Nigerien military regime’s proposal to restore democratic rule within three years has deepened the country’s political crisis, Gboyega Akinsanmi writes
At last, a relative peace process has taken off in Niger. This came to the fore after an inaugural peace meeting that took place penultimate Saturday between the special envoy of the Economic Community of the West African State (ECOWAS) to Niger, General Abdulsalami Abubakar (rtd) and the leaders of the military regime that truncated the democratically elected government on July 26.
The peace meeting further eased a three-week diplomatic standoff between the sub-regional bloc and the junta, as well as opened a channel of communication, which might engender desirable outcomes. With this process, the global community also looks forward to the return of constitutional order to the troubled country with a staggering record of five coup plots since it gained independence from France on November 6, 1960.
After the inaugural peace talks, the junta proposed a three-year plan to restore democratic rule in the country. Already, the proposal has triggered scepticism among key global actors about the commitment of the military junta to the peace process established by ECOWAS and supported by the African Union (AU), European Union (EU) as well as the United Nations.
The three-year plan, in its intent and purpose, contravened the resolutions of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government that condemned the military overthrow of the constitutional government, demanded the immediate release of President Mohammed Bazoum from illegal detention and directed the military regime to restore the democratically elected government within seven days. Likewise, the plan dampened the expectations of other key global actors that had been working at different levels to Niger’s descent to a state of outright failure.
For this reason, the global community unanimously rejected the junta’s transition plan. The rejection was based on the ground that Niger “is a willing signatory of all international agreements, conventions and treaties that discourage any form of unconstitutional change of government on any ground and espouse democratic means to ascending political offices.”
After its summit last week, the AU responded more decisively to the proposal of the military junta, which most experts in international affairs agreed, was the first far-reaching decision the regional bloc had ever taken since the resurgence of putschists in Africa. In its resolutions, AU Peace and Security Council suspended the membership of Niger with immediate effect and directed all its members to sever relations with its junta.
Besides, the regional institution also suspended the membership of Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali, all of which are currently under military dictatorships. Like ECOWAS, AU mulled its own plan to activate the African Standby Force to restore constitutional order in Niger if the military regime refused to reinstate the democratically elected government. However, AU did not specify any timeframe for its military intervention plan.
AU’s resolutions have, again, provoked vicious resistance not only from Niger’s junta, but also from other unconstitutional regimes within the bloc. In response, the ruling juntas of Burkina Faso and Mali have deployed warplanes in support of their Nigerien counterparts. On its part, the Niger junta warned the global community against the use of force, which according to its leadership, would not be “a walk in the park.”
At domestic level, public opinion has not largely espoused the resolutions of the AU and ECOWAS, especially their plans to resort to the use of force if diplomacy eventually fails to restore constitutional order in the Sahel country. Democratic governments, as public opinion depicts in most West African states, have not brought about sustainable development for the region.
Public opinion did not also align with justifications both AU and ECOWAS had provided to intervene militarily. Amid this ambiguity, the path to peaceful resolution of Niger’s political crisis appears invariably darker than the hope that the peace process initially presented. Now that the future of civilian rule uncertain in Africa, will this pattern of public opinion prevail over the commitments of the AU and ECOWAS to enforce conventions their members willingly ratified?
However, many analysts have argued for the indispensability of military intervention in resolving the crisis if the putschists further disrespect Niger’s commitments to various protocols and treaties on democracy. Aside its commitments to ECOWAS Protocols and Treaties, Niger is also a willing signatory to the Constitutive Act of the AU, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU.
With these instruments, many experts argued, AU has the onus to enforce its protocols not just to prevent future coups, but also to exert itself as an effective institution with clearer direction and vision. They anchored this perspective to different articles, which empowered the AU to intervene militarily when need arises.
Article 3(10) of African Charter, for instance, condemns and rejects unconstitutional changes of government among its 55 signatories across the continent. Also, Article 14(1) directs all state actors “to strengthen and institutionalise constitutional civilian control over the armed and security forces to ensure the consolidation of democracy and constitutional order.”
Under Article 23 (1-5), all members agree that the use of the illegal means of accessing or maintaining political power “constitute an unconstitutional change of government.” The article defines the illegal means to include coup d’etat, intervention by mercenaries, armed dissidence, refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power and any constitutional amendment that infringes democratic principles.
No doubt, neither AU nor ECOWAS is under any obligation to negotiate peace whether in Niger or Mali, Burkina Faso or Guinea, Chad or Sudan before moving in to restore order and stability. Rather, as stipulated under Article 13(3) of its Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, they are under obligations to deploy the instruments of force to restore the democratic governments within their precincts.
But why have they not been able to enforce their own agreements and protocols? The answer is not far-fetched. First, most of their members are still under authoritarian regimes, whose reigns have spanned more than three decades evidenced in Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda and Uganda, among others. Yet, the institutions never overtly condemned such authoritarian regimes.
Second, the two institutions were not as decisive and pungent as expected when the putschists usurped political powers on August 18, 2020 in Mali; April 11, 2021 in Chad Republic; September 5, 2021 in Guinea; October 25, 2021 in Sudan and September 30, 2022 in Burkina Faso. Rather, they endured the military takeover within their areas of influence, a decision that obviously made the coup d’etat a rewarding undertaking on the continent.
For many analysts, civilian administrations in many African countries are not truly democratic and do not deserve to be restored by military intervention when sacked by a junta. By implication, as they have argued, bad governance has been a recipe for putschists to usurp political powers in many countries and the Niger coup will not likely be the last if AU and ECOWAS are more decisive.
Now that the coup d’etat is gradually gaining public support amid a gnawing governance deficit that characterises most African states, both AU and ECOWAS are now faced with an uncertain future with limited choice. If the putschists resist diplomatic overture, the institutions have the responsibility to protect the future of African democracies militarily. Even afterwards, according to analysts, they have greater obligations to reactivate their mechanisms for deepening democracy and ensuring good governance on the continent.
