THE TROUBLING LOGIC OF STATE POLICE

 KALU OKORONKWO contends that Nigeria should focus on deep structural reforms within the existing policing system

During an interfaith breaking of the fast with members of the Senate at the Presidential Villa in Abuja recently, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu signaled openness to exploring the creation of state police as part of broader security reforms, describing Nigeria as “extremely challenged” by terrorism, banditry and insurgency.

The new Inspector-General of Police, Mr.Olatunji Disu, has also inaugurated a committee to examine possible frameworks for state police.

Given the constitutional amendments required to establish state police, governors under the Nigeria Governors’ Forum have intensified their calls for decentralisation, arguing that local policing would enable quicker and more effective responses to security threats.

At first glance, the renewed push for state police appears both logical and timely. Nigeria is grappling with worsening insecurity: banditry across the North-West and North-East, kidnappings along highways, violent communal clashes, and the growing audacity of organised criminal networks.

The proposal therefore sounds persuasive. After all, if security challenges are local, policing should also be local. But beneath this appealing logic lies a troubling question Nigeria must confront: will creating state police solve the security crisis, or will it merely decentralise the dysfunction already embedded within the system?

The uncomfortable truth is that Nigeria’s security crisis is not primarily the result of an institutional gap. Rather, it stems from weak accountability, a fragile governance culture, and inconsistent political will. Creating new policing structures without addressing these deeper failures may simply multiply the problem.

Nigeria’s central challenge in security governance is not the absence of institutions; it is the absence of institutional discipline and political accountability. Across the country, episodes of insecurity often generate dramatic headlines but very little consequence. Public officials associated with serious security failures frequently remain in office without meaningful scrutiny. Investigations into security breaches rarely produce transparent findings or systemic reforms.

Introducing state police in such an environment could easily reproduce these same weaknesses, only this time across 36 different political jurisdictions. The question therefore becomes unavoidable: if accountability is weak at the federal level, what guarantees exist that it will be stronger at the state level? Without strong oversight institutions, decentralisation risks becoming nothing more than a decentralisation of impunity.

Advocates of state police often cite federal systems such as the United States, Canada and Australia, where policing is largely decentralised. However, these comparisons overlook a critical difference. In those countries, police institutions operate within strong oversight systems, independent judicial structures, professional training regimes and transparent disciplinary mechanisms.

In those climes, civilian review boards investigate police misconduct while independent prosecutors handle abuse of power. Institutional cultures emphasise professionalism and public accountability. In short, decentralisation works effectively in those systems because accountability institutions already exist. Without such safeguards, decentralisation can easily become a pathway to localised authoritarianism.

Another argument frequently advanced by supporters of state police concerns the structural weaknesses of Nigeria’s centralised policing architecture. Critics note that the Nigeria Police Force operates under federal command despite Nigeria’s federal political structure. They argue that this arrangement creates bureaucratic distance between security institutions and local communities.

Academic research has reinforced this view. For example, a study published in the Journal of Legal Studies and Research argues that states are closer to their communities and may therefore respond more effectively to local crime patterns if empowered with their own police forces. Other researches on police  reforms similarly observe that rising insecurity including banditry, kidnapping, terrorism and communal violence has intensified calls for decentralised policing across Nigeria.

These arguments are not without merit. Nigeria’s police system faces severe capacity limitations, including manpower shortages, logistical constraints and overstretched operational responsibilities. Yet structural reform alone cannot guarantee effective policing. The more fundamental question is: who controls the instruments of force and how those instruments are used?.

Perhaps the most troubling risk associated with state police lies at the intersection of policing and politics. Nigeria’s political system remains intensely competitive and deeply personalised. In many states, political loyalty often determines access to power, influence and economic opportunity. In such situations, control of armed security institutions becomes enormously consequential.

Under a state police system, appointments, promotions and operational priorities could easily be tainted by political patronage. Leadership positions might be a reward for  party loyalty rather than professional competence, while recruitment could gradually favour political loyalists over trained law enforcement professionals.

The danger is clear: institutions designed to enforce the law could gradually become instruments for enforcing political power. Democratic systems depend on the neutrality of security institutions. Once policing becomes politicised, the boundary between law enforcement and political intimidation begins to erode.

Nigeria has already witnessed periodic accusations of security agencies being deployed during elections or political disputes. Granting operational control of police forces directly to state political authorities could intensify these risks. State police could easily become instruments of political power rather than guardians of public safety.

Nigeria’s political environment remains deeply competitive and often intolerant of opposition. In such a climate, state-controlled security outfits could become tools for political intimidation, election manipulation and the suppression of dissent.

History already offers warning signs. Even federally controlled security agencies have occasionally faced accusations of political misuse. Transferring policing authority to governors who already wield enormous influence over state institutions may blur the line between law enforcement and political enforcement. The result could be a patchwork of security regimes where the neutrality of policing varies from state to state.

Nigeria’s federal structure is not merely administrative; it is also ethnically and politically delicate. In several states, demographic and ethnic minorities already fear marginalisation by dominant groups. A state police force operating under the authority of local political actors could intensify these fears, particularly in regions with longstanding communal tensions.

For citizens who already feel vulnerable, the question may no longer be whether the police exist, but whose police they are. A national police institution, though imperfect, at least offers the possibility of neutrality beyond local rivalries.

Another difficult question concerns financial sustainability. Modern policing is expensive. It requires advanced training, forensic capacity, intelligence systems, communications technology, vehicles, surveillance infrastructure and continuous professional development.

Yet many Nigerian states struggle to fund critical public services such as education, healthcare, infrastructure and civil service obligations. If states already face difficulty sustaining basic governance functions, it is reasonable to ask how they will maintain professional, well-equipped and accountable police institutions.

Poorly funded policing systems do not strengthen security. They often produce the opposite: underpaid officers, inadequate training and increased vulnerability to corruption. Without sustainable financial frameworks, state police could become weaker replicas of an already strained national force.

Another rarely discussed concern relates to the potential shift from a federal remuneration framework to state-controlled pay structures. Such a transition could undermine the integrity and professionalism of the force.

Policing is not merely a matter of institutional structure; it is also a matter of incentives, welfare and ethical culture. In Nigeria, where inadequate remuneration has historically contributed to corruption within the security sector, creating multiple pay systems across states could aggravate rather than resolve the problem.

One of the enduring challenges within the Nigeria Police Force has been poor welfare. For decades, officers have operated under difficult financial conditions: low salaries, delayed allowances, inadequate housing and limited operational support. These structural weaknesses have contributed to the culture of petty bribery and extortion that has eroded public trust in the Nigerian Police Force.

While corruption within the force cannot be justified, the link between poor remuneration and institutional vulnerability is well documented in policing studies worldwide. Officers struggling to meet basic economic needs are more susceptible to compromise, particularly in environments where oversight mechanisms are weak.

The logical solution should therefore be to improve police welfare nationwide not fragment the remuneration system into dozens of uneven structures. Under the current system, police officers operate within a centralised federal salary framework that at least provides some degree of uniformity across the country. The introduction of state police would likely create multiple salary regimes determined by the fiscal capacity and political priorities of individual states.

In such a system, officers serving in wealthier states might enjoy better salaries and welfare packages, while those in financially weaker states could face lower pay, delayed salaries or inadequate operational funding.

This disparity would inevitably produce institutional distortions. Rather than promoting professional stability, the policing system could become fragmented along economic lines, with officers seeking transfers to financially stronger states or becoming demoralised in underfunded ones.

Rather than multiplying institutions, Nigeria must focus on deep structural reforms within the existing policing system and the priorities are clear:

First, professionalisation and training. Nigerian police officers require modern investigative training, forensic capacity and continuous professional development to address contemporary crime.

Second, independent oversight and accountability. Strengthening institutions such as the Police Service Commission and establishing credible civilian complaint mechanisms would help restore public trust.

Third, improved welfare and equipment. Underpaid and poorly equipped officers cannot effectively enforce law and order. Competitive salaries, decent housing, insurance and modern policing tools are essential.

Fourth, community policing within a national framework. Officers working closely with local communities can harness local intelligence without fragmenting the command structure.

Finally, policing must be insulated from political interference through clear legal safeguards that prevent misuse by political actors at all levels of government.

The debate over state police ultimately raises a deeper question about governance in Nigeria: is the country prepared to undertake the difficult work of institutional reform and accountability, or will it once again pursue structural changes that avoid confronting deeper political failures?

Security cannot be legislated into existence through institutional multiplication alone. It emerges from ethical leadership, disciplined institutions and a culture of accountability. Until Nigeria strengthens those foundations, the creation of state police may not resolve the security crisis. It may simply distribute it more widely across the federation.

Nigeria must therefore approach the question of state police with caution. In matters of security, the most dangerous reform is not the one that fails immediately, it is the one that appears to solve a problem while quietly creating a far more dangerous one.

 Okoronkwo is a communications strategist, a leadership and good governance advocate