “At the time I was leaving office to take up an ambassadorial role, I warned that this was a cankerworm that could persist much longer than expected. I did not say this for attention, but because I understood that it is not just the military’s responsibility.”
Moving beyond kinetic solutions, he cited ongoing challenges in parts of the North-east and North-west, including poor infrastructure, difficult terrain, and ungoverned spaces. According to him, addressing insecurity requires sustained investment in development, including roads, rail, social services, and job creation, to tackle the root causes of instability.
He further added that while the military had made progress and was not overwhelmed, it continued to face operational challenges, including a limited workforce and equipment relative to the vast terrain of the North-east.
His words: “I don’t see that the insurgency is overwhelming the troops. We are okay, but we need more enablers such as drones and additional platforms. The landmass is enormous, and troops are widely dispersed.”
According to the former army boss, lasting peace would depend not only on military operations but also on sustained government action, institutional coordination, and societal involvement in addressing the drivers of insurgency.
He has also consistently stressed that fighting insurgency requires community resilience and local commitment arguing that the war against insecurity is a collective responsibility of all Nigerians, not just the military.
Throughout his career, General Buratai has always pushed for a professional, well-equipped and disciplined military that is dedicated to national integrity. Today, his positions have not changed.
His stand on dealing with terrorism financiers speaks to a foundational challenge, a key oxygen driving the terrorism fire. This needs to be quenched now by resolute state action.






